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SUMMARY
The world of aviation is moving towards novel aircraft architectures and tech-
nologies as a result of a push towards higher efficiency, lower operating costs, and
lower emissions. One of the barriers to the development of future concepts is the
uncertainty related to their reliability and the safety risk they pose. It is paramount
for aircraft designers to have the capability to quantify safety-related off-nominal
requirements and reliability earlier in the design stage in a manner that allows explo-
ration of the architectural space before degrees of freedom are locked down by design
decisions.
In the traditional paradigm, system safety and reliability for an aircraft are gen-
erally quantified in the detailed design stage when most of the design decisions have
been made. In the conceptual and preliminary design stage, traditional techniques
rely on heuristics, experience, and historical data to assess system safety and re-
liability requirements. The limitations and off-nominal operational considerations
generally postulated during traditional safety analysis may not be complete or cor-
rect for new concepts. Additionally, a dearth of available reliability data results in
poor treatment of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty for such novel concepts. This
motivates the overall objective of the current work.
The overarching objective of this dissertation is to develop a framework that will
enhance the safety assessments of novel aircraft physical architectures and technolo-
gies in early design by identifying, characterizing, and allocating off-nominal require-
ments, enabling compliance decision making under uncertainty, all while informing
design trade studies with the information generated.
For the first research area in this dissertation, the developed framework utilizes
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system performance models to evaluate system response to off-nominal operating
states. Towards that end, Continuous-FHA (that considers the magnitude of func-
tional degradation) is extended to consider the number of terminal, function-satisfying
components lost in a failure mode. This extended C-FHA is developed for conceptual
level analysis and demonstrated on a test distributed electric propulsion (T-DEP)
aircraft inspired by the X-57. When additional design information is available, a
preliminary 6 degrees of freedom (6-DoF) model is utilized in a performance-based
multi-state analysis framework to evaluate the aircraft’s response in different failure
states. Combining the results of these conceptual and 6-DoF analyses with certifi-
cation requirements or engineering judgement allows the characterization of hazard
severity at the aircraft system level. Additionally, a network-based bottom-up al-
gorithm is demonstrated along with the Critical Flow Method to allocate reliability
requirements at the component level.
To deal with epistemic and aleatory uncertainty while assessing unit level fail-
ure rates, a Bayesian probability approach is utilized. The Bayesian framework al-
lows subject matter expert opinion to be encoded in the failure rate models through
prior distributions that capture epistemic uncertainty. This framework also enables
the evaluation and propagation of alternative models generated by different subject
matter experts to decision makers, leading to a more comprehensive treatment of
uncertainty as compared to utilizing traditional measures of central tendency (point
estimates). A Bayesian decision theoretic approach provides a mathematically backed
framework for compliance finding. It utilizes the expected loss principle to minimize
the posterior expected loss for any component while making a compliance decision.
Such a method makes full use of the uncertainty encoded in Bayesian failure rate
posteriors to provide a loss value for different compliance actions to decision makers,
who can then make an informed choice. This thesis contributes a modified Monte-
Carlo algorithm to estimate multi-state reliability of complex systems while utilizing
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the Bayesian failure rate posteriors previously generated.
Finally, the developed tools, techniques, and methods are combined into an in-
tegrated framework with the capability to perform trade studies informed by safety
and reliability considerations for novel aircraft architectures. A system reliability
sensitivity study of the T-DEP aircraft architecture to components’ reliability is eval-
uated using specially modified multi-state component importance measures. These
measures help identify which components have the highest impact on improving or de-
creasing the aircraft system reliability, as well as the general sensitivity of the system
reliability to the component reliability. To demonstrate how the developed integrated
framework might be used to perform design trade studies, two trade-studies are con-
ducted based on observations made from results of the first two research areas of
this dissertation. These include resizing the vertical tail and over-sizing the cruise
motor-inverters of the T-DEP aircraft to improve its performance in asymmetric loss
of thrust scenarios. It is found that while over-sizing the vertical tail helps improve
the aircraft’s performance in asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios slightly, over-sizing
the cruise motor inverter results in a much bigger benefit.
Providing a systematic, performance-based framework that enhances the safety
assessment of novel aircraft architectures, and informs the conceptual and preliminary
stage design trade-studies with safety-related off-nominal requirements is the defining
contribution of this dissertation. It supports the main research objective of the present
work with an example demonstration on a test distributed electric propulsion (T-
DEP) aircraft inspired by NASA’s X-57. The developed framework is expected to
support the ability to more quickly explore the architectural and design space for
novel aircraft architectures and technologies while bringing safety-related off-nominal





The last decade has witnessed a demand for air passenger services grow with a long-
term average of over 5% in terms of revenue passenger miles (RPK) [97]. To mitigate
the impact of this growth in aviation on the environment, as well as to maximize
the economic benefit that can be achieved from added efficiency and performance,
NASA Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) project has suggested aggressive
goals through the N+ program as shown in Table 1 [164]. The target for N + 1
generation was a reduction in the fuel burn by over 30% relative to a B737 with a
CFM56 engine. Additionally, the aviation industry is committed to achieve a 50%
reduction in its CO2 emissions by 2050 over a 2005 baseline [88] (See Fig. 1). A push
towards cleaner aircraft concepts is also visible in General Aviation (GA). As the
current aircraft concepts and architectures mature and reach technology saturation,
new technologies and revolutionary (as against evolutionary) aircraft architectures
will have to be developed to achieve these targets in a time-bound manner as seen in
figure 1.
Table 1: NASA ERA targets [164]
Technology Generations (TRL 4-6)
Technology Benefits N+1 (2015) N+2 (2020) N+3 (2025)
Noise - 32 dB - 42 dB - 71 dB
LTO NOx Emissions
(below CAEP 6) -60% -75% -80%
Aircraft Fuel/Energy Consumption
(rel. to 2005 best in class) -33% -50% -60%
1
Figure 1: Schematic CO2 emissions reduction roadmap [88] (Source: IATA)
1.2 A Paradigm Shift to Novel Aircraft Architectures and
Technologies
Aircraft are typically designed to comply with different type certification require-
ments put forth by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the US. Aircraft
type certifications occur under 14 CFR Part 23 (Normal Category Airplanes), Part
25 (Transport Category Airplanes), Part 27 (Normal Category Rotorcraft), and Part
29 (Transport Category Rotorcraft). Aircraft operations are certified under another
set of rules which typically include 14 CFR Part 91 (General), Part 135 (Commuter
and On-Demand), and Part 121 (Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental). General Avi-
ation (GA) is an unofficial blanket term applied to certain types of Part 91 and 135
operations. It accounts for more than 90% of the registered civil aircraft fleet in the
US [24]. An estimated 65% of GA flights annually are for business or other purposes
that cannot be served by commercial flights [24], with a large proportion of these
aircraft being design certified as normal category airplanes or rotorcraft.
Normal category airplanes (14 CFR Part 23) comprise the vast majority of GA
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operations. Most of these utilize a piston engine as the primary power source with
mechanically linked control surfaces, and very little secondary power drawn for instru-
mentation. The certification rules for this part were overhauled recently by the FAA
in Amendment 64 [72], where earlier prescriptive requirements were replaced with
performance-based requirements. These changes are intended to maintain the same
level of safety associated with 14 CFR Part 23 Amendment 63 while establishing a
higher level of safety for loss of control and icing [72]. The prescriptive means of com-
pliance that used to be contained within the rules and associated advisory circulars
(ACs) are now being ported over to a number of different consensus standards from
the aviation community [73]. This new approach leverages the idea that the means of
compliance (MoCs) developed from consensus standards organizations can be more
agile than federal rule-making, thus enabling faster adoption of new technologies for
these aircraft [35, 38]. Due to their size and scale, along with the enabling changes
to their regulatory framework, this segment is slated to receive a big boost with the
advent of novel architectures, technologies, and concepts of operations.
However, Part 23 is not unique in its push towards adoption of novel aircraft
architectures and technologies. For transport category airplanes (14 CFR Part 25),
traditional aircraft architectures largely feature mechanical, hydraulic, and pneumatic
secondary power drawn from a power source like an internal combustion engine or
a turbine engine whose primary function is to generate thrust. These conventional
subsystem architectures are inherently inefficient due to a significant energy wastage
associated with extracting bleed-air from the engines, and due to the bulkiness of
the hydraulic systems [50]. To improve fuel efficiency over technologically saturated
conventional concepts, a lot of research has been carried out to electrify aircraft
architectures [36, 50, 75, 91, 103, 109, 115, 148, 175]. There are two general directions
for aircraft electrification – electrification of the primary propulsive power, or of the
secondary power extraction.
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An All-Electric Aircraft (AEA) is one where the secondary power extractions
(that drive conventionally pneumatic or hydraulic subsystems) are fully electrified.
When partial electrification of these subsystems is achieved, the aircraft is termed
More-Electric. These can be considered evolutionary concepts where new technologies
are incorporated into a traditional system architecture. The More-Electric Aircraft
(MEA) concept is one where the subsystems, including the Environmental Control
System (ECS), flight controls, landing gear actuation and braking among others,
consume secondary power that is solely electric in nature and represents an evo-
lutionary leap towards novel technologies. Studies on quantification of subsystem
electrification on fuel burn in MEA architectures suggest initial benefits of around 3-
5% [32,88,151]. Subsystem electrification has already started in commercial aviation,
with Airbus A380 introducing electric actuators for several flight controls in parallel
to hydraulic actuators resulting in a weight savings of about 450 kg [51, 169]. The
Boeing 787 has already achieved a bleedless architecture, by using electric power for
the cabin environmental control system (ECS) and the wing ice protection system
(IPS). As subsystem electrification technologies mature, these benefits are expected
to keep growing.
While these technology improvements continue, they will not be enough. The
big improvements needed to meet aggressive future goals from Fig. 1 are expected
to come from revolutionary architectures. The term hybrid-electric is usually applied
to aircraft with partial electrification of primary propulsive power, while complete
electrification of the same is called an electric aircraft. These can further be integrated
with novel architectures like distributed propulsion to generate truly revolutionary
architectures that are needed to meet the NASA ERA targets given in table 1.
The maturation of electrical power systems technologies, are at the heart of this
push towards the development of various revolutionary concepts. These are not re-
stricted to a particular design or operational certification category. They can be
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found spread among 14 CFR parts 23, 25, 27, 29 for their design certification or parts
91, 121, and 135 for their operations. Novel concepts involving Urban/Advanced Air
Mobility (UAM/AAM) use architectures such as electric vertical take-off and landing
(e-VTOLs), and technologies such as distributed electric propulsion (DEP) which are
being developed in every design and operational certification categories. Thus, novel
concepts are diverse not only in terms of their certification requirements, but also in
terms of their aircraft architectures, with some examples shown in Figure 2.
(a) Volocopter (Credit [14]) (b) Joby Aviation (Credit [13])
(c) Jaunt Air Mobility (Credit [12]) (d) NASA X-57 (Credit NASA)
Figure 2: Example Novel Aircraft Concepts
1.3 Trends in Aviation Safety
Aviation remains one of the safest modes of transportation accounting for < 1% of
the annual transportation fatalities in 2017 [135]. For scheduled commercial flights,
there has been a general trend of a lower number of fatalities and fatal accidents over
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the past decade as seen in Figure 3. Runway safety events are the overall leading
cause of all types of accidents, while loss of control in flight and operational damage
are both significant contributors [90].
(a) Fatalities in scheduled commercial flight
(b) Fatal accidents in scheduled commercial flight
Figure 3: Commercial flight accident statistics [90]
However, within civil aviation, GA accounted for over 93% of accidents, 96% of
fatal accidents, and 95% of fatalities in 2017 [136]. Figure 4 shows the number of
fatal and overall accidents in GA between 2008 - 2017. While accident rates and
fatalities for GA have marginally gone down over the years, they are still an order of
magnitude higher than commercial flights.
While accident rates are slowly going down, global commercial operations are
expected to grow by 2.5% per year in terms of revenue passenger miles flown [74].
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The GA fleet is expected to remain stable year over year, with GA hours flown
expected to grow by 0.7% annually. This is because the growth in turbine, rotorcraft,
and experimental hours is expected to more than offset a decline in fixed wing piston
hours in GA [74]. The potential revitalization of GA due to the advent of novel
architectures and Con Ops means that the demand for improving the safety of aircraft
is ever increasing.
Figure 4: GA Accidents between 2008 - 2017 (Source: NTSB [136])
1.4 A System Safety Perspective
On January 7, 2013, a Japan Airlines Boeing 787-8 auxiliary power unit battery
caught fire while it was parked at a gate. A similar incident involved the main
battery of a B787 operated by Nippon Airways on January 16, 2013. While the
rate of occurrence of such an event was estimated at 1 in 10 million flight hours,
two had occurred in less than 52000 flight hours at the time of these incidents. An
investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) listed “incorrect
assumptions in safety assessments” as one of the reasons for these incidents [134].
In March 2019, B737 MAX aircraft were grounded worldwide following two fatal
crashes less than five months apart. The cause is suspected to be an automatic flight
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control feature - the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
forcing both the aircraft into a dive following erroneous data from a single Angle of
Attack (AoA) sensor [40]. The introduction of the larger CFM LEAP-1B engines,
with bigger nacelles required them to be positioned further ahead on the wing of the
B737 MAX. The MCAS was originally introduced to mitigate the aerodynamic effect
of this change [39].
Safety on GA side continues to lag behind that of commercial aviation as previ-
ously discussed. Figure 5 provides a breakdown of GA accident statistics by flight
phase and major causes. As can be seen, powerplant and non-powerplant system
malfunctions are some of the biggest contributing events to GA accidents, both fatal
and non-fatal. While the landing phase is the most critical in terms of the number of
accidents, the initial climb, en-route, and maneuvering phases of flight are when the
maximum number of fatal accidents occur. Novel aircraft architectures and concepts
of operation carry with them an uncertainty related to the off-nominal operational
risk they pose. It can be argued that aircraft designers would do well to include
requirements related to such risks early in the design phases.
The above-mentioned accident cases and statistics highlight the importance of
safety assessments in aircraft design. However, it is difficult to perform accurate
safety assessments of novel aircraft architectures and technologies because of the
inherent uncertainties associated with them. The limitations and off-nominal opera-
tional considerations generally postulated during traditional safety analysis may not
be complete or correct for new concepts. Thus to enable a rapid transition towards
novel architectures and technologies, it is paramount for aircraft designers to have the
capability to quantify system safety risk earlier in the design phases to help mitigate
avoidable surprises once the aircraft is already built.
Historically, analyses to determine system safety and reliability are performed
during the detailed design phase of aircraft design. By this time, numerous design
8
(a) Causes of GA accidents
(b) GA accidents by phase of flight
Figure 5: GA accident statistics (Source: NTSB [136])
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decisions have been made and degrees of freedom locked down. As will be established
in later chapters, the current methods to estimate safety and reliability at the con-
ceptual and preliminary design stages are limited when it comes to application to
revolutionary architectures, and hence cannot be applied effectively while exploring
the design and architectural space. The goal of this thesis is to incorporate off-nominal
requirements pertaining to system safety and reliability in conceptual and early pre-
liminary design while allowing a more comprehensive treatment of uncertainty and
informing design trade studies.
1.5 Summary
The world of aviation is moving towards novel aircraft architectures and technologies
as a result of a push towards higher efficiencies, lower operating costs, and lower
emissions. This can be seen in the development of novel aircraft concepts, operations,
and technologies like UAM, e-VTOL, and a general push to implement electrified
architectures. While these novel concepts and architectures are required to achieve
aggressive targets in fuel efficiency and emissions, their development and implemen-
tation faces obstacles in terms of uncertainty regarding the reliability and safety risk
they pose. The limitations and off-nominal operational considerations generally pos-
tulated during traditional safety analysis may not be complete or correct for new
concepts. Even when Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have preferred to
take a cautious approach by introducing new technologies in a step-wise manner in
commercial aircraft, recent incidents have reiterated the need to do so in a safe man-
ner. This need is therefore felt even more strongly in the case of revolutionary designs
that are likely to be introduced. In order to speed up the process of introduction of
novel aircraft architectures and technologies, it is paramount for aircraft designers to
have the capability to quantify off-nominal requirements earlier in the design phases
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in a manner that provides a better treatment of uncertainty in light of limited knowl-
edge and experience with these concepts, and informs trade studies before degrees of
freedom are locked down by design decisions. These observations provide a high-level
rationale to motivate the overall research objective of this thesis:
Research Objective:
Develop a framework that will enhance safety assessments of novel aircraft physical
architectures and technologies in early design by
1. identifying off-nominal requirements,
2. allocating them to the system and component level,
3. enabling compliance decision-making while addressing both epistemic and
aleatory uncertainties, and
4. informing design trade-studies.
A detailed background and literature survey to inform the gaps leading to the stated
research objective is given in the following chapter. The rest of this thesis is organized
as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents the background and literature review of the existing methods
for safety and reliability assessment from various domains along with some
observations and gaps found
• Chapter 3 presents the research questions and states the hypotheses while also
providing an overview of the developed framework and the test problem utilized
throughout this thesis
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• Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provides details of the developed framework, along with
results of experiments conducted to validate the hypotheses




BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
As discussed earlier, off-nominal requirements generally postulated during the concep-
tual design stage may not be complete or correct for novel or revolutionary architec-
tures. These can act as potential show-stoppers if not considered earlier in the design
phase. This chapter provides some background into the ideas and concepts to help
focus the discussion from the motivations seen previously towards observations that
will inform the research direction that follows in this thesis. This chapter begins by
providing an overview of the aircraft design process, focusing on the tasks of require-
ments identification and aircraft architecting. The traditional means of incorporating
off-nominal requirements into design are discussed, while bringing the focus on safety
and reliability related off-nominal requirements. Next, some basic concepts of aircraft
safety and risk analysis are explained for readers unfamiliar with this field. This is
followed by a discussion on the current paradigm of safety assessments, and how its
processes and methods are used during the aircraft design phases to inform and verify
off-nominal requirements that result from architecting. Finally, the state of the art
in safety and risk analysis is explored. All throughout this chapter, observations are
made regarding the limitations posed by the current paradigm with regards to novel
aircraft concepts, as well as any potential enablers that may hint at the appropriate
direction to be taken to achieve the research objective of the present work.
2.1 The Aircraft Conceptual Design Process
Aircraft are complex systems characterized by large, multidisciplinary architectures,
the design process of which is traditionally broken down into three phases - conceptual,
preliminary, and detailed design. The conceptual design phase is generally considered
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the most critical of the three due to the high levels of cost committed and design
freedom locked in early on under limited knowledge. This is visible in Figure 6
shown by solid lines for the cost committed, knowledge available, and design freedom
available. This is because early decisions impact future considerations of materials,
labor, manufacturing, as well as the complete life cycle of the aircraft. Most recent
research efforts therefore have been to buckle these trends by incorporating design for
affordability and probabilistic techniques to increase the knowledge available earlier
in the design phases, while maintaining design freedom and reducing cost committed.
This is generally achieved by resorting to inexpensive first principles analyses or
techniques like surrogate modeling to conduct design trade-offs [122].
Figure 6: Cost, knowledge, and freedom with design stages [122]
The conceptual design stage generally includes three major steps of (i) defining
the problem, (ii) generating alternatives, and (iii) down-selecting alternatives [158,
168]. The problem definition phase is when most of the customer requirements are
generated. Conceptual design then investigates whether these requirements can be
viably met by one or more high-level solutions that consider an overall understanding
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of the basic functions the systems need to fulfil. This typically involves performing
numerous concept studies drawing on the knowledge and experience of the design
team to generate multiple alternatives. Filters or metrics are then used to down-select
alternatives that are then considered for further development. Due to the limited
knowledge available at this stage, it is difficult to identify all the detail necessary to
architect a system. Therefore, aircraft conceptual design has traditionally primarily
focused on geometry, weights, aerodynamics, propulsion, and structures [42]. While
the emphasis on subsystems, architecture, and controls might be low, these disciplines
can be included at this stage.
Figure 7: Aircraft conceptual design process [154]
Figure 7 shows a typical aircraft conceptual design process adapted from Raymer [154].
It begins with a set of design requirements that must be met. These can include pa-
rameters like payload, range, takeoff and landing performance, speed, and also any
potential standard specifications. An initial geometry is then defined, followed by
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sizing the aircraft to meet the mission requirements by estimating its weight and
aerodynamic or propulsive performance. This process can be iterated until desired
convergence, following which considerations of subsystems, stability, and controls can
be brought in. Finally, performance is evaluated and optimized depending on the de-
sign objectives. It is at this stage that multiple possible alternatives are considered
and evaluated. These are then down-selected using metrics of interest to proceed
with preliminary design, where configuration and some of the additional details like
lofting, structural design are fixed, and higher fidelity analyses are conducted. Mod-
ifications to this process for evolutionary designs involve incorporating technologies
that affect aerodynamic, propulsive, or structural assumptions, and utilizing physics-
based analyses to inform the sizing and performance instead of historical data. When
it comes to design of revolutionary or novel concepts, defining design requirements,
and conceptual architecting are two of the most important areas.
2.1.1 Aircraft Architecting
Architecting is the process by which solutions are defined to satisfy system require-
ments. The International Organization for Standards defines architecture design as a
process to synthesize solutions that satisfy system requirements and explore multiple
implementation strategies at an appropriate level of detail [92].
An architecture, on the other hand, can be considered as a fundamental defining
characteristic of any complex system and can have an immense impact on its perfor-
mance. There is no common definition for a system architecture, with each discipline
providing its own depending on the perspective in which it is used. Jakkola and Thal-
heim state that a system architecture represents the conceptual model that defines
the structure, behavior, and more views of a system [93]. IEEE 1471 defines archi-
tecture as a fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components, their
relationships, and to the environment [11]. The International Council of Systems
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Engineering (INCOSE) prefers this definition for its own work. System architecture
is also defined by Whitney et al. as an abstract description of the entities of a system
and the relationships between them [173]. Maier uses the term “architecture” in the
sense of a fundamental or unifying system structure defined in any system dimen-
sion or view [118]. While talking about systems integration, Sage and Lynch define
architecture in relation to the structure properties of the system, which may include
components, interrelationships, and principles and guidelines under which the system
is used [158]. They also distinguish between the systems’ functional architecture,
physical architecture, and implementation architecture. ‘Architecture’ in the present
work refers mainly to physical architectures and not functional or logical ones.
During conceptual design, aircraft architectures are often predefined or certainly
assumed. This makes it easier for the designer to select a physical implementation
to satisfy the desired functions. Conceptual designers must decide on the choice of
lifting surfaces, control surface locations, propulsion systems, subsystems, payload
storage geometry, etc. [157]. In the traditional paradigm, several of these choices
end up being static, for e.g. a cantilever monoplane wing, separate horizontal and
vertical empennage surfaces, single cylindrical fuselage, and a tricycle landing gear
arrangement. Therefore, the majority of architecting decisions in the conceptual
design phase of traditional architectures are about the number and location of the
engines, the position of the wing, and empennage configuration [86]. When coming up
with a derivative (e.g. extended range versions) or evolutionary (e.g. MEA) design,
a fixed architectural scheme is assumed with modified energy storage or subsystems.
In a review of architectural decisions of 157 aircraft from the DC-3 to the 787, Kellari
et al. [101] state,
Aircraft designers have increasingly made the same architectural deci-
sions, while realizing performance gains in component technologies rather
than from major architectural innovations... Current improvements in
17
performance with this dominant architecture may be reaching the stage
of diminishing returns.
Coming up with derivative or evolutionary designs, therefore, may restrict the per-
formance improvement possible from an aircraft.
2.1.1.1 Novel Aircraft Architectures
In the light of the above, the definition of a ‘novel architecture’ is of particular interest
in this thesis. Unfortunately, very little literature was found on this definition.
Definition 2.1.1 (Novel Aircraft Architecture). A novel aircraft architecture is
loosely defined here as one which differs significantly from the traditional paradigm
mentioned above in its physical implementation to fulfil at least one aircraft level
function.
For instance, a novel architecture may differ in its choice of physical implemen-
tation to satisfy any aircraft function ‘Generate Thrust’ (distributed electric propul-
sion), or ‘Generate Lift’ (lift augmented compound helicopters/ hybrid wing body)
among others. The possibilities for these concepts is as large as the combinatorial
space of alternatives for implementing the aircraft functions itself. Appendix A pro-
vides the matrix of alternatives for traditional architecting solutions. The space for
novel architectures is likely to be even larger.
On the technology front, revolutionary technologies (e.g. turbo-electric, propul-
sion airframe integration, active flow control) are expected to be implemented in novel
architectural concepts. They promise a significant improvement, but also require cre-
ative and innovative architecture definition. These novel architectures can introduce
complex interactions between the components which in turn result in previously un-
known additional requirements at the system and component level.
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2.1.2 Requirements Definition
The first step in the design process in Figure 7 is generating design requirements.
This is conducted through requirements analysis, which is a means of generating
desired attributes that a system must meet, and is carried out prior to any definition
of the system functions, functional architecture, or physical architecture. At this
stage, emphasis is placed on the end goals of a system, and not on how those are
achieved. David Hay cautions against confusing requirements analysis with system
design, stating that the prior concerns only with the problem space (what), and not
the solution space (how) [84].
The requirements analysis preceding aircraft design considers primarily safety,
cost, performance, regulations and standards, and environmental conditions among
others. These are then grouped into mission, project, environmental, customer, in-
terface, and non-functional requirements [114]. Also called the concept of operations
(ConOps), this provides a description of aircraft level functions and sizing scenarios
in terms of the mission and constraints. The Department of Defense distinguishes
between three different views of requirements: operational, functional, and physi-
cal [114]. Operations determine the magnitude, duration, and environment of the
platform level requirements, which must then be fulfilled by the aircraft in the func-
tional view. The physical view focuses on the physical solutions (physical architecture)
to meet the functions. Therefore, the platform-level requirements are analyzed and
generated independently of the aircraft architecture. This means these requirements
can be allocated differently to the aircraft systems and components depending on
which functional and physical architectural solutions are considered [26].
One class of requirements not considered so far are “Emergent” requirements. In
his Ph.D. thesis, Armstrong states [26],
Some requirements do not exist and cannot be predicted until product
definition takes place
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Emergent requirements are not defined through a decomposition of requirements
obtained during the analysis phase. In fact, emergent requirements cannot be iden-
tified during traditional requirements analysis, since they result from the systems’
‘emergent’ behavior - a result of complex interactions between the elements of its
architecture. While some aircraft function level safety requirements may be defined
prior to the definition of a physical architecture, most system safety and reliabil-
ity requirements fall into the category of ‘emergent’. All such safety and reliability
requirements are of particular interest in this thesis.
The traditional source of generating aircraft level requirements is the aircraft
mission. Each phase presents constraints that must be satisfied by the aircraft which
in turn drive the conceptual sizing loop given in Figure 7. However, off-nominal
operations often drive system sizing critical requirements. These are architecture
specific and inherently emergent as discussed earlier. The traditional approach to
generate aircraft requirements is explored next, followed by literature on identifying
safety-related requirements.
2.1.2.1 Traditional Aircraft Design Requirements Identification
Requirements identification in typical aircraft conceptual design process begins with
a design mission. Each mission phase presents unique requirements on the primary
flight functions (thrust, lift) that can drive aircraft attributes. Considering all the
different phases together poses requirements on the energy storage which drives sizing.
In addition to mission phases, information regarding means of takeoff or landing may
be necessary. Traditional sizing determines the aircraft’s gross weight by using aircraft
scaling parameters. An energy-based constraint analysis by Mattingly is typically
used which relates the thrust-to-weight ( TSL
WT O
) and wing loading (WT O
S
) at sea-level
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Figure 8: A notional constraint analysis plot for the F-86
Solving for Eq. 1 for different mission phases generates constraints on the thrust-
to-weight ratio and wing loading. A notional plot showing these constraints for an
example mission for the F-86 aircraft is shown in Fig. 8. The more critical of these
constraints restrict the design solutions and drive aircraft level requirements for thrust
and lift. Next, gross weight is iterated upon by determining the aircraft level energy
storage requirements using historical information, as well as appropriate range and
endurance equations for appropriate phases of flight.
Limited consideration is given to off-nominal scenarios in the traditional concep-
tual design process. Often, critical off-nominal scenarios are postulated based on his-
torical experience designing similar aircraft concepts. For instance, a reserve mission
is included in design missions to account for off-nominal conditions. Conditions like
one-engine-out or ETOPS1 (Extended Range Twin-Engine Operations) postulated
by regulatory requirements often end up becoming the driving cases for propulsion
requirements [68, 69]. These scenarios, in particular, can be easily included in the
previously mentioned constraint analysis by modifying Eq. 1 appropriately.
The second kind of off-nominal scenarios are presented from identifying critical
1informally called Engines Turn Or Passengers Swim
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failure cases. This lies under the domain of safety analysis, which is typically car-
ried out in the detailed design stage after the physical architecture has been defined
and frozen. Such scenarios often impact the requirements imposed on the aircraft
architecture and its components. The goal of such analysis is to verify that the archi-
tecture can meet reliability requirements and is safe. In the early stages, this effort
focuses on identifying critical failure modes and incorporating redundancy to meet
fail-safe design requirements [66]. These are typically determined based on previous
experience with similar architectures. However, with novel aircraft concepts, where
architectures may be unknown, flexible, or simply revolutionary, such processes of
identifying safety requirements may not succeed. The off-nominal scenarios postu-
lated may be wrong or incomplete. Thus, more exploratory approaches are necessary
that do not assume failure modes or their criticality. We can draw the following
observations from the discussions so far:
Observation: Most aircraft safety and reliability requirements are emergent and
depend on the physical architecture definition
Observation: Off-nominal scenarios have the potential to pose significant sizing and
architecture specific requirements at the system level
2.2 Basic Concepts
2.2.1 Definitions
The definitions of a few recurrent terms used commonly in literature in the context
of reliability and safety assessment are provided here [4, 6, 130].
External Event – “An occurrence which has its origin distinct from the aircraft or
the system being examined, such as atmospheric conditions (e.g., wind gusts/shear,
temperature variations, icing, lightning strikes), operating environment (e.g. runway
conditions, conditions of communication, navigation, and surveillance services)„ cabin
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and baggage fires, and bird-strike. The term is not intended to cover sabotage.”
Failure – “A loss of function or a malfunction of a system or a part thereof.”
Hazard – “A condition resulting from failures, external events, errors, or combina-
tions thereof where safety is affected..”
Redundancy – “Multiple independent means incorporated to accomplish a given
function..”
Reliability – “The probability that a system or item will perform a required function
under specified conditions, without failure, for a specified period of time..”
Risk – “The combination of the frequency (probability) of an occurrence and its
associated level of severity.”
Safety – “The state in which risk is acceptable.”
2.2.2 Safety Requirements
As discussed earlier, novel aircraft concepts and architectures are expected to be
developed across the spectrum of different airworthiness categories. Regardless, each
of these parts have a requirement to ensure the safety risk of equipment and systems
remains acceptable.
For normal category aircraft, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) imple-
mented a new set of performance-based rules in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations (CFR) Part 23 amendment 64 in 2017 [72] to ensure safety in an evolving
paradigm. Compliance with these rules can now be shown using means of compliance
information provided by approved consensus standards such as those developed by
ASTM Committee F44 on GA aircraft [27,73]. In contrast, the 14 CFR Part 25 regu-
lations remain prescriptive in nature. In the normal category (Part 23), of particular
interest in this thesis is 14 CFR 23.2510 that is the prime drivers for the assignment of
reliability requirements to aircraft equipment, systems, and installations by requiring
them to have [72]
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Table 2: Quantitative Part 23 Allowable Failure Rate for Different Failure Conditions
[8]




<10−3 <10−4 <10−5 <10−6
II <10−3 <10−5 <10−6 <10−7
III <10−3 <10−5 <10−7 <10−8
IV <10−3 <10−5 <10−7 <10−9
“a logical and acceptable inverse relationship between the average prob-
ability and severity of failure conditions.”
The safety risk is generally quantified as a combination of two entities - the prob-
ability of a failure, and the severity associated with it [4]. The probability of a failure
is the frequency with which it can be expected to occur, and is generally quantified
using historical data [130]. The severity denotes the impact of a failure and is gener-
ally classified into multiple categories depending on whether said failure puts life or
property in harm’s way. Generally speaking, severity is defined as [128]:
1. Catastrophic when there is a chance of multiple fatalities and/or a total loss
of the aircraft,
2. Hazardous when a failure may result in serious injuries or some loss of life,
3. Major when there is a significant reduction in safety or functional capability
of the aircraft, with expected continuation of safe flight, and
4. Minor when there may be little loss of safety margins but no expected injuries
or damage.
Table 2 shows the relationship between failure probability and severity of failure
conditions for normal category aircraft [8]. These pose reliability requirements at the
aircraft level in terms of allowable probabilities of transitioning from a nominal flight
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to the failed, off-nominal conditions. These are what can be called, safety require-
ments at the most basic level. These requirements, in turn, can pose requirements
on the architecture in terms of system capacity and redundancy needed from the
different elements.
The basic safety requirements mentioned above change slightly for transport cat-
egory aircraft. Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309-1A requires that major failure condi-
tions be improbable (< 10−5), while catastrophic failures are extremely improbable
(< 10−9). Additionally, unlike 14 CFR 23.2510, AC 25.1309-1A requires a fail-safe
design concept, where the following basic objectives apply [66]:
1. “In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, com-
ponent, or connection during any one flight (brake release through
ground deceleration to stop) should be assumed, regardless of its
probability. Such single failures should not prevent continued safe
flight and landing, or significantly reduce the capability of the air-
plane or the ability of the crew to cope with the resulting failure
conditions.
2. Subsequent failures during the same flight, whether detected or la-
tent, and combinations thereof, should also be assumed, unless their
joint probability with the first failure is shown to be extremely im-
probable.”
The intent of safety assessments in the concept design stage then can be sum-
marized as ensuring that any system under consideration poses no worse than an
acceptable level of risk by allocating reliability requirements at the system and com-




Reliability has many definitions with most of them converging on a similar intent.
SAE ARP 4761 defines reliability as [4]
“The probability that a system or item will perform a required function
under specified conditions, without failure, for a specified period of time..”
It can be considered an attribute of the system that depends on the functional
and physical architecture including the components and their interactions. Math-
ematically, it can be defined as a function R(t) which represents the probability of
success for an item in a given time interval (0, t). By definition, the failure probability
is the complement of the reliability, and is also termed the cumulative distribution
function [130]:
F (t) = 1−R(t) (2)
The probability density function (pdf), also called failure density f(t), is the first
derivative of F (t).
f(t) = dF (t)
dt
(3)
f(t) shows the frequency of failures at any specified time (t) in number per unit
time [130]. A conditional failure rate λ(t) denotes the probability of an item failing
between (t, t+∆t) given that it has survived until time t. The failure rate is considered
as the most basic measure of reliability, and describes the distribution of failure time




Over the lifetime of a large population of items, a reliability bathtub curve char-
acterizes the failure rate as shown in Fig. 9. The three phases shown include [130]
1. A Decreasing Failure Rate Phase also called as the burn in phase, when
weak components fail early and design and processes are refined
26
2. A Constant Failure Rate Phase also called the useful life phase, when
components fail randomly but at an approximately constant failure rate
3. An Increasing Failure Rate Phase also called the wear out phase, when
ageing components fail because of degradation mechanisms
Figure 9: The reliability bathtub curve
Under the constant failure rate phase, the failure rate λ is assumed to be a con-





R(t) = e−λt (5)
F (t) = 1− e−λt (6)
f(t) = λe−λt (7)
It is evident that such an assumption leads to an exponential distribution of the
failure density function as seen from Eq. 7. Apart from the exponential distribution,
the Weibull distribution is also commonly used to describe component reliability. A






The above provided definitions and equations form the basis for determining sys-
tem reliability, and hence safety. When risk assessments at the system level allocate
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functionality requirements at the component level, the criticality of failures acts as
constraints on component reliability.
2.3 Safety Assessments: The Current Paradigm
Before we can discuss traditional and state-of-the-art in safety assessments or risk
analysis, we must answer the following questions: i) “What is risk?”, and ii) “What
makes it acceptable?”. Risk and its estimation, typically involves providing answers
to the following three questions: i) what can go wrong?, ii) how likely is it?, and iii)
what is the consequence? In one of the seminal works on quantitatively defining risk,
Kaplan and Garrick suggest a ‘set of triplets’ idea – where risk is denoted by a triplet
of i) scenario, ii) likelihood, and iii) consequence, to answer the three questions given
above [100]. In determining what constitutes an “acceptable risk”, they pose two
difficulties with the problem itself – one minor and one major. The ‘Minor’ difficulty
is that risk is not linearly comparable – two different risks cannot always simply be
compared2. The ‘Major’ difficulty, which also serves as the answer to this underlying
question, is that risk cannot be considered in isolation, but only in combination with
the costs and benefits of the alternatives attendant to it. Thus, once we decide to
fly, we must accept some inherent risk, with a baseline given by the risk posed by
concepts and technologies available to us today. It is with this understanding that we
proceed with the task of estimating and comparing (to make a decision on compliance)
the risks posed by novel aircraft concepts and architectures. For the discussion that
follows, we revert to a ‘hazard severity & probability’ paradigm to assess risk and
make it comparable. A hazard is typically considered as a ‘source of danger’, which
combined with the likelihood of precipitating it into damage or loss, gives us the
risk [100].
Many different system safety and reliability standards have been developed by
2e.g. consider the famous Trolley problem [76,94,167] and the risks posed to the persons on the
tracks
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different agencies [4, 6, 59, 70]. Of these, SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice
(ARP) 4761 and ARP 4754 are widely used to conduct system safety analysis and
design assurance in order to comply with the relevant regulatory requirements. While
ARP 4761 focuses on guidelines and methods of performing the safety assessments of
aircraft, ARP 4754 looks at the development of aircraft systems along with validation
of requirements and verification of design implementation for certification and product
assurance [4, 6]. The interplay between the two is shown in Figure 10 [6].
Figure 10: Interplay between ARP 4761 and ARP 4754 [6]
There are two key aspects to the safety assurance of novel aircraft concepts – i)
software and electronic hardware development assurance, and ii) hardware reliability
assessment. The prior aspect is important given that most of these novel concepts
involve some elements of autonomy and non-deterministic methods (like artificial
intelligence). To ensure compliance with airworthiness regulations, consensus stan-
dards DO-178C for software and DO-254 for airborne electronic hardware are used in
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Figure 11: Generic RTA Architecture (Adapted from Ref. [10])
the traditional paradigm [10]. Both these standards provide development assurance
processes to gain confidence that development errors have been eliminated. Reliabil-
ity is another concept that may be used to gain equivalent confidence in a system.
However, these do not provide a cost-effective path to certifying the complex non-
deterministic methods required for advanced autonomy [10]. A direct requirement of
assuring a function satisfied by software using non-deterministic methods may involve
an enormous number of test cases. The Run-Time Assurance (RTA) concept utilizes
one or more safety monitors along with assured recovery control functions to ensure
safety for a novel non-deterministic control software. The complex system of interest
may not be assured but the reversionary/recovery system is assured using traditional
methods. The novel software/electronic system function is thus prevented from ‘do-
ing the wrong thing’ by a safety monitor that switches control from the new system
to the recovery system if needed [10]. Such a generic RTA architecture is shown in
figure 11. While important in its own right, the development and real-time assurance
of novel flight critical software and related electronic hardware is beyond the scope
of the present work.
Instead, the present work focuses on the second aspect of design-time assurance
which involves hardware reliability of novel aircraft physical architectures. System
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Figure 12: The System V & V diagram in the context of safety and aircraft design
(Adapted from ARP4754 [6])
safety assessment processes of these are generally carried out in parallel to the devel-
opment effort. Figure 12 shows a systems engineering ‘V ’ in the context of safety and
aircraft design. It shows that safety and reliability requirements are allocated to the
item or component level following a hierarchical decomposition of aircraft functions
and architecture. Safety requirements are initially functionally decomposed at the
aircraft level. The system level requirements are generated by a flow-down of the air-
craft level functions to the system level. The analyses conducted at this level include
both aircraft and system level Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), Common Cause
Analysis (CCA), and a Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA). In terms of
the aircraft design timeline, these correlate well with the conceptual and preliminary
design phases. The present work focuses on enhancing the safety assessments of novel
aircraft physical architectures at these stages. This corresponds to the upper part of
figure 10 and the first two vertical sections of figure 12. As the design matures, Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA) is conducted at the aircraft and system level. As the aircraft is
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built, these analyses and the requirements generated are verified, thus travelling back
up the ‘V ’.
ARP 4761 partitions the safety assessment practice into two top-level groups - i)
the safety assessment process, and ii) the safety assessment analysis methods [4].
2.3.1 The Safety Assessment Process
The intent of the safety assessment process is to generate safety-related off-nominal
requirements and verify that they are met during the aircraft development activities.
It provides a methodology to systematically evaluate the aircraft throughout its design
process to identify hazards, allocate requirements, and complete verification. The
safety assessment process begins at conceptual design as is seen in Figure 12 where
functional requirements are generated and hazards assessed. As the design evolves,
the changes are reassessed, leading to further changes, leading to a loop that must be
iterated until convergence. Finally, verification activities continue well past detailed
design where flight tests may be conducted to provide the necessary evidence.
2.3.1.1 Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA)
ARP 4761 defines Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) as [4]
“a systematic, comprehensive examination of functions to identify and
classify failure conditions of those functions according to their severity”
An FHA is conducted at the aircraft level in conceptual design. It is meant to identify
and classify failure conditions associated with aircraft level functions and combina-
tions of functions [4]. While the aircraft level FHA is high level and qualitative, once
an architecture is defined and aircraft functions assigned to subsystems, a system
level FHA is conducted. The failure modes considered in a FHA are dependent on
the mission phase. The output of the FHA is used as a starting point for conducting
a PSSA (explained later) [4].
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FHA usually involves multiple steps, including identification of all the functions
of an aircraft, description of failure conditions associated with them, determination
of the effects of those conditions, classifying them according to their severity (see
table 2), and assigning requirements at the lower level [4]. FHA usually takes a
tabular form as shown in Fig. 13.
Traditional FHA utilizes the fact that the functional decomposition of an aircraft
is likely to remain the same (irrespective of what configurations or technologies are
implemented) to keep the implementation and behavioral spaces independent while
characterizing hazards [26]. Thus, an advantage of such a functional analysis is that it
provides an understanding of system functionality, interconnection between functions,
and a base for further reliability and system safety analysis. However, traditional FHA
usually results in only two discrete types of functional requirements – (i) Availability
(e.g. the loss of function), and (ii) Integrity (e.g. malfunction) [83]. Additionally,
wrong assumptions, for instance in performance models or criteria, can lead to wrong
conclusions [95]. Here lies its limitation when it comes to novel aircraft concepts and
architectures. Novel concepts may not have discrete functional failures, and their
consequences may not be well understood due to a lack of historical precedent and
data. Qualifying a function failure merely as a loss of function or malfunction may
not provide a complete picture for such concepts. As Armstrong demonstrates in his
Ph.D. thesis [26]
“Assumptions regarding the relationship between function loss and hazard
severity employed during traditional FHA bias architecture design and
lead to inaccurate estimation of unit level requirements.”
Finally, the traditional tabular approach is slow and time consuming since it requires
an analyst to evaluate every unique aircraft architecture manually – greatly limiting
the scope for conducting trade studies in conceptual design.
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Observation: Traditional FHA allocates hazard values to discrete losses of function
or malfunction
2.3.1.2 Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA)
The PSSA process as defined in ARP 4761 is a systematic top down approach to
determine how failures in a proposed system architecture can lead to the functional
hazards identified by FHA, and how the corresponding requirements can be met [4].
The PSSA is concerned with analyzing proposed system architectures to validate
the safety of the proposed system design and to identify derived safety requirements
(DSR) to guide further development [54]. For each aircraft or system functional failure
identified in the FHA, the PSSA addresses the failure conditions through a qualitative
or quantitative analysis as required [4]. The quantitative tools utilized to verify safety
requirements being met by the aircraft and system architecture include fault trees and
reliability block diagrams among others, both of which will be explained later. The
system FHA and the aircraft Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are the two main inputs to
the PSSA process. The FTA may also be supplemented by a Common Cause Analysis
(CCA), which establishes system level requirements like redundancy, separation, and
independence in system architecting. The output of the PSSA process is intended
to identify effects of component failures, reliability budgets, Development Assurance
Levels (DALs), and any additional architectural features needed to meet aircraft and
system safety objectives [4].
Figure 13 shows an overview of the relationship between FHA and FTA in con-
ceptual and preliminary aircraft design. FTA, which forms an important part of
Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) is verified using a Failure Modes, Ef-
fects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) by postulating failure mechanisms at the
component level, and the addition of failure probability data available [128]. These
are discussed in the section that follows. As the design progresses from the conceptual
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phase to the preliminary design phase, functional safety assessments are followed by
physical assessments that focus on the physical layout, while validating any redun-
dancy and independence assumptions made. Finally, operational safety requirements
are generated out of unusual scenarios, with unsatisfactory results being fed back into
the design process [83].
Figure 13: Relationship between FHAs and FTAs (Adapted from ARP 4761 [4])
While the intent of the PSSA process is to enable validation of system safety
requirements earlier in the design phases, it does have quite a few shortcomings as
reported by Dawkins et al. [54]. They state:
“There is a genuine conundrum in doing PSSA. To meet its objectives
we want to do PSSA early and thus influence the design, but we will
then be faced with the cost of updating the PSSA at each design change.
Conversely, by waiting until the design is “stable” we will save money
in PSSA, but lose the ability to influence the design cheaply. What is
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needed is a “lightweight” way of doing PSSA early on, which becomes
more rigorous as the design matures.”
System design and safety teams are often at loggerheads, since the responsibility for
making trade-offs between different objectives lie with the designers, while it is the
safety perspectives that give better insight into effective designs [54].
Additionally, there is uncertainty with how the PSSA process should be used
with modifications and evolution of aircraft and systems. Sometimes, the smallest
of changes may necessitate a re-analysis of system safety, and the effort required to
implement such a change becomes proportional to the size of the system, not the size
of the change [54].
Observation: Traditional PSSA limits the scope for conducting trade studies in
conceptual design
2.3.1.3 System Safety Assessment (SSA)
A system safety assessment (SSA) is a comprehensive evaluation of the aircraft and
its systems to prove that all safety requirements are met. Therein lies the difference
between a PSSA and SSA. While both use similar methods, the prior evaluates the
proposed architecture to identify safety requirements, whereas the latter provides
evidence to verify that those requirements have been met by the final architecture [4].
The SSA process flow is generally represented through succeeding levels of verifica-
tion. The right side of Figure 12 denotes these upward hierarchical verification levels
where hardware reliability requirements, architectural requirements, and hardware
and software Development Assurance Levels are verified against the safety require-
ments generated from the PSSA process. Various analysis methods like FTA, CCA,
Failure Models, Effects, and Criticality Analysis(FMECA), Markov Analysis (MA)
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among others are utilized in this effort to support the failure rates and modes con-
sidered and verify that safety objectives are met. Some of these analysis methods are
discussed next.
Overall, it can be seen that the current paradigm seeks to identify hazards early
in the design process and percolate corresponding qualitative or quantitative safety
requirements downstream. Washington et al. [172] summarize the outcome of the
system safety assessment process as four related sets F (not to be confused with
failure probability defined earlier), C, Λ, and O where:
1. F is the set of n identified failure conditions f1 − fn
2. C is the set of severity ci assigned to each failure condition fi
3. Λ is the set of failure rate λi of each failure condition fi, and
4. O is the set of failure rate objective oi associated with fi and its severity ci, as
given by AC 25.1309-1A or table 2
2.3.2 The Safety Assessment Analysis Methods
Once FHAs and/or PSSAs are completed, airplane and system functional designs or
architectures are proposed to meet the generated safety requirements. The verification
of functional designs takes the form of numerical analyses [83]. There are two broad
classes of numerical analysis methods prescribed for this task:
1. Top-down Methods:
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)




• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
• Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
In addition to these, a Common Cause Analysis (CCA) is conducted to test the
assumption of independence between functions, systems, or components. A brief
overview of some of these is provided next.
2.3.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
FTA was originally invented in Bell Labs by H. Watson and Allison B. Mearns. It was
later used by Dave Haasl of the Boeing company who recognized the power of this
method to conduct quantitative safety analysis [64]. FTA is one of the most widely
accepted, graphical, logic and probability based method for system safety assessment.
It is a top-down method where an analyst begins with a single top level hazard and
determines its root cause and probability of occurrence by recursively finding all
single fault or failure combinations at the immediate lower level which could cause
said hazard [4,64]. Such a recursive analysis continues till a primary event – one which
cannot be broken down further is uncovered. These primary events may be internal
or external in nature. In reality, however, FTAs are conducted to a level suitable
for the phase of design and knowledge available at that point. For instance, during
preliminary aircraft design, aircraft level events may be broken down to failures in
subsystems or components and then stopped, thus treating these subsystem failures
as primary events.
Figure 14 shows the basic building blocks for the FTA. The graphical fault tree is
constructed using four basic building blocks [64] – (i) Basic Events, (ii) Gate Events,
(iii) Conditional Events, and (iv) Transfer Events. Ericson defines three principle
concepts to construct a fault tree using these basic blocks [64]:
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Figure 14: Basic building blocks for FTA (Adapted from [64])
1. The I-N-S concept – Involves answering the question “What is immediate (I),
necessary (N), and sufficient (S)”
2. The SS-SC concept – If a fault is caused due to component failure, classify it as
a “state-of-the-component” (SC) fault, otherwise classify it as a “state-of-the-
system” (SS) fault
3. The P-S-C concept – Involves answering the question “What are the primary
(P), secondary (S), and command (C) causes of the event?”
The creation of a fault tree using these building blocks and concepts is shown in
Fig. 15. Using such a construction, the top level hazard probability can be determined
based on primary event / component failure probabilities. An example of the aircraft
and system level FTA can be seen in Fig. 13.
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Figure 15: Steps for building a FTA (Adapted from [64])
An important time and cost saving feature of the FTA method is that only the
system elements or components contributing directly to the top level hazard are
analyzed. FTA can be used to (i) verify design compliance with DSR, (ii) Identify
safety deficiencies that may be missed,(iii) Establish preventive measures to eliminate
or mitigate such deficiencies, (iv) Identify common failure modes, and to (v) Establish
system design requirements when working with fail-safe qualitative requirements [4,
64].
While FTA is a very powerful method and is widely used, it does have certain
drawbacks. To start, while ARP 4761 considers FTA, dependence diagrams, and
Markov analysis as equivalent, FTA cannot express repair and recovery strategies
like Markov analysis. At the same time, FTA can support an upward propagation
of probabilities, not the top-down allocation required for PSSA [54]. It requires
an analyst with experience and understanding of FTA as well as the system being
analyzed to conduct a FTA. With a logical structure, a FTA can become intractably
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large and time consuming for complex systems. This means whenever an aircraft
architecture changes, developed FTAs will have to be re-evaluated, in most cases
manually, thus limiting the scope to conduct trade studies before design freedom is
restricted.
2.3.2.2 Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD)
The RBD is an inductive, function and dependence driven approach where the sys-
tem is divided into blocks that represent system elements [25,95]. It is also described
as a success-oriented network, that allows an exhaustive search for pathways of suc-
cess [95]. The structure of the RBD defines the logical interaction of component
reliability by arranging them in series and parallel.
(a)
(b)
Figure 16: (a) Blocks in series (b) Blocks in parallel
Consider the series and parallel systems shown in Fig. 16 with the assumption that
component failures are independent. When the components are in series, a failure in
any combination of components will result in system failure. Thus, the system failure
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probability and reliability are given as:
FS = FA + FB + FC + FAB + FAC + FBC + FABC
= (1−RA) + (1−RB) + (1−RC) + (1−RA)(1−RB) + (1−RA)(1−RC)
+(1−RA)(1−RC) + (1−RB)(1−RC) + (1−RA)(1−RB)(1−RC)
= 1−RA ·RB ·RC
RS,series = RA ·RB ·RC (9)




RS,parallel = 1− (1−RA)(1−RB)(1−RC) (10)
RBD can be a powerful tool in determining system reliability. When components
can be assumed to belong to a constant rate phase, the reliability (R) as a function
of failure rate (λ) is given by Eq. 5 repeated here for convenience:
R(t) = e−λt
Thus, when the reliability is to be determined for a system shown in Fig. 16 in
terms of component failure rates (failures/unit time) under a constant failure rate
assumption, Eq. 5,9,10 give:
RS,series = e−(λA+λB+λC)t (11)
RS,parallel = 1− (1− e−λAt)(1− e−λBt)(1− e−λCt) (12)
As can be seen, placing components in parallel increases reliability of the system
due to redundancy, while placing components in series decreases reliability. In general,
the RBD correlates well with the physical relationship between system components
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and can help quantify reliability levels of aircraft and system architecture during
PSSA. However, as systems get complex, the equations to compute reliability using
RBDs get complex, leading to a reduced utility for aircraft conceptual design, when
exploration and trade studies of complex systems are of interest.
2.3.2.3 Markov Analysis
Markov Analysis (MA) models system failure as a stochastic process where the sys-
tem state (Ss) is modeled with transition probabilities (λ) and repair rate (µ). The
evolution of the system state, therefore, is a function of both time, and probabilities
(λ, µ). Typically, the process of system transition is discrete in the state-space, and
continuous in the time-space, and is typically called a chain. When a system state at
time t+ ∆t as a result of failure transitions is only dependent on its state at time t,
this process is called Markovian. The system state can then be represented as:
Ss(t+ ∆t) = fn(Ss(t), λs(t), µs(t)) (13)
Figure 17: Example Markov Analysis for a three component non-repairable system
During the constant failure rate phase as shown in Fig. 9, the system transition
probabilities (component failure rates) depend not on t, but only on ∆t. This as-
sumption results in a steady state stochastic process with the corresponding Markov
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process being called ‘homogeneous’. In such a case, the probabilities λ and µ are
given by the inverse of the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and Mean Time
To Repair (MTTR) respectively, and are called failure rates and repair rates respec-
tively [16]. Typically for aerospace applications, failure duration and their impacts
are visible within the mission being flown when a component fails. Thus, aircraft
failures can be considered non-repairable to evaluate their effect in terms of severity.
Figure 17 shows a Markov chain created for failure analysis of a three component
non-repairable system from Fig. 16. Beginning in state S at time t where all compo-
nents are functioning, the probability that the system leaves S in time ∆t is given by
PS→ = (λSA + λSB + λSC)∆t (14)
When component states are binary (working or failed), the total number of system
failure states can be 2N , where N is the number of components. A similar analysis
for all the other states provides a system of first order linear differential equations
that can be solved rapidly. MA provides an efficient means of stochastically modeling
the failure state transitions of a complex system, without having to perform Monte
Carlo analysis [16]. However, each failure state involving multiple components can be
reached in multiple paths (for e.g. system state with components A, B failed can be
reached if A fails first and B second, or vice-versa. Thus, the total number of chains
and states explored in Markov analysis can explode with the number of components.
To deal with this intractability, two assumptions can be made - i) Trim the MA by
assuming component independence, so only one chain is considered leading to any
system state (e.g. A first, B second); and/or ii) Truncate the MA to only consider
a limited number of failures at once. When the individual component reliability is
high as is the case in aircraft systems, the probability of multiple failures at once is
exceedingly low. Thus, the Markov chains can be trimmed to only consider one or
two component failures at once without losing much fidelity.
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2.3.2.4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
ARP 4761 defines Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as [4]
“an inductive or a bottom-up method of identifying the failure modes of
a system, item, or function and determining the effects on the next higher
level of the design.”
As seen in Fig. 12, FMEA is conducted when the design of an aircraft transitions from
the preliminary to the detailed stages, and more knowledge on system architecture
and components is available. When combined to support a quantitative method
like the FTA or Markov analysis, that can assign criticality to the failures postulated,
FMEA is also called FMECA. In this bottom-up analysis, a certain component failure
or initiating condition is postulated, and its effect on the system is determined. The
output of such an analysis is an FMECA worksheet that documents (i) the component
or function postulated to fail, (ii) identified failure modes and failure rates, and (iii)
effects of the failure (directly and/or at the next higher level) [4].
An advantage of this method is that it offers a systematic review of all components
in an aircraft architecture and identifies failure modes and their effects. The output
of FMEA can be used in conjunction with FTA and RBD to inform the criticality of
such component failures [95].
Similar to FTA, an FMECA is time consuming. In fact, it only covers a single
failure at a time in a tabular manner. It also requires sufficient detail regarding aircraft
architecture and components, and thus cannot be used for design-space exploration
before degrees of freedom are locked down. Additionally, for a complex system, such
an analysis can become prohibitively expensive.
2.3.2.5 Common Cause Analysis (CCA)
Many times during quantitative analysis using the methods discussed above, inde-
pendence between system functions or components is assumed. While this tends to
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simplify calculations, it is important to verify these assumptions. CCA provides tools
to identify dependencies or external events that may cause multiple failures and is
subdivided into three types [4].
1. Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA) is performed on each zone of the aircraft with the
objective to ensure any components are installed properly and do not cause
unwanted interference with other systems under failure.
2. Particular Risks Analysis (PRA) is used to identify events that can impact
safety but are outside the system, such as hail, bird strikes, lightning etc. The
intent is to show that such risks are either eliminated or acceptable.
3. Common Mode Analysis (CMA) is performed to verify that different AND
events postulated in FTAs are indeed independent.
2.3.3 Probability Models
While most of the above described processes or methods can be used to qualify hazard
severity, they need to be combined with probability theory to provide quantifiable
failure requirements, or to determine the actual failure probability. Failure rates are
generally estimated by looking at available data and trying to determine summary
statistics like the mean, median, or mode of the data, along with confidence intervals.
Sometimes, patterns of failure are represented by probability distributions, and the
parameters estimated using available sample data. The probability theory and models
utilized in traditional aircraft safety assessment literature is what is known as the
‘frequentist’ approach by modern statisticians. In this approach, probabilities are
informed purely by available data, where any uncertainty is reduced by increasing
the number of data points.
Such a ‘frequentist’ approach, suggested by ARP 4761, cannot comprehensively
address uncertainty in input data and models [172]. Uncertainty is generally classified
into two categories [146]:
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• Epistemic Uncertainty (Greek ‘episteme’: knowledge) is also called knowledge-
based uncertainty that results from incomplete knowledge or understanding
about fundamental phenomenon. This uncertainty is significant in situations
where not enough evidence or data is available.
• Aleatory Uncertainty (Latin ‘alea’ : game of dice) is the second type of
uncertainty and relates to the inherent randomness or stochasticity of a system
that is not reducible.
The ‘frequentist’ approach can only take aleatory uncertainty into account through
data that is available [146]. ARP 4754 and 4761 suggest making conservative assump-
tions to deal with this downside and manage uncertainty better [4, 6, 172]. However,
with novel aircraft concepts and architectures, data available are insufficient and
epistemic uncertainty is large, thus rendering existing ‘frequentist’ probability models
unsuitable [58, 172].
Observation: Traditional methods for conducting safety assessments are unsuitable
for dealing with the large uncertainty associated with novel concepts.
2.3.4 Summary and Observations
The intent of the safety assessments is to ensure that any aircraft or system under
consideration poses no more than an acceptable level of risk. The current paradigm
is largely based on SAE ARP 4761 and 4754, which act as established guides for
performing safety assessments [4, 6, 73].
A functional hazard assessment (FHA) is performed at the aircraft and system
level under preliminary aircraft safety assessment (PASA) followed by a preliminary
system safety assessment (PSSA). These generally correlate with aircraft conceptual
and preliminary design stages. A benefit of the FHA is that it keeps functional
and behavioral spaces independent while characterizing hazards [25]. This allows the
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aircraft level assessment to be conducted before design degrees of freedom are locked
down by keeping it independent of architectural details. However, traditional FHA is a
tabular approach in which assumed discrete functional failures are assigned a discrete
hazard severity. This assumption may not be valid for novel aircraft concepts. Also,
the FHA process is slow and time consuming, requiring an analyst to analyze every
unique configuration manually for the system level FHA, thus limiting the scope for
conducting trade studies during early design.
A fault tree analysis (FTA) is a powerful method and is widely used. However, it
supports an upward propagation of failure probabilities, not the downward required
for PSSA. It is generally constructed manually, can get intractably large, and needs
to be re-created with any change in system design. This also restricts its usefulness
earlier in the design phase.
Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) can determine system reliability using simple
logical relationships and correlates well with the physical relationship between system
components. This technique can be combined with certain aspects of network theory
to enable exploration of the architecture space as is described later.
Markov analysis models the transitions of system failure states as Markov chains,
and benefits from the well established mathematical framework to support it. It
provides an advantage over some of the other methods discussed so far in exploring the
scenario tree of system failure states. However, MA suffers from the cost of explosion
of the state-space for complex problems with a large number of components.
A failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) offers a systematic
review of all components, along with the failure modes and their effects at the aircraft
level. It can also be used in conjunction with FTA or RBD to inform the criticality
of such failures. However, this method is time consuming, takes a tabular form, and
cannot be used for conducting design trade studies efficiently.
48
Observation: The traditional safety assessment processes and methods used in pre-
liminary design phases limit the scope for exploration of the design and architecture
space
Additionally, novel aircraft concepts and architectures may not have discrete func-
tional failures, and the severity (consequences) of such failures may not be well un-
derstood. Consider for instance a distributed electric propulsion (DEP) architecture
that is being considered for some novel GA concepts. Instead of traditional scenarios
regarding loss of thrust, the DEP is likely to have a range of thrust degradation sce-
narios (0% to 100% thrust degradation depending on how many propulsors lose power
or fail). Since there is no historical precedent, the current approaches fall short in
qualifying the severity of functional degradation and can potentially result in incorrect
functional hazard severity allocation. A hypothesis demonstrated by Armstrong [25]
in his Ph.D. thesis thus becomes another observation of interest here:
Observation: Assumptions regarding the relationship between functional loss and
hazard severity during traditional PSSA can lead to inaccurate estimation of compo-
nent level requirements for novel aircraft concepts and architectures
On the aspect of computing failure probability, the current approach uses either
summary statistics or probability models whose parameters are estimated from data
samples to represent patterns of failure. For conventional systems and architectures,
where large quantities of data are available over multiple decades, this approach has
proved to be quite useful to ensure air transportation remains one of the safest means
of travel. However, this ‘frequentist’ approach cannot address uncertainty well, espe-
cially in the absence of available data. For novel aircraft concepts and architectures,
data is insufficient and epistemic uncertainty is large, making the existing approach
unsuitable.
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Observation: Traditional approaches to model failure probability are insufficient to
address the large uncertainties associated with novel aircraft concepts and architectures
2.4 Reliability and Safety Assessments: State of the Art
In light of the previous observations, a literature review was conducted to identify
the state of the art in reliability and safety assessment processes and methods to
identify alternatives and promising techniques. This section is broadly divided into
four parts. The first part looks at the improvements made in methods for conducting
safety assessments. The second looks at reliability and safety studies conducted in
the context of system design. The third part looks at informing system design trade-
studies and optimization using safety and reliability considerations, while the fourth
looks at treatments of uncertainty in the state of the art.
2.4.1 Methods
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a method similar to FHA, but uses a
design view of the system instead of functional requirements one for failure identifi-
cation. [18]. HAZOP was originally used for analyzing processes or operations, with
a focus on a flow of materials through a chemical plant [25]. While HAZOP has a
larger set of guide-words than FHA, it is limited in its ability to respond quickly and
accurately to a redesign or alternate configurations [18, 25].
Amongst all the methods used for safety assessments, FTA has probably received
the most attention in terms of research interest and improvements suggested. Ruijters
and Stoelinga published a survey on the state of the art in modeling FTA [155]. They
note that a “wild jungle” of different FTA techniques now exists, including standard
fault trees (FTs), as well as extensions like dynamic, repairable, and extended FTs.
Standard FTs, also called static FTs (SFTs) are the most basic fault trees as explained
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in the previous section. They can be analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively and
have some commercial tools available for ease of implementation [155]. Dynamic FTs
(DFTs) include a temporal sequence of information that cannot be handled by SFTs.
Due to the inclusion of a temporal element, the qualitative and quantitative analysis
of DFTs is different from SFTs [155]. Repairable FTs are used when reliability is
computed over a long period of time with the possibility of repairing or replacing
failed components [155]. However, in aircraft applications, failures cause an imme-
diate dynamic response in the order of seconds because of which the assumption of
repairability is invalid, making repairable FTs less preferred [61]. Finally, Fuzzy FTs
are proposed to be used where precise data are not available, and decisions need to be
made from vague information. Fuzzy set theory has proven useful when experts can-
not provide exact numerical values for component failure probabilities, and instead
give their opinion in linguistic terms [98]. Despite all these developments in FTAs,
a typical FTA remains architecture specific and requires time and manual effort to
conduct for every system under consideration. They also require experience in postu-
lating safety critical events or hazards, which may be lacking for novel architectural
or operational concepts.
Observation: Advances in the state-of-the-art safety methods like HAZOP or FTA
variants have not improved identification and classification of hazards for novel con-
cepts, nor improved the ease of conducting design trade studies with safety consider-
ations
Since FTAs require a lot of modeling effort, the field of Model Based Dependabil-
ity Analysis (MBDA) has developed to explore how dependability information can be
synthesized from system models automatically [98]. Papadopoulos and others looked
at automating the generation of FTAs and FMEAs [138,139,141,142]. In a tool they
51
developed called Hierarchically Performed hazard Origin & Propagation Studies (HiP-
HOPS), FTAs and FMEAs can be generated automatically once the corresponding
system Simulink model is annotated with component failure information. Addition-
ally, the tool provides optimization capability by automatically changing the system
topology [140, 143]. Walker et al. extended HiP-HOPS to include a temporal aspect
to the generated FTAs [171], while Kabir et al. extended the method to conduct
dynamic analysis using Petri nets and Bayesian belief networks that provide a better
treatment of uncertainty [99].
While the tools developed to automate the generation of FTAs, and enable design
optimization by letting the optimizer change the system topology are quite powerful,
one must note that (i) they were developed over almost a decade of research, and
(ii) the tools are limited to using MATLAB Simulink models annotated with failure
data to give meaningful results. For the safety assessment of novel aircraft concepts
and architectures, these techniques do not address the limitations in the generation
of safety critical off-nominal requirements.
Observation: Model Based Dependability Analysis (MBDA) techniques show promise
in automating safety analyses and enabling architectural space exploration and opti-
mization
2.4.2 Reliability in Preliminary System Design
Numerous studies have been conducted in the recent past to look at the reliability and
safety of novel aircraft architectures and systems early in the design phase. Safety
and reliability considerations while designing an aircraft electrical system have been
of interest for a long time [111]. Due to the large number of components electrified,
certain studies suggest restricting analyses to components considered safety critical -
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flight surface actuators, fuel pumps, and generators [41]. Due to the lack of opera-
tional experience of MEA architectures, a combination of FTA, Markov analysis, and
Bayesian analysis is suggested [166], as against the traditional paradigm [159].
For novel concepts and architectures in non-aerospace applications, safety assess-
ment techniques in literature have focused on the traditional paradigm. While looking
at an integrated power system for an electric ship, Menis et al. utilized FTAs and
FMEA tables to analyze the causes and effects of faults and/or failures occurring in
an integrated power system component [124]. On a similar study on a direct methanol
fuel cell, Deodath et al. conducted extensive quantitative FTA and FMEA analysis to
determine system reliability under different failure states [56]. In both these studies,
like many others [87], a fixed system architecture was analyzed with no considerations
of informing design trade-studies.
Within the aerospace domain, numerous studies have been conducted for safety
assessment of novel architectures or technologies. Hasan et al. [82] integrated hard-
ware reliability with a simulation of flight operations to measure safety improvements
due to deployment of new technologies. Hemm et al. [85] conducted a safety assess-
ment of ground automation-controlled and ground automation-augmented concepts
under two abnormal conditions. Both these studies utilized modeling and simulation
tools to gain additional knowledge regarding hazard severity and probabilities while
focusing on the operational safety paradigm. Otherwise, they utilized traditional
techniques like FTAs to analyze failure scenarios and their relationship to system-
wide risk. Papathakis et al. [145] demonstrated a safety system design process used
while building technology demonstrators in the form of electric propulsion aircraft
test-beds where a system safety workgroup was established to assess hazard severity,
probabilities, and design to eliminate or mitigate hazards. Woodham et al. utilized a
Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) method to address safety challenges associated
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with NASA’s FUELEAP3 project [174]. In it, an aircraft level FHA was conducted
using SysML hazard blocks, with the intent of relating hazard conditions to initiating
events and possible mitigations like design modifications [174]. These last two studies
relied on expert opinions to conduct a safety assessment using traditional tabular
structures for representing safety risk.
Observation: Traditional methods continue to be the dominant approach for con-
ducting safety assessments for novel system architectures
One of the problems with determining the safety risk and reliability of novel
aircraft concepts and architectures lies in determining the severity of failures because
there is little historical data or precedent to inform the analyst. In such a situation,
an approach that utilizes system performance and dynamic models, along with multi-
state reliability theory seems to show promise. Multi-state reliability is a relatively
recent concept in reliability theory where both system and components are allowed
to assume more than two levels of performance. In a review article, Yingkui and
Jing [176] look at the latest methods, computational approaches, and optimization of
multi-state system reliability. In a study that utilizes system models to determine the
effects of component failure on critical functions, Borer et al. [44] evaluated two critical
portions of proposed NASA Lunar Surface Systems. When physical components were
mapped to system critical functions, a direct simulation of component dependencies
(power, thermal, etc.) resulted in the identification of cascading failures and allowed
the determination of architectural features that drive system loss probability [44].
Dominiguez-Garcia et al. [61] proposed a methodology that uses a behavioral model
for system performance and dynamics with artifacts to model component failure,
along with Markov chains for modeling the different configurations (states) a system
can adopt under component failures to enable dynamic performance and reliability
3FUELEAP - Fostering Ultra-Efficient Low-Emitting Aviation Power
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evaluation of fault-tolerant systems. In a case study on a lateral-directional flight
control system of a fighter aircraft, they demonstrated that using a quantitative
system behavioral model allowed them to assess the “degree of failure” along with
degraded system operational modes [61]. In a multi-state design approach to analyze
twin-engine aircraft performance robustness, Agte et al. [15] determined the effect of
changing aircraft geometry, control gains, and component failure rates on expected
aircraft performance to inform availability. They showed how making small changes
in aircraft design variables can improve performance and help optimize the aircraft
for nominal conditions, but can end up hurting performance in off-nominal conditions
by decreasing expected performance or availability across system lifetime [15].
Observation: Optimizing aircraft design parameters for nominal conditions can
worsen performance in off-nominal conditions and lead to lower availability across
system lifetime
Observation: Multi-state reliability assessment methods that utilize system per-
formance and behavioral models show promise while determining hazard severity for
novel aircraft concepts and architectures
2.4.3 Optimization and System Safety
There have been some studies that try to include aircraft design and architectural
optimization while considering safety and reliability requirements. In a Ph.D. thesis,
Johansson [95] suggested using Markov analysis as the best approach to model re-
liability in early design phases, after looking at reliability methods like RBD, event
trees, Markov analysis, and Petri nets. She then applied a genetic algorithm to opti-
mize for system safety and reliability while minimizing development cost by finding
the optimal vendor for each piece of equipment [95]. It is important to note that a
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fixed system architecture was considered in this optimization. In another study by
the same author, three fixed fuel system architectures were analyzed with the aim to
inform the selection of the best alternative in a multi-attribute sense [96].
Campbell [48] in her PhD thesis developed a methodology to architect a power
distribution system of turbo-electric aircraft while allocating redundancy. The re-
dundancy allocation was optimized using particle swarm optimization to meet sys-
tem level reliability requirements. However, the reliability requirement was based
on a single simplistic hazard of having enough motors operational for take-off, while
failure rate estimation was carried out through historical data [48].
Armstrong [25] in his thesis developed the method to identify off-nominal opera-
tional requirements based on risk and reliability during the conceptual design phase.
In it, traditional functional hazard analysis and system safety analysis was expanded
to consider the magnitude of function loss, instead of the discrete functional loss sce-
narios suggested by the current paradigm. The result pertinent to the current work
was the development of Continuous FHA (C-FHA) where severity of functional fail-
ures are expressed as a continuous function of the magnitude of function loss, and
Analog PSSA where failure probability requirements are expressed as a continuous
function of the magnitude of function loss [25]. These ideas regarding C-FHA and
Analog PSSA will be discussed further later in the current work.
While Armstrong did not conduct optimization of the system architecture, he
evaluated the system safety risk for a conventional and more electric baseline and
optimized for the load-shedding strategies since such off-nominal considerations were
shown to drive system requirements [25].
Observation: Informing the trade-studies during the aircraft design process with re-
liability considerations has received limited attention in the aircraft design community
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2.4.4 Treatments of Uncertainty
As established earlier, uncertainty is of two primary types – aleatory uncertainty
refers to inherent randomness in the system, while epistemic uncertainty refers to un-
certainty due to lack of knowledge. For novel aircraft concepts and architectures, the
aleatory uncertainty is large due to the lack of available data. Additionally, because
of the limited knowledge and experience available for these aircraft, the epistemic
uncertainty is large too. As explained in the summary of Sec. 2.3, the traditional
approach, also called the frequentist approach is unable to comprehensively address
these uncertainties [172]. Additionally, there are difficulties in demonstrating a given
reliability requirement when the available data are limited. When failure is assumed
to follow an exponential distribution (constant failure rate), Bonis [43] observes the
following two conditions must be met:
1. To ensure the lower confidence limit is at least equal to required reliability, the
observed reliability value must be much higher than required, and
2. In order to avoid endless testing, the designed Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) must be several times the required MTBF
As can be anticipated, such requirements can lead to significant over-design of the
system, or worse – a reduction of confidence levels for demonstrating reliability re-
quirements (a risky option). Under such seemingly impossible options, an alternate
approach to the treatment of uncertainty in failure rates lies in the paradigm of
Bayesian inference. While the field is old, the current work refers to the work of
Dezfuli et al. [58] who define Bayesian inference as:
“A process of inference using Bayes’ theorem in which information is used
to newly infer the plausibility of a hypothesis.”
While the frequentist approach uses data to determine failure probabilities, aBayesian
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approach utilizes information, including models, data, and subject matter expert opin-
ions among others [58]. The utility of the Bayesian approach can be attested to when
one considers that numerous industries consider these techniques standard [1, 58, 79,
80,102]. Additional details on the theory behind Bayesian inference will be provided
in later chapters.
Kelly and Smith [102] conducted a Bayesian risk analysis of the space shuttle based
on O-ring data collected prior to the ill-fated launch of the Challenger in July 1986.
The intent of this analysis was to include a better treatment of uncertainty in the
data by allowing uncertainties in observable launch parameters such as temperature
to be propagated through the model. An et al. [21] proposed a Bayesian framework
to address the epistemic and aleatory uncertainty in the input variables, as well as
meta-model uncertainty that arises from the approximation of the response function
while performing reliability analysis. Two case studies are provided where input un-
certainties are managed through a posterior predictive distribution to evaluate failure
probability, while the meta-model uncertainties are quantified using a Gaussian pro-
cess or Kriging model [21]. Youn and Wang [177] proposed a Bayesian reliability
based design optimization (RBDO) approach to optimize a use case while dealing
with uncertainty. Banghart et al. [28] applied a Bayesian network to a field data-
set to develop a predictive method capable of predicting failure of several important
components as compared to traditional reactive methods. Luxhøj [116] implemented
a Bayesian belief network in an aviation system risk model that combines the use of
a human error taxonomy and case based scenarios to assess a relative risk intensity
metric. In a non-aerospace application, Ewing et al. [65] tried to estimate a marine
energy converter drive train reliability under a lack of specific reliability data. They
developed a Bayesian updating framework using high fidelity onshore wind failure
data to form the prior distributions of the unknown parameters of a Weibull compo-
nent failure model and updated those with the next 6 months of failure data [65].
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A NASA handbook by Dezfuli et al. [58] aims to provide engineers and scientists
an analytical structure for combining data and information from various sources to
generate estimates of parameters of uncertainty distributions used in risk and reli-
ability models. All readers interested to learn more about the Bayesian inference
method and its uses in probabilistic risk assessment are directed to this document.
Washington and Clothier [172] utilized some elements from this NASA handbook to
present a Bayesian approach to showing compliance to system safety requirements
for unmanned aircraft systems. Their reason for choosing a Bayesian approach re-
mains similar to every other so far – a better treatment of both levels of uncertainty,
especially when available data are scarce.
Another approach to address uncertainty is using Fuzzy set theory. It is especially
used to deal with semantic variables where linguistics can cause ambiguity in the true
value. Oztekin and Luxhøj [137] proposed a hybrid fuzzy-Bayesian approach for
safety assessment of unmanned aircraft operations in the presence of uncertainty and
vagueness. Suresh et al. [165] presented a comparative study of probabilistic and
fuzzy methodologies for the evaluation of top level uncertainty in a fault tree (FT).
In a study that applies fuzzy FTs to patient safety risk in healthcare, Komal [104]
states that fuzzy FTs are used when:
1. Clear boundaries between success and failure states of the system do not exist,
2. A lack of sufficient data, and resulting uncertainty means the failure probability
cannot be calculated precisely, and
3. There is subjective evaluation of reliability.
It is apparent that a Bayesian approach suits the problem of dealing with limited
data and knowledge associated with novel architectures and technologies better than
any other.
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Observation: Bayesian inference techniques are widely used in nuclear and space in-
dustry to better characterize aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in probabilistic safety
assessment
2.5 Summary of Observations
The observations of this chapter have been summarized here for easy reference. They
serve to identify the shortcomings in the current paradigm related to identifying safety
related off-nominal requirements for novel architectures and technologies and incor-
porating them earlier in the aircraft design process to inform design trade-studies.
Some observations from the state of the art serve to identify potential enablers to
solve some of the shortcomings and to guide the direction of the search for a solution
for the research objective. These observations have been divided into three top level
groupings as shown below.
Observations Group 1: Characterizing safety related off-nominal requirements
for novel aircraft architectures
1. Off-nominal scenarios have the potential to pose significant sizing and architec-
ture specific requirements at the system level
2. Most aircraft safety and reliability requirements are emergent and depend on the
physical architecture definition
3. Traditional methods continue to be the dominant approach for conducting safety
assessments for novel system architectures
4. Traditional FHA allocates hazard values to discrete losses of function or mal-
function
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5. Assumptions regarding the relationship between functional loss and hazard sever-
ity during traditional PSSA can lead to inaccurate estimation of component level
requirements for novel aircraft concepts and architectures
6. Multi-state reliability assessment methods that utilize system performance and
behavioral models show promise while determining hazard severity for novel
aircraft concepts and architectures
Observations Group 2: Treatment of uncertainty in available data and models
1. Traditional approaches to model failure probability are insufficient to address
the large uncertainties associated with novel aircraft concepts and architectures
2. Bayesian inference techniques are widely used in nuclear and space industry
to better characterize aleatory and epistemic uncertainty in probabilistic safety
assessment
Observations Group 3: Incorporating safety requirements in early design
1. The traditional safety assessment processes and methods used in preliminary
design phases limit the scope for exploration of the design and architecture
space
2. Informing the trade-studies during the aircraft design process with reliability
considerations has received limited attention in the aircraft design community
3. Optimizing aircraft design parameters for nominal conditions can worsen per-
formance in off-nominal conditions and lead to lower availability across system
lifetime
4. Model Based Dependability Analysis (MBDA) techniques show promise in au-
tomating safety analyses and enabling architectural space exploration and opti-
mization
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The observations made above will help guide the direction of research in this
thesis. Along with any additional ones made during the course of implementation




Building on the arguments, observations, and gaps identified in the previous chapter,
this chapter will focus on formulating the problem at hand and explaining the pro-
posed approach. This will involve coming up with an overall research objective, along
with certain requirements and broad research areas that must be addressed by any
proposed solution. These will lead to the formulation of specific research questions
that seek to tackle deficiencies identified, which when answered, will seek to meet the
overall research objective. A set of hypotheses will be built based on observations
from literature, or original research conducted by the author to answer these research
questions. Any background necessary to understand the corresponding hypothesis
will be provided as needed. When any hypothesis leads to additional questions, an
attempt is made to duly identify them and answer them based on knowledge of prior
art. If such questions need to be tackled separately to completely test the parent hy-
pothesis, these questions become secondary research questions. Secondary hypotheses
are then proposed to answer such questions.
3.1 Research Objective
Based on the motivation and observations stated in chapters 1 and 2, a need to
enhance the safety assessment of novel aircraft architectures can be established. This
leads to the overall research objective of this thesis which was stated in chapter 1.5,
and is restated here.
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Research Objective:
Develop a framework that will enhance safety assessments of novel aircraft physical
architectures and technologies in early design by
1. identifying off-nominal requirements,
2. allocating them to the system and component level,
3. enabling compliance decision-making while addressing both epistemic and
aleatory uncertainties, and
4. informing design trade-studies.
This research objective talks about enhancing safety assessments for novel archi-
tectures and technologies. It is important to pause here and restate the definition
of novel aircraft architectures and technologies used in this thesis (See Def. 2.1.1.1)
before proceeding.
Definition 3.1.1 (Novel Aircraft Architecture). A novel aircraft architecture is
loosely defined here as one which differs significantly from the traditional paradigm
mentioned above in its physical implementation to fulfil at least one aircraft level
function.
The stated research objective can be realized by addressing the four enumerated
requirements listed in it. In this thesis, the research objective is thus broken down into
three parts for this purpose. The first research area focuses on methods for the identi-
fication and characterization of safety related off-nominal requirements at the aircraft
level for novel architectures, followed by methods to allocate these requirements at
the system and component level. The second research area focuses on addressing the
large uncertainty due to the limited data and experience with novel concepts while
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enabling decision making. The third research area integrates the framework consist-
ing of the outcomes of the first two and uses it to demonstrate its applicability to
informing design trade-studies. These three research areas will be discussed next.
3.2 Research Area 1
This research area focuses on addressing the gaps found in observations group 1 from
chapter 2.5. Risk assessment is an exercise in the imagination of failure. As noted
earlier, novel aircraft architectures and technologies carry with them an uncertainty
related to the off-nominal risk they pose. The limitations and off-nominal operational
considerations postulated during the traditional safety assessments may not be correct
or complete for these.
Research Question 1
Observations group 1 in chapter 2.5 alludes to multiple problems in identifying,
characterizing, and allocating off-nominal requirements for novel aircraft architec-
tures using traditional methods. Traditional methods require designers or analysts
to assess individual architectures manually creating the FHA/FMEA tables and FTs.
The FHA process assumes discrete functional loss which may not be valid for novel
aircraft architectures and technologies. Analysts have to determine safety critical
scenarios and estimate the severity of hazards, both of which are usually conducted
manually through subject matter expert opinions for a given architecture. These are
then fed back into design to allocate failure rate requirements at the component and
subsystem level. It may be difficult to determine the hazard severity due to limited
prior knowledge of failures associated with novel architectures. As a result, hazards
may be identified or characterized with large uncertainty. All of these considerations
lead to the first research question (RQ 1):
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Research Question 1:
What method or group of methods can enable identification, characterization, and
allocation of safety related off-nominal requirements for novel aircraft architectures
and technologies in the conceptual and preliminary design stage?
Resultant Requirements Any solution to this research question must satisfy the
following requirements to be considered complete.
Requirements:
1. Generation of off-nominal / safety critical scenarios and corresponding hazards
2. Estimation of hazard severity under different scenarios
3. Allocation of reliability requirements to components and subsystems
4. Treatment of uncertainty in models while estimating hazard severity
A solution to satisfy the first requirement must allow for the generation of off-
nominal/hazardous scenarios, while the second requirement requires the solution to
have the capability to estimate the hazard severity under said conditions. Finally,
we require the solution to be able to allocate reliability requirements generated from
the corresponding hazard severity to the components and subsystems. The focus on
improved treatment of uncertainty in the last requirement is intended for the solution
to operate in an environment with little knowledge and experience, as will be found
in the design of novel concepts.
Formulation of Hypothesis 1
The primary goal of this research area is to identify or develop a method or a
combination of methods that provide a better identification, characterization, and
allocation of safety related off-nominal requirements at the system and component
level for novel aircraft architectures and technologies. As such, it should be able to
deal with the uncertainty due to a lack of knowledge and experience while dealing
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with novel concepts and their failures. In observations group 1 from chapter 2.5,
it was noted that multi-state reliability assessment techniques that utilize system
performance and behavioral models show promise in answering research question 1.
However, the multi-state reliability methods discussed in literature [15,16,61] all rely
on detailed system models to quantify system performance under off-nominal oper-
ating conditions. For case studies involving aircraft, a six degree of freedom (6-DoF)
model was created that can quantify aircraft dynamic response to different failures.
While promising when preliminary design knowledge is available, the intent of re-
search question 1 is to estimate risk related requirements in the aircraft conceptual
design phase as well. Therefore, another method is needed that can work in the
conceptual stage and is generalizable with respect to the varying physical implemen-
tations of novel architectures.
Figure 18: Notional plot of the extended C-FHA process
The functional decomposition of a novel system architecture or technology is likely
to remain similar to a conventional system even if the implementation varies dras-
tically between the two. Thus, a method based on loss of function to characterize
hazards can be expected to be generalizable regardless of the physical implementation
of the aircraft concept. While traditional FHA with its discrete function loss assump-
tion might not suit novel concepts well, the current work utilizes an extension of the
Continuous FHA developed by Armstrong [25] in his Ph.D. thesis for the conceptual
design stage. This is shown through a notional plot in figure 18. At a high level,
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a continuous degradation in the aircraft’s functions is postulated, with the effect of
such conditions quantified using ‘safety metrics’ of interest. These safety metrics
are ones that can ideally be linked to the severity of the underlying hazards. Once
numerous such metrics are computed for a given aircraft level function under differ-
ent scenarios of degradation, aircraft level continuous function loss can be allocated
hazard severity.
Figure 19: Notional plot of the multistate performance based safety assessment
process
Novel aircraft architectures are likely to have different off-nominal operational
modes compared to traditional predefined scenarios. In network reliability theory,
this is known as a multistate reliability problem, where each component and the sys-
tem as a whole may have different operational states depending on which node or edge
has failed. Thus, the traditional point reliability problem of ensuring compliance of
a binary system is replaced with a problem of ensuring that every system state is in
compliance with reliability requirements. This piece of the puzzle is solved using a
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method similar to multistate system safety assessment using aircraft performance as
proposed by Agte [16], and Dominguez-Garcia et al [61]. Figure 19 shows a notional
process to conduct a multistate performance based analysis of the system. A pre-
liminary 6-DoF model of the aircraft is created in the early preliminary design stage
using available geometry and estimated mass properties and aero-propulsive loads.
Different failure states of the system are simulated using this model to obtain trim
solutions while capturing safety metrics of interest. These are then used to infer the
hazard severity of the different states.
Hypothesis 1: A hybrid approach utilizing Continuous FHA during conceptual
sizing and multistate performance models during preliminary sizing, along with suit-
able safety metrics and reliability allocation methods, will yield more accurate iden-
tification and allocation of off-nominal requirements (than traditional safety analysis
methods) for novel aircraft architectures and technologies
Research Questions 1.1 and 1.2
Two questions immediately follow based on the notional plots in figures 18, 19, and
Hypothesis 1. The earlier section explained how extended C-FHA and the multistate
performance-based method are facilitated by appropriate safety metrics. However,
these methods assume the existence of certain ‘safety metrics’ that can be used to
characterize the different off-nominal conditions in terms of their hazard severity. The
following two obvious questions can thus be asked, (i) “What are these metrics?”, and
(ii) “How can they be used?”. Research question 1 is therefore further decomposed
into RQ 1.1 and 1.2 at this stage as follows:
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Research Question 1.1:
What metrics can be used with the methods given in hypothesis 1 to identify off-
nominal requirements in the conceptual and preliminary design phase?
Research Question 1.2:
How can safety related off-nominal requirements be identified and allocated at the
system level during conceptual and preliminary design phases using the previously
defined safety metrics?
Formulation of Solutions for RQ 1.1 and RQ 1.2
There is no one-size-fits-all answer to RQ 1.1. A degradation in different functions
can have different consequences on the safe operation of the aircraft. For instance, a
transport aircraft, whether conventional or all-electric, will have to provide thrust as
well as enough fresh air in the pressurized cabin. The failures of these two have dif-
ferent consequences, but both can lead to catastrophic hazards. While a degradation
in thrust during take-off may be characterized by multiple metrics such as ‘required
Takeoff Field Length (TOFL)’ or ‘climb gradient’, the function ‘provide fresh air’
might only have ‘available mass flow’ as a single metric to characterize hazard sever-
ity under degradation scenarios.
A thorough literature search conducted with the intent of identifying suitable
safety metrics resulted in a few possible solutions. When it comes to quantitative
safety analysis of flight operations, literature abounds with metrics for programs
like Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) [67] and Flight Data Monitoring
(FDM) [47]. While common and widespread in transport category (14 CFR Part
25) aircraft, metrics and tools to conduct such statistical flight data analyses on
normal category (Part 23) airplanes have been of interest in literature. Puranik [150]
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Table 3: Potential safety metrics for RQ 1.1
Performance Models Degraded Function Safety Metrics
Conceptual Provide Thrust
TOFL,
Max Potential Climb Gradient,
ϕmax, nmax




requires that safety metrics pertinent to GA flight data analysis have three qualities
– (i) Parsimony, in terms of the number of metrics defined, as well as the amount
of recorded or generated data required to define them; (ii) Safety relevance, to map
how these metrics help identify anomalous events; and (iii) Generalizability – to
ensure metrics remain comparable across a wide spectrum of GA aircraft classes and
operations.
While most of the research to identify metrics that correlate with safety deals
with aircraft operations, the intent of this thesis is to identify an appropriate subset
of these to be used during conceptual and preliminary sizing to aid safety by design.
This requires that these metrics be computed with the limited information or models
available in the corresponding phases of design, along with identifying appropriate
thresholds which signify deviation from safe performance. Thus, RQ 1.1 is answered
through a combination of a literature survey, downselection, and rationalization with-
out the need for an explicit hypothesis for the same. The details of these are provided
Ch. 4.2. A brief overview of the metrics implemented in this dissertation is provided
in table 3.
Research question (RQ) 1.2 poses a question about the identification and allo-
cation of requirements to the system level using previously defined safety metrics.
The solution for this stems from hypothesis 1, where the two methods - an extended
C-FHA and multistate performance based safety analysis, are used for this purpose.
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However, both these methods rely on appropriate system performance models that
can quantify the safety metrics under off-nominal operations. Combined with pre-
defined thresholds on these safety metrics using values suggested from certification
rules, or just plain logic, these performance models can be used to make a determi-
nation of hazard severity of different off-nominal scenarios. Thus, hypothesis 1.2 is
stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1.2: If the identified safety metrics are quantified under off-nominal
scenarios using appropriate system performance models, then identification and alloca-
tion of safety requirements at the system level can be completed with greater resolution
and accuracy than traditional methods
Research Question 1.3
RQs 1.1 and 1.2 decompose the first research question and deal with the first two
requirements posed when RQ 1 was first defined in chapter 3.2. The present research
question deals with requirement 3 stated under RQ 1 - the need to allocate hazard
severity and allowable failure rate probability to the subsystem and component level.
Research Question 1.3:
How can the identified aircraft level off-nominal requirements be allocated to the unit
level?
Formulation of Hypothesis 1.3
The output of hypothesis 1.2 is expected to be a hazard severity allocation to the
‘multistate’ novel aircraft architecture characterized by multiple unique failure states
for a given function. For novel aircraft concepts that fall under 14 CFR Part 23
(Normal Category), each hazard severity has an associated maximum allowable failure
rate requirement imposed by the FAA and is given in table 2. These requirements
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are imposed at the top level and need to be allocated to the component level for
any system. This is accomplished in the present work by using a network reliability
algorithm that automates a bottom-up analysis to determine the effect of component
failures on the platform level functions. A rough idea of how this algorithm works
is stated here, along with further details provided in Ch. 4.4. The overarching idea
is to determine system level failure states by considering a single component failure
at a time. Once a set of all system level failure states is obtained, single component
failures that lead to the same state are combined into a logical ‘OR’ statement.
The allowable failure probability of the system in the given state, as computed from
hypothesis 1.2, is therefore a sum of the individual component probabilities that result
in the said state. These are then allocated using a reliability allocation method. This
method assumes that component failures are independent of one another and that the
probability of multiple components failing at once is much less than the probability
of any one component failing.
At the end of the allocation exercise, it is expected that all components of a system
architecture will have allowable probability requirements (or reliability requirements)
allocated.
Hypothesis 1.3: If unit level failures are mapped to system level failure states,
the allowable failure rate requirements generated at the system level can be allocated
to the unit level
A Note on Uncertainty
Hypothesis 1 which combines extended C-FHA and multistate performance based
severity assessment, relies on available performance models to determine the effects of
functional degradation on safety metrics in order to characterize hazards and allocate
failure rate requirements to the unit level. The last requirement to be satisfied to
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completely answer research question 1 needs a quantification of uncertainty due to
modeling assumptions. This is accomplished by completing the process laid out under
chapter 3.2 for different modeling assumptions and is shown notionally in Fig. 20.
Figure 20: Notional uncertainty propagation during the C-FHA process
Since the safety metrics are computed from functional degradation scenarios using
available performance models, the uncertainty in model inputs can be propagated
using the same models. This can be achieved by representing modeling uncertainty
by distributions in input variables. The resultant output will be a distribution in the
safety metrics of interest, which can be used to determine hazard severity by designers
as shown notionally in Fig. 20.
Figure 21 provides an overview of the research formulation of research area 1.
3.3 Research Area 2
Observation group 2 from chapter 2.5 is concerned with the large uncertainty in
quantitative risk assessments of novel aircraft architectures primarily due to the lack
of data and experience. The goal of this research area is to provide a solution to this
problem using some enablers found in literature.
Research Question 2
It was noted earlier that traditional methods are unable to provide a complete
treatment of epistemic uncertainty due to the traditional ‘frequentist’ approach. Ad-
ditionally, the aleatory uncertainty, which is best reduced with abundant data, is
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Figure 21: Overview of Research Area 1
large for novel technologies. This leads to the following research question (RQ):
Research Question 2:
What method or group of methods can allow estimation of unit and system reliability
- accounting for both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty under scarcity of available
data, while also providing a mathematically defensible framework for compliance
decision making?
Resultant Requirements It is clear that any solution that tries to answer RQ 2
must account for both aleatory as well as epistemic uncertainty under a scarcity of
available data. Additionally, it requires the solution to provide a mathematically de-
fensible framework for compliance decision making. Thus, the resultant requirements
to be met by any potential solution for RQ 2 are as follows:
Requirements:
1. Ability to estimate unit level probabilities under scarcity of available data
2. Explicit treatment of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty
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3. A mathematically defensible framework for compliance decision making
4. Estimation of multistate system reliability
Research Question 2.1
A solution under consideration can be shown to answer research question 2 if
and only if it can meet the requirements above. These requirements can be further
grouped into three broad categories. The first deals with the ability to estimate unit
level probabilities while providing a thorough treatment of uncertainty under scarce
data (requirements 1,2 above). These two can therefore be restated as a smaller re-
search question:
Research Question 2.1:
What method or group of methods can allow estimation of unit level reliability while
accounting for both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty under scarcity of available
data?
Formulation of Hypothesis 2.1
There are two schools of thought when it comes to defining probability - the
‘frequentist’ (objective) and the ‘Bayesian’ (subjective). A Bayesian approach of
estimating probability allows for the treatment of both epistemic and aleatory un-
certainty even when available data is limited. Kaplan and Garrick argue that when
faced with insufficient data, there is no choice but to use a Bayesian approach [100].
Instead of only using data, a Bayesian approach relies on using information - which
includes data, models, and other available information like subject matter expert
(SME) knowledge [58]. Furthermore, a Bayesian inference model can be continuously
updated as additional information becomes available. Bayesian inference techniques
for safety and reliability assessment have been applied to numerous problems in lit-
erature [21, 28, 43, 177] and are considered mature and mathematically sound for the
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purpose. The utility of this approach can be attested to when one considers that
numerous industries consider these techniques standard [1, 79, 80, 102]. Hypothesis
2.1 is therefore stated as follows:
Hypothesis 2.1: Utilizing a Bayesian probability framework to model unit level
failure rates results in a more comprehensive treatment of both epistemic and aleatory
uncertainty under scarcity of available data.
Research Question 2.2
Once unit level reliability requirements have been allocated using hypothesis 1.3
and Bayesian failure rate posteriors are obtained, the next obvious step is to com-
plete a compliance finding for each component of the architecture of interest. The
traditional means of completing this step involves utilizing a point probability value
for every component, along with a point probability requirement as stated in table 2.
The benefit of a Bayesian framework over a traditional frequentist approach is that it
provides a ‘probability of frequency’ [100]. A probability distribution (of failure rate
for instance), has intrinsic meaning in quantifying uncertainty. This is lost when a
simple point estimate is taken of it. Therefore, the next logical question to be asked
pertains to whether an advantage of the Bayesian probability framework can be taken
when it comes to compliance decision making - so as to not throw away all the gains
made in quantifying uncertainty in failure rates by reverting to a point estimate. This
is stated as research question 2.2:
Research Question 2.2:
How can mathematically defensible compliance decisions be made without losing the
gains made in quantifying uncertainty?
Formulation of Hypothesis 2.2
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Compliance finding is often an exercise in decision making under uncertainty.
Washington et al. [172] suggest using a Bayesian decision framework for this pur-
pose alongside generated Bayesian probability estimates. Bayesian inference pro-
vides a mathematical framework for measuring uncertainty while making decisions
using Bayesian probability theory. Input to such a framework are the unit fail-
ure rate posteriors which provide the degree of belief in the failure rates of com-
ponents, along with any requirements on said components. In a Bayesian decision
theoretic setup, an action space a ∈ A represents actions to be taken (in this context:
A = {‘compliant′, ‘non − compliant′}). Every action comes with a loss (opposite
of utility), which is given by a loss function L(θ, a). The loss function depends not
only on the compliance action taken but also on the (unknown) true state of the
component. This true state is estimated using the posterior distribution obtained
from hypothesis 2.1. The idea behind a Bayesian decision framework is to minimize
the expectation of this loss function with respect to the component posterior failure
rate. A decision action a∗ (also called Bayes’ action), that minimizes this expected
loss, is chosen as a compliance action for the given component. Further details of this
method are given in Ch. 5.2. Hypothesis 2.2 can thus be stated as follows:
Hypothesis 2.2: If the posterior expected loss using suitable loss functions can be
determined for system components, then the action that minimizes such an expected
loss would inform the compliance action to be taken under uncertainty
Research Question 2.3
With hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2, the part of research question 2 that deals with esti-
mating unit level probabilities under a scarcity of data while characterizing epistemic
and aleatory uncertainty, as well as a mathematically defensible framework for unit
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level compliance making is complete. All that remains is the requirement to esti-
mate the multistate reliability of novel architectures at the system level. This final
research sub-question, once answered, will completely satisfy the requirements neces-
sary to provide a solution for research question 2.
Research Question 2.3:
What method can allow the estimation of multistate system reliability while account-
ing for both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty under scarcity of available data?
Formulation of Hypothesis 2.3
As stated earlier, novel aircraft concepts are expected to have physical architec-
tures that satisfy at least one aircraft level function using non-traditional solutions
(see definition 2.1.1.1). As a result, it can be assumed, without loss of generality, that
such configurations will not have the traditional binary failure states for a function or
system of interest (operating/failed). Instead, these architectures are likely to have
multiple terminal components providing a given function. Consider a distributed elec-
tric propulsion aircraft for example. The task of providing thrust is divided between
multiple electric propulsors, instead of the traditional usual two. When multiple com-
ponents help satisfy a system level function, their failures result in the system having
multiple failure states. Thus, novel aircraft architectures are likely to have multiple
failure states in certain functions of interest. In literature, reliability assessment of
systems with multiple failure states falls under the domain of multi-state systems.
Multi-state network reliability theory is one of the most developed in this field and
therefore, the most promising to provide a solution to the problem at hand. Within
the multi-state network reliability paradigm, numerous methods exist to estimate the
reliability (analogous to failure rate) of a complex system in its various states [176].
While additional details have been provided in chapter 5.3, a modified Monte Carlo
approach seems promising and robust [176]. Therefore, hypothesis 2.3 can be stated
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as:
Hypothesis 2.3: A multistate network reliability approach utilizing Monte Carlo
simulations, suitably adjusted to work with Bayesian failure rate posteriors will pro-
vide accurate estimation of the system level reliability under uncertainty.
Figure 22 provides an overview of the research formulation of research area 2.
Figure 22: Overview of Research Area 2
3.4 Research Area 3
The intent of research area 3 is to integrate the tools and methods discussed so
far into a framework that allows better incorporation of safety related off-nominal
considerations into early design stages for novel aircraft architectures.
Research Question 3
The chief takeaway from observation group 3 in chapter 2.5 is the limited scope
to incorporate safety related off-nominal requirements into the aircraft design loop
during the early design phases. In the overarching research objective of the present
thesis, research areas 1 and 2 focus on (i) identifying the off-nominal requirements
for novel architectures, (ii) allocating them to the system and component level, and
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(iii) enabling compliance decision making at the system and component level under
uncertainty. The last remaining objective is utilizing the developed framework to
inform design trade studies during the preliminary design stage. With that in mind,
research question 3 (RQ 3) is stated as follows:
Research Question 3:
How can design trade studies for novel aircraft architectures and technologies be
conducted in early design while incorporating safety related off-nominal scenarios?
Formulation of Hypothesis 3
The resultant framework is intended to integrate the methods utilized to iden-
tify and characterize off-nominal hazards with the multi-state reliability assessment
and compliance process to evaluate the safety of a novel aircraft architecture. Re-
sults from component and system level compliance decision making can be fed back
into the design loop, where alternatives can be evaluated. This can be in terms of
targeted resizing or re-architecting of the system to improve compliance finding. Pro-
viding designers with results of a what-if analysis to make such safety-risk informed
decisions is the end goal of the present work. To this end, an integrated framework to
evaluate off-nominal requirements and reliability of novel aircraft architectures and
technologies is provided in Ch. 3.5.
Hypothesis 3: The integrated framework given in figures 24 or 70 enables design
trade studies while incorporating safety related off-nominal requirements and reliabil-
ity of novel aircraft architectures in early design
Figure 23 provides an overview of the research formulation of research area 3.
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Figure 23: Overview of Research Area 3
3.5 Developed Framework
An overview of the developed framework is provided in figure 24. It is assumed in
Fig. 24 that the configuration has been sized – this includes the weight breakdown
including mass properties, geometric definitions including wing and other areas in-
cluding locations of control surfaces if any, architecture definition that includes any
redundancy considerations for the internal energy flows of the systems, any available
aerodynamics and propulsion models, and finally, any available subsystem sizing de-
tails. Depending on the stage of design (conceptual/preliminary), the first task then
is to identify a set of appropriate safety metrics of interest for the given architecture.
For the conceptual level analysis, adequate models are developed for the functions of
interest to characterize the effect of functional degradation on safety metrics. These
may include models that can characterize the take-off, climb, cruise, and landing
performance in the conceptual design phase. When additional knowledge is avail-
able in early preliminary design, this performance model library can be expanded to
include aircraft trim and dynamic considerations under off-nominal operating states
that the architecture may find itself in. The purpose of these models is to quantify
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the change in safety metrics of interest (see Table 3) under functional or component
loss scenarios. These metrics are compared with their allowable thresholds that are
established based on regulatory requirements, or subject matter expert suggestions
to obtain system level functional or multistate availability requirements. These are
passed on to the next module to compute component level requirements. A bottom-up
network algorithm computes the requirements allocated to the components, followed
by a Bayesian safety and decision making framework. The system level multistate
reliability is computed along with system level multistate compliance findings. The
outputs of the compliance findings are translated to the final part where unit level im-
portance metrics are quantified as an exercise in sensitivity analysis to the component
failure rate posteriors. Any geometric trade studies can be conducted by repeating
the process after obtaining modified system models. At this stage, the framework can
be used to inform design decisions, as well as close the loop to optimize the conceptual
sizing using reliability information in a reliability based design optimization (RBDO)
loop (beyond the scope of the present work). The outputs of which can be used to
inform the late stage preliminary design and onward.
3.6 Test Problem Definition
The framework developed in this work will be thoroughly demonstrated on a test
problem. The intent of this section is to characterize the desired qualities in a test
problem in order to utilize the results generated and verify all the hypotheses stated so
far. It is important that the test problem maintain sufficient complexity and fidelity
in order to characterize real life conceptual design problems, while also being simple
enough so that the results do not get confounded with other emergent attributes of
the system.
Problem Characterization





























































problem that meets certain criteria. The research objective of this thesis is to enhance
the current safety assessment paradigm for novel architectures and technologies. As
discussed earlier, novel concepts have a lack of available data or relevant experience
for safety assessments. Additionally, due to multiple terminal components utilized to
satisfy a top level function in a novel architecture, traditional binary system failure
states are replaced with multi-state failure considerations. Finally, the framework
aims to inform the early preliminary aircraft design process, which places restrictions
on the amount of detail available. Thus, a test problem used to demonstrate this
framework needs to satisfy the following considerations:
1. Novel architecture according to definition 2.1.1.1
2. Insufficient safety data - large uncertainty
3. Complex architectural connectivity leading to multiple failure states
4. Design knowledge - conceptual to preliminary
5. Benchmarking results available for comparison
A Test Distributed Electric Propulsion (T-DEP) Aircraft
A test distributed electric propulsion architecture (T-DEP) aircraft inspired by
the X-57 is chosen as a test-case aircraft to demonstrate the proposed method. The
X-57 Maxwell is an experimental aircraft designed to demonstrate a 3.5 times aero-
propulsive efficiency gain at a “high-speed cruise” flight condition for comparable
general aviation aircraft by effectively utilizing propulsive airframe integration (PAI),
made practical due to the progress made in electric propulsive powertrains [52]. To
build the X-57, a Tecnam P2006T airframe is to be modified with a higher aspect ra-
tio wing, with two main propulsive electric motors installed at the wingtips to power
the cruise propellers. Another 12 electric motors in nacelle-pylons will power the
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high lift propellers distributed across the wing leading edge. This Distributed Elec-
tric Propulsion (DEP) architecture is expected to provide a higher dynamic pressure
during takeoff and landing while providing more efficient aero-propulsive performance
during cruise. Overall, the X-57 is expected to achieve a five times lower energy use
than the Tecnam P2006T [55].
It is easy to demonstrate that the T-DEP aircraft modeled on the X-57 meets the
definition provided for novel aircraft architectures (see Def. 2.1.1.1). The distributed
electric propulsors along with wing-tip cruise motors provide a novel architectural
solution for the aircraft level function of ‘Provide Thrust’. Similarly, the twelve high
lift propulsors also augment the aerodynamic characteristics, specifically the lift gen-
erated by the wing, and therefore act as high-lift devices (in addition to the presence
of flaps). This provides a novel solution to the aircraft level function of ‘Provide High
Lift’ during takeoff or landing, with wing flaps being the traditional choice of physical
solution to provide that function.
Being a novel DEP concept, there is limited data regarding the reliability of
electrical systems of such an aircraft, leading to large uncertainty. The modeled T-
DEP aircraft simplifies the design detail publicly available for the X-57, and can be
considered to be at the preliminary stage (see Ref. [132] for details). In addition
to the novel technologies being tested with the X-57 program, of interest in the
present work are the tools and methods used to conduct a safety analysis of such
transformational aviation concepts. Research in this direction available in literature
points towards the utilization of traditional methods or early conceptual analyses to
assess safety [52, 145, 147, 174].
The DEP architecture is the novel feature of the test aircraft considered in this
dissertation. Having multiple propulsors, the effect of one or more propulsors failing
must be considered to assess the safety of the aircraft. Each cruise motor can fail at
either 50% thrust, or 0%, while each high lift motor has a binary failure mode. As a
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result, the total number of failure states of the T-DEP aircraft propulsion architecture
is 32.212 − 1 = 36861. Discounting for symmetry in the XZ plane, these become
18431 unique failure states – a number large enough to cause difficulty in conducting
a traditional safety analysis comprehensively. Therefore, the modeled aircraft, in
particular, its traction power system architecture meets all the requirements stated
under the problem characterization above and forms the test problem for the current
work.
(a) The X-57 (credit: NASA)
(b) The T-DEP aircraft power system representative diagram (Adapted from Ref. [52])
Figure 25: Test problem concept and architecture
The simplified power system of the T-DEP aircraft is inspired by the X-57. Its
components and connectivity are shown in figure 25 and have been adapted and
simplified from Clarke et al. [52]. It has two main batteries, traction buses, pre-
chargers, and inverters supplying 30 kW each (half of the required cruise power)
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to the wing-tip cruise motors. Similarly, each battery bus supplies three high lift
motors on either side of the wing, providing good redundancy. The X-57 traction
power system has been designed using a combination of available standards and best
practices since the traditional 14 CFR Part 23 and Part 25 provide little applicable
guidance for electric power systems [52]. Clarke et al. [52] also performed a traditional
safety analysis (FMECA1) on this system, including all permutations of cruise or high
lift motors failing. Since multiple failure modes of any component have the same effect
at the system level, only single-point top level failure modes of the components were
considered. Their results show two primary critical failure scenarios – (i) asymmetric
thrust due to cruise motor failure, and (ii) in-flight battery fire. While the former
results in an untrimmable yawing moment using the stock rudder, the latter can result
in total power loss and catastrophic structural failure. Both of these are potentially
unrecoverable for the pilot. Additionally, Ref. [52] provides a failure scenario matrix
providing criticality of single component failures. These results will therefore be
utilized to benchmark the performance of the severity assessment method presented
in the current work.
Chapter 4 up next deals with the first research area in greater detail, while chap-
ters 5, and 6 discuss the second and third research area is greater detail. The experi-
ments conducted in this thesis are not discussed in the present chapter. Instead, they
are discussed in the chapters that discuss the details of every research area. This is
to allow sufficient discussion on designing the correct experiments for the research
questions and hypotheses of interest while providing enough technical background on
the test problem at hand.
1Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
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CHAPTER IV
EXTENDED C-FHA AND PERFORMANCE-BASED
MULTISTATE ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the work on the first research area which deals with identi-
fication, characterization, and allocation of safety related off-nominal requirements.
This particular research area is motivated by observations group 1 (see Ch. 2.5). To
recap, it was discussed how traditional FHA considers the discrete loss of function or
malfunction scenarios, while assumptions during traditional PSSA can lead to inac-
curate estimation of off-nominal requirements. These issues are especially pertinent
for novel aircraft architectures, where the imagination of failure might be limited due
to lack of experience, and where traditionally postulated off-nominal scenarios might
not capture the safety space accurately. These considerations led to the first research
question (RQ), which is restated below:
Research Question 1:
What method or group of methods can enable identification, characterization, and
allocation of safety related off-nominal requirements for novel aircraft architectures
and technologies in the conceptual and preliminary design stage?
Literature to deal with identifying off-nominal conditions in novel concepts or
technologies converges on the need to utilize system performance or dynamic models
for this purpose. Methods in literature that take this approach to reliability can be
broadly classified into five categories.
89
Model Based Dependability Analysis (MBDA) techniques synthesize dependabil-
ity information from system models automatically [98, 99]. This is typically accom-
plished by automatically generating fault trees (FTs) and failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) tables using system models that have been annotated with failure
information, including the modes in which each component fails, and their probabil-
ities [138, 139, 141, 142, 171]. While these help to automate the task of conducting
analysis during the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), they do not explic-
itly deal with the challenges faced by novel technologies, viz. the lack of knowledge
or experience regarding their off-nominal scenarios.
Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) was developed over a decade be-
tween 1981 to 1992 to evaluate nuclear reactor safety [17,20,57]. It involves utilizing
a dynamic-behavioral model of the system along with Markov chains to model the
stochastic transitions that take place between system configurations as components
fail. However, this method presumes a coupling between system dynamic variables
and stochastic transitions between component failures - an assumption that is un-
necessary given aircraft failure states pan out over time periods of seconds, and the
probability of multiple components failing in that time duration is very small. This
makes the mathematical formulation of DPRA needlessly complex for aircraft prob-
lems [61].
In fault tolerant computing systems, ‘Performability’ analysis deals with quanti-
fying system performance degradation due to faults and their interactions with the
overall system [29, 126]. Meyer coined the term ‘Performability’ to denote a unified
treatment of performance and reliability while providing a probabilistic framework
to jointly model the two [127]. In it, a reward, based on the system’s performance is
assigned to every state of the Markov chain. While promising, this technique needs
modifications in the reward function to deal with aircraft systems applications.
Armstrong proposed Continuous Functional Hazard Assessment (C-FHA) instead
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of traditional FHA to explore the effect of the magnitude of function loss on hazard
severity [25]. Since it works at a functional level, this method is well suited to be
applied during the conceptual design phase, when not much is known in terms of the
detailed subsystem architecture. While it was used to determine optimal load shed-
ding schedules under degradation, it shows promise to be applied to novel concepts
in the current work.
Finally, Domínguez-García and Agte developed a method to utilize elements of
Performability analysis, viz Markov rewards models, but with reward functions given
by differential equations related to aircraft performance metrics to model multistate
system reliability using dynamic performance models [15, 16, 60, 61]. These methods
utilize Markov Analysis and are therefore restricted by its limitations of an exponen-
tially growing state-space as the size of the system being analyzed increases.
Of these five broad techniques that utilize system performance under off-nominal
situations to infer hazard severity, the last two – C-FHA and multistate system per-
formance analysis seem to fit the requirements generated from RQ 1 and provided in
chapter 3.2. In their implementation in the present work, they are modified to better
suit the research objective and are explained in the following sections.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Extension to C-FHA
The functional decomposition of a novel system architecture or technology is likely
to remain similar to a conventional system even if the implementation varies drasti-
cally between the two. For example, an airborne system is likely to have a function
“Provide Thrust” to overcome drag and translate, or “Provide Lift” to stay airborne
irrespective of whether it is a conventional tube and wing aircraft, or a Distributed
Electric Propulsion (DEP) concept. Traditional FHA utilizes this knowledge to keep
implementation and behavioral spaces independent while characterizing hazards [26].
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While traditional FHA considers discrete off-nominal scenarios like (i) Excess func-
tion, (ii) Loss of function, (iii) Incorrect operation of function, these scenarios might
not be enough to explain off-nominal conditions faced by novel architectures. It can
become important to differentiate between magnitudes of function loss in terms of
continuous functional degradation.
(a) Traditional loss function for given limits (b) Taguchi loss function for given limits
Figure 26: From traditional loss to Taguchi loss (adapted from [25])
Armstrong made a case for Continuous FHA (C-FHA) to assign a continuous
hazard severity to a continuous functional degradation scenario [25] while looking
at load shedding optimization under off-nominal scenarios. He compared the C-
FHA approach to Taguchi’s loss function approach in quality control and robust
design, where a traditional step loss function is replaced by a continuous one. This
is represented notionally in figure 26. Taguchi’s idea was to minimize the loss of
design variance in terms of cost, while Armstrong used a continuous representation
of functional hazard to inform load shedding optimization by minimizing hazard risk
for the more-electric aircraft [25].
The present work utilizes this approach in a different sense to optimizing the load
shedding capability of the system. Novel architectures by definition, are likely to have
unique solutions for satisfying aircraft level functions by definition. More often than
not, this involves distributing the satisfaction of these functions to multiple terminal
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(a) Notional traditional FHA severity (b) Notional C-FHA severity
Figure 27: Notional hazard severity - from traditional FHA to Continuous FHA
components (energy sinks) as opposed to the traditional one or two. Therefore, a
failure in a subset of these terminal components is likely to result in a near-continuous
degradation in the function performed. For example, consider a distributed electric
propulsion system with 16 propulsors. The satisfaction of the function ‘generate
thrust’ is now the responsibility of 16 terminal propulsors, as against a traditional
two. Losing 4 out of 16 propulsors may result in a 25% loss of thrust, while losing 8
out of 16 may result in a 50% loss of thrust. While both of these situations would fall
under Partial thrust loss under the traditional FHA paradigm, both these situations
will result in different system responses and hazard severity.
Continuous FHA allows the characterization of such continuous degradation sce-
narios by assigning a continuous hazard severity to them as is shown notionally by
figure 27. Even within the case where 4 out of 16 propulsors fail, the system response
may be different based on which specific propulsors fail. Four outboard propulsors
failing on the same side of the wing are likely to cause a more severe hazard compared
to two each failing symmetrically due to lateral stability considerations. C-FHA ex-
tends the traditional FHA to consider the magnitude of function loss while assessing
an architecture.
The present work extends C-FHA to involve the number of terminal component
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failures in evaluating the failure states and consequences of novel multistate architec-
tures 1. Once a hazard severity is defined as a result of continuous function degra-
dation, the allowable failure rates necessarily follow an inverse trend (as is also seen
in table 2 in chapter 1). This now means that reliability needs to be redefined as a
multi-state reliability – in terms of the capability or probability of a system’s ability
to perform a given degree of a function. In the above example of a distributed elec-
tric propulsion architecture, the probability of 8 out of 16 propulsors failing would
generally be lower than the probability of 4 out of 16 failing. In such a case, the
architecture will have a different probability of providing (reliability) 50% thrust as
compared to its probability of providing 25% thrust.
Figure 28: Notional plot of the extended C-FHA process
The extension to C-FHA in the present work can be notionally explained through
Fig. 28. As a first step, the analyst establishes safety critical metrics of interest for
different functions and different flight phases. Next, the effect of functional degra-
dation scenarios on the established safety metrics is determined using appropriate
performance or simulation models. Typically, every such metric is likely to have a
threshold, which when crossed represents a safety concern. Therefore, the analyst is
required to define continuous hazard severity as a function of variation in the estab-
lished safety metrics. Decision makers can then utilize this knowledge to combine the
different hazard severity curves into one most conservative hazard severity curve for
1This approach has been demonstrated by the author in prior work [30,34]
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the function under consideration for the flight phase of interest. This is shown in the
first part of Fig. 28. This final hazard severity - function loss curve now provides a
physics backed relationship between the two, as opposed to a heuristic and case-by-
case approach provided by traditional FHA. Finally, this process must be repeated
for a given function at each mission phase and expected off-nominal scenarios.
SMi = Fn(Fdegraded, A,Op) (15)
H = Fn(SMi, SMthreshold, A,Op) (16)
Op = {altitude,Mach, configuration, ...} (17)
Thus, the safety metrics are computed as a function of degradation in aircraft
function, aircraft architecture, and operational scenario as given in Eq. 15. When a
threshold value for these safety metrics is established, it can be used alongside the
computed metrics to determine the hazard severity given in Eq. 16. Such a C-FHA
curve can be generated for every aircraft level function of interest under different
flight conditions. Once these hazard severity curves are generated, the allowable
failure rate requirements necessarily follow an inverse trend as mentioned earlier.
These requirements are allocated to the aircraft at a functional level and need to be
allocated down to the system and subsystem or component level – a problem that will
be dealt with later. Selecting appropriate safety metrics, and defining hazard severity
as a function of these safety metrics are the only two steps an analyst is required to
perform manually a priori in the current method. However, it is important to note
that hazard severity requirements eventually collapse from their continuous form to
step functions mandated by regulations which designers have little power to change.
They are generally categorized into four significant, discrete categories - i) Minor,
ii) Major, iii) Hazardous, and iv) Catastrophic [8]. Therefore, even after using a
continuous curve for hazard analysis, the final system level allocation must, due to
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regulations, be discrete.
4.1.2 Performance-based Multi-state Analysis
C-FHA utilizes conceptual level system performance models to characterize hazard
severity. When higher fidelity models and greater design knowledge is available, 6
degrees of freedom (6-DoF) system models can be used to inform the severity of
off-nominal conditions. The second method is this thesis is inspired by the work
of Domínguez-García and Agte who developed a method to utilize Markov chains to
compute aircraft state transitions as one or more components fail [15,16,60,61]. They
augmented the Markov reward functions with performance metrics from aircraft 6-
DoF models to determine safe and unsafe aircraft characteristics for every system state
identified in the Markov chains. While they generate results to estimate nominal and
off-nominal states, they do not explicitly translate these performance characteristics
into hazard severity and therefore reliability requirements. Instead, they identify
system availability and unreliability as a function of time, while not dealing with the
problem of requirements allocation at the system and component level.
Figure 29 was first introduced in chapter 3.2 and is reproduced here to provide
a notional overview of what this method entails. A detailed model of the aircraft
that combines aircraft geometry and configuration details with mass properties and
aero-propulsive forces and moments to generate a 6-DoF trim analysis capability
is developed for this method. The intent is to simulate each unique system state
under consideration to determine the capability of the aircraft while maintaining trim
conditions. These trim solutions are used in conjunction with engineering judgement
and certification requirements to characterize the severity of different system states.
Similar to C-FHA, this method seeks to quantify performance metrics of interest and
compare them against a threshold to determine hazard severity. The difference is the
utilization of higher fidelity (6-DoF) models to conduct trim analysis under failures.
96
Figure 29: Notional plot of the multi-state performance based safety assessment
process
Therefore, developing models that can simulate the system in its different states,
and identifying metrics that can be used to characterize hazard severity are the two
precursors to successfully implementing this method.
(a) Example network representation (b) Corresponding adjacency matrix
Figure 30: An example system with two sources and three terminal components in
network representation
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The last block in figure 29 denotes the system failure states identified and sim-
ulated using the generated 6-DoF aircraft model. In the present method, system
states is a term borrowed from Markov analysis where different failure states are
called Markov states. Presently, these states refer to failed system configurations
when one or more of the terminal components that provide a system level function
fail.
As an example, consider a system with two sources and three sinks as shown in
figure 30(a). In an aircraft, these can be represented by batteries (sources of energy),
and propulsors (sinks that satisfy system function ‘Provide Thrust’). Dummy com-
ponents D1, D2 have been added to the system for the purpose of computing system
reliability as will be discussed in Ch. 5.3, and can be ignored in the following dis-
cussion. The system level function is provided by the three terminal components T1,
T2, T3 shown. The source components S1, S2 redundantly supply the intermediate
component I2, while I1 and I3 are supplied by a single source. Such a system architec-
ture can be represented as a binary adjacency matrix as shown in figure 30(b), with
dark spaces showing the positions of ‘1’s. At the system level, the function under
consideration is being satisfied by just three terminal components - T1, T2, and T3.
Assuming each of these has a binary operational state of operational or failed, a total
of 7 unique failure states result at the system level function. These are given in the
first column of table 4. The system states can be a result of different components,
or a combination of components failing and is given by the second column. The cor-
responding probability of the system entering said failed states is given by the third
column and is of interest in the problem of multi-state reliability calculation that
will be discussed in Ch. 5.3. The idea of the last block in figure 29 is to identify
such unique states so that they can be simulated by the aircraft 6-DoF model to
obtain their trim performance. The obtained performance metrics are then used to
determine the hazard severity for each one of these states.
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T1 S1 or I1 or T1 p(S1)+p(I1)+p(T1)
T2 I2 or T2 p(I2)+p(T2)
T3 S2 or I3 or T3 p(S2)+p(I3)+p(T3)
T1 & T2
(S1 and I2) or (I1 and I2)
or (S1 and T2) or (I1 and T2)
or (T1 and T2) or (I2 and T1)
p(S1).p(I2) + p(I1).p(I2)
+ p(S1).p(T2) + p(I1).p(T2)
+ p(T1).p(T2) + p(I2).p(T1)
T2 & T3
(S2 and I2) or (I3 and I2)
or (S2 and T2) or (I3 and T2)
or (T3 and T2) or (I2 and T3)
p(S2).p(I2) + p(I3).p(I2)
+ p(S2).p(T2) + p(I3).p(T2)
+ p(T3).p(T2) + p(I2).p(T3)
T1 & T3
(I1 and I3) or (I1 and T3)
or (I3 and T1) or (T1 and T3)
p(I1).p(I3) + p(I1).p(T3)
+ p(I3).p(T1) + p(T1).p(T3)
T1 & T2 & T3 (S1 and S2) or ... (3x terms) p(S1).p(S2) + ... (3x terms)
The first hypothesis considers the two methods discussed above and is restated
here
Hypothesis 1: A hybrid approach utilizing Continuous FHA during conceptual
sizing and multistate performance models during preliminary sizing, along with suit-
able safety metrics and reliability allocation methods, will yield more accurate iden-
tification and allocation of off-nominal requirements (than traditional safety analysis
methods) for novel aircraft architectures and technologies
4.2 Safety Metrics
The extended C-FHA and multistate performance based methods both rely on the
identification and evaluation of suitable metrics, termed ‘safety metrics’ to quantify
hazards. This leads to the first research sub-question that is restated here:
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Research Question 1.1:
What metrics can be used with the methods given in hypothesis 1 to identify off-
nominal requirements in the conceptual and preliminary design phase?
As noted in chapter 3.2 under the formulation of solutions for research question 1.1,
there is no one-size fits all answer for the appropriate safety metrics to be considered
in the above mentioned methods. Novel concepts can vary in their novelty regard-
ing the physical architectural solutions for different functions. Therefore, different
metrics may have to be used depending on the architecture of interest.
The first quality that any metrics considered for this problem have is safety rele-
vance. They must correlate well with safety for the mission segments they are consid-
ered. Additionally, it would be preferred if they provide not just a binary distinction
of ‘safe’ versus ‘unsafe’, but also provide an understanding of the extent to which a
condition is unsafe. Although different metrics may be used for different architec-
tures, it would be favorable to have some homogeneity in their definition and use. As
a second quality to have, it would be favorable if these metrics be as generalizable as
possible. Due to the wide architectural diversity expected in novel aircraft concepts,
it is important that the safety metrics identified be comparable across a wide range
of aircraft sizes, architectures, and operations.
The test problem of interest in the present section is the T-DEP power systems
architecture that provides power supply to the two cruise motors and the twelve
distributed propulsors. For the present section, solutions to research question 1.1 are
drawn from an extensive literature survey of criteria or metrics that are traditionally
correlated with safety for the function ‘Provide Thrust’. Literature review for this
exercise focuses on two broad areas – i) Metrics used in the safety analysis of flight
operations, and ii) Metrics used in preliminary aircraft and system safety assessments
using performance models.
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4.2.1 Metrics from Flight Operations
Literature related to flight operations data analysis abounds, especially in commer-
cial aviation, with metrics for programs like Flight Operational Quality Assurance
(FOQA) [67] and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) [47]. An unstable approach is a
major cause of aircraft accidents (see fig 5). An unstable approach may lead to
landing short, runway overruns, or hard landings. The FAA requires a stabilized
approach to have a constant rate of descent and constant angle near the touchdown
point, among other things [71]. These lead to stabilized approach criteria (SAC) that
have been widely studied [129, 162]. Some of the important parameters in SAC, and
summarized by Puranik [150] are
1. Descent altitude and profile
2. Airspeed




Exceedances are another set of criteria currently in use in the analysis of flight
operations. It is the deviation of a parameter beyond a predefined threshold. When
multiple parameter exceedances occur concurrently, it is called an Event. Typical






5. Oil temperature and pressure
6. Fuel quantity
7. Cylinder head temperature
It is clear from the above lists that not all these metrics satisfy the generalizability
requirement. For instance, exceedances in oil pressure, fuel quantity, and cylinder
head temperature are not applicable in most novel electric propulsion aircraft that
are expected to form a bulk of novel architectures. Metrics like airspeed or rate of
descent can be dependent on the size of the aircraft, and may not be comparable
across the board. Energy based metrics are another class of metrics that solve this
issue by providing a weight specific energy state characterization of the aircraft.
Energy Metrics
Originally used for fighter aircraft performance [46,156,178], energy metrics have
been used in cockpit displays to improve pilot awareness [19, 77, 170], in trajectory
optimization of unmanned vehicles [23], in energy based control systems [105, 107,
108] among numerous other studies. Puranik [149] suggested 19 energy metrics for
retrospective safety analysis of flight operations during takeoff, approach, and landing.
These typically include specific potential, kinetic, and total energy, their rates, and
their errors with respect to a reference profile. Figure 31 provides an overview of
these energy metrics.
The energy metrics given in figure 31 primarily compute the aircraft’s weight
specific mechanical energy, specific excess power, or its variants. Of these, when used
during conceptual design, the specific mechanical energy metrics (kinetic/potential)
are a function of the aircraft operational state and are assumed rather than calculated
using flight data. Only the metrics that can be computed from performance models
in the right column are relevant during conceptual design. If a simulator model that
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Figure 31: Summary of energy metrics utilized in GA flight data analysis (Adapted
from Ref. [150])
can simulate the flight profile under off-nominal states is available, the complete set
of metrics may be utilized. For the present work, it is assumed that a complete flight
simulator is unavailable, and only a preliminary 6-DoF model to conduct aircraft trim
analysis in the presence of failures is available. Some of these metrics are provided
below to aid further discussion –
Maximum Potential Flight Path angle is a theoretical maximum flight path






In the present work, this metric can be computed for different system failure states
and provides a surrogate for available specific excess power if the pilot were to apply
maximum throttle. This is achieved by replacing the Tmax term with a Tmax,available
term to represent that maximum thrust available might not be equal to the aircraft’s
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theoretical maximum thrust post failure. PFPAmax can then also be used in com-
puting the climb gradient under different loss of thrust scenarios.
Maximum Potential Climb Gradient (MPCG) can be obtained from PFPAmax
in light of the test problem for this thesis - the T-DEP power architecture, as a more
intuitive and direct metric that can be compared to certain certification requirements.
γmax = arcsin(PFPAmax) (19)
Minimum Potential Flight Path Angle is a theoretical minimum attainable at





Thrust Margin (TM) is a term that computes the margin between currently
required thrust to the maximum available at the current flight condition [150].
TM = 1− T
Tmax
(21)
While it provides an indicator of the percentage of available thrust being utilized in
a given scenario, it does not directly provide a comparable insight into the capability
of aircraft.
Energy Rate Margin (ERM) is a better indicator of the capability of an aircraft
to get out of trouble caused due to a low energy state. To that extent, it provides
a better metric than TM which does not tell much about its impact on the aircraft
energy state. ERM is defined as the ratio of actual specific excess power (PS) to the
theoretical maximum specific excess power that is provided at maximum thrust [150].
ERM =







In the present work, ERM is used under various loss of thrust scenarios. In such
off-nominal conditions, Tmax is replaced by Tmax,degraded to indicate it is the degraded
maximum capability available to the aircraft. A value less than -1 indicates that the
aircraft is rapidly losing energy height and has no means of making PS positive or even
0 – a potentially catastrophic situation. Similarly, during takeoff or climb conditions,
ERM is positive between 0 and +1. A value closer to +1 indicates that the aircraft is
operating close to its maximum power setting available and has little room to improve
performance further. Whereas, a case when −1 < ERM < 0 in climbing or cruise
segment might indicate the aircraft is limited by the control authority/trim penalty
and cannot fully utilize the thrust available post failure.
Energy Rate Demand (ERDm) denotes the maximum energy that can be dissi-
pated by the aircraft at the current speed and configuration [150]. When descending,
it is given by
ERDm =
W (γc + V̇cg )
Tidle −D
(24)
and while climbing, it is given by
ERDm =
W (γc + V̇cg )
Tmax −D
(25)
This metric is typically between 0 and 1, and when greater than one represents that
the commanded trajectory is untenable. A downside of this metric is that it requires a
commanded (or reference) flight profile while descending or climbing. For the present
analysis, such a commanded profile may not be available.
4.2.2 Metrics from Safety Analysis Literature
Studies that utilize system performance models to characterize aircraft safety are
relatively rare in literature. In a case study of the lateral directional flight control
system of a fighter aircraft, Dominguez-Garcia et al. [61] chose the sideslip angle,
the body axis roll rate, the body axis yaw rate, and the body axis roll angle as
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performance metrics to characterize hazards due to failures of different components.
These correspond well to the aircraft state variables typically considered under the
exceedance detection paradigm discussed above.
In a multistate design and performance robustness study by Agte et al. [15],
expected specific excess power in a climbing turn was considered as the metric of
interest to be evaluated for the nominal as well as off-nominal failure cases. The
specific excess power is just one of many metrics already discussed while deliberating
on ‘Energy Metrics’ above. In both these studies, detailed flight dynamics models, or
6-DoF models were utilized to map the response of failure cases in terms of metrics
of interest.
While evaluating off-nominal requirements on the More Electric Aircraft architec-
tures using optimal load-shedding, Armstrong utilized metrics like required takeoff
field length (TOFL) and available range for loss of thrust, potable air mass flow for
ECS failures, etc. for characterizing hazard severity [25].
In a study on reliability lunar surface systems, Borer et al [44] utilized system be-
havioral models to determine the degradation in system functions due to component
failures. While the metrics they used apply for lunar systems and are not particu-
larly relevant for novel aircraft architectures, they utilized side constraints on system
performance (lower bounds on functional satisfaction) to determine if a system was
failed.
4.2.3 Summary of Implemented Safety Metrics
The test problem of interest in the present work is T-DEP aircraft inspired by the
X-57 Maxwell (see Ch. 3.6). Although it has a novel architecture for the functions
of ‘provide thrust’ and ‘provide high lift’, the rest of the aircraft is a conventional
tube and wing design with a conventional horizontal and vertical tail. As has been
mentioned above, there is no one-size-fits-all set of metrics that can be utilized as
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safety metrics for the safety framework provided in this thesis. Therefore, this section
focused on identifying the metrics that would be best suited for the test problem in
implementing the developed framework.
Table 5: Summary of implemented safety metrics for the T-DEP problem
Classification Safety Metrics Required Model Detail
Performance-based
TOFLReq














(γ, θ, ψ, ϕ)
Throttle settings (τL, τR)
Control Deflections
(δr, δa)
Overall, research question 1.1 is answered by identifying and borrowing safety
relevant metrics by conducting a thorough literature review. Table 5 provides a
summary of the implemented metrics in this dissertation for research question 1.1.
4.3 Safety Related Off-Nominal Requirements
Having identified metrics suitable for the test problem of interest, the next research
sub-question considers the problem of estimating them under off-nominal scenarios,
and utilizing them to identify and characterize hazard severity.
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Research Question 1.2:
How can safety related off-nominal requirements be identified and allocated at the
system level during conceptual and preliminary design phases using the previously
defined safety metrics?
The formulation of hypothesis 1.2 for this research question is given in chapter 3.2.
Specifically, Continuous FHA and a performance-based multistate analysis were pro-
posed as two methods to quantify the metrics provided in table 5. The methods
themselves can be found in chapter 4.1. The idea is to utilize these methods to
quantify system performance using the metrics discussed earlier and compare them
to a threshold that is established using engineering judgement, or using regulatory
requirements. In light of this, hypothesis 1.2 is restated here for convenience:
Hypothesis 1.2: If the identified safety metrics are quantified under off-nominal
scenarios using appropriate system performance models, then identification and alloca-
tion of safety requirements at the system level can be completed with greater resolution
and accuracy than traditional methods
The process followed to implement C-FHA and the multistate method is given in
figure 32. A background is first provided into the available information and knowledge
about the distributed electric propulsion (DEP) aircraft.
4.3.1 Experiment 1.2
The intent of the present section is to follow the process given in figure 32 to demon-
strate that the two methods - C-FHA and Multistate Performance Analysis (see
Ch. 4.1), provide a better identification and characterization of safety requirements
than traditional methods. For that purpose experiment 1.2 is designed to test hy-
pothesis 1.2.
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Figure 32: Characterizing safety related off-nominal requirements
4.3.1.1 Purpose of the Experiment
Research question (RQ) 1 was partitioned into three sub-questions in Ch. 3.2 to make
it easier to demonstrate the truth value of hypothesis 1. In those partitions, RQ 1.2
deals with the first two requirements that were stated under RQ 1 – i) identification of
safety related off-nominal scenarios and corresponding hazards, and ii) Estimation of
safety requirements at the aircraft level. Hypothesis (H) 1.2 suggests that quantifying
the down-selected safety metrics from Ch. 4.2.3 on the test problem should result in
a more accurate allocation of safety requirements at the aircraft level compared to
traditional methods. Thus, the following are the main objectives of this experiment:
1. Demonstrate the utility of safety metrics to identify and characterize hazards
using the models discussed
2. Demonstrate that the resultant hazard severity allocation at the aircraft level
provides a better resolution than traditional methods
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4.3.1.2 Experiment Setup
In order to test H-1.2, two preconditions must be met - i) Hazards for the test problem
identified from traditional methods must be characterized, and ii) Hazard severity
results using the new methods and safety metrics must be generated. On comparing
the two sets of results, a determination can be made about whether the new methods
provide improved characterization of hazards.
The test problem of interest is the T-DEP traction power system architecture,
which is a simplified version of the X-57 traction power architecture. Failures in this
system affect the aircraft level functions of ‘Provide Thrust’ and ‘Provide High Lift’.
A failure in the traction power system can result in either a symmetric degradation
or an asymmetric degradation in these functions. Figure 33 that shows the T-DEP
aircraft traction power system was first introduced in Ch. 3.6 and is reproduced below
to aid the upcoming discussions.
Figure 33: T-DEP aircraft traction power system
For the benchmarking case, results available in literature [52, 144] are utilized
along with an assumed step function loss - hazard severity curve. For experiment 1.2,
hazard severity for functional degradation is identified using C-FHA and compared
against the benchmark FHA results. Additional results generated using the multi-
state performance analysis method are also compared to results from literature as a
benchmark. Upon comparison, it will be demonstrated that the methods proposed in
this thesis provide a better resolution in identifying and characterizing hazards and
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corresponding requirements compared to traditional approaches.
4.3.2 Benchmark Results
Traditional FHA typically recognizes a discrete loss of function to allocate hazard
severity to the aircraft level. For the test aircraft, this is represented in the present
work as three states for the function ‘Provide Thrust’ - i) Nominal, ii) Partial Loss
of Thrust, and iii) Complete Loss of Thrust. These are allocated hazard severity of
i)None, ii) Major, and iii) Catastrophic to serve as the benchmark functional hazard
allocation, and is represented by figure 34.
Figure 34: Traditional FHA - loss of thrust hazard severity
In addition, literature provides some results regarding the hazard severity of differ-
ent failure conditions of the X-57 traction power system [52,144]. In a presentation on
safety considerations for the X-57, Papathakis [144] classified five safety events rele-
vant to the traction power system using severity categories from MIL-STD-882E [59].
These categories as per MIL-STD-882E are: I - Catastrophic, II - Critical, III -
Marginal, IV - Negligible. For the present work, they are translated into the cat-
egories presented in table 2 as: I - Catastrophic, II - Hazardous, III - Major, IV -
Minor. The identified hazards and their risk profile is provided in table 6.
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Table 6: X-57 Power system hazard characterization [144]
Identified Hazard Severity Estimated Probability
Aircraft traction battery fire Catastrophic Remote
Traction bus failure Catastrophic Improbable
Symmetric loss of cruise
propeller thrust (partial/total) Hazardous Improbable
Abrupt asymmetric thrust Catastrophic Remote
Failure of propulsor system Catastrophic Improbable
In a study on the X-57 traction power system, Clarke et al [52] provided a failure
scenario matrix for the Mod-II and III architecture with no high lift propulsors (HLP)
given here in table 7. The severity categories are stated as follows [52] – S: Land as
Table 7: X-57 Power system failure scenarios [52]
Failure Scenario Severity
Single cruise motor S
Single motor controller M
Quad motor controller S
Single traction bus M
Quad traction buses S
Single main battery S
Dual main batteries S
soon as possible, and M: Land as soon as practical. These results from literature
visibly characterize failure scenarios as discrete loss of thrust events. They lend
credence to the hazard severity assigned to loss of thrust, partial or complete given
in figure 34. This discrete, step hazard allocation is therefore used as a benchmark to
compare the results generated from the process given in figure 32 for experiment 1.2.
The next sections will provide some background on the conceptual performance
and preliminary 6-DoF trim analysis models created in the present work to implement
the methods given in chapter 4.1.
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4.3.3 The T-DEP Aircraft Models
Both methods listed under chapter 4.1 require aircraft performance models to be
established to estimate safety metrics of interest. Therefore, the T-DEP aircraft’s
models have been created for the purpose of this thesis at two levels of detail -
i) conceptual to compute performance, and ii) 6-DoF preliminary to conduct trim
analysis. Conceptual models utilized for the C-FHA method require information of
only the aircraft weight, wing area, drag polar in different configurations, and thrust
in different configurations at different velocities. The 6-DoF preliminary model, on the
other hand, requires much more detailed definition of the geometry, mass properties,
aerodynamic characteristics, and propulsive performance. This detailed model is
explained below. The basic conceptual models will be explained when they are used.
The preliminary 6-DoF model is developed utilizing publicly available data, and first
order estimates where data is unavailable.
Maneuver Maneuver command
Time marching
ti , i = 0, ... , tf
~x at ti
~u at ti − ∆t
~x at ti
Controller ~u at ti
~x ,~u time history Vehicle ~x ~x ,~u ~x ,~u ~x
Mass
properties









~x at ti + ∆t Integration
Figure 35: DELPHI framework (Credit: Refs. [34, 161])
The Dynamic Environment for Loads Prediction and Handling Investigation (DEL-
PHI) framework developed as a flight dynamics simulation environment at the Aerospace
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Systems Design Lab is used in this work for 6-DoF trim analysis [63, 78, 160, 161].
Developed as an object-oriented python code, DELPHI is intended to have the capa-
bility to simulate any aircraft model in any desired maneuver. A high-level view of
DELPHI is shown in Fig. 35. Appendix B provides additional details of the simula-
tion environment. Some pertinent details are provided in the following sections for
completeness.
4.3.3.1 Geometry
Geometric details of the T-DEP aircraft are based on the publicly available X-57
OpenVSP model provided by NASA [133]. Figure 36 shows the three views of the
publicly available OpenVSP common research model (CRM) of the X-57 Mod. IV.
Important wing, horizontal stabilator, and vertical tail geometric details are given in
tables 8, 9, and 10.
Table 8: T-DEP aircraft wing geometry
Parameter Value Unit
Planform area- Swing 6.2 m2
Wingspan- bwing 9.64 m
Reference chord- cwing 0.65 m
Aspect ratio- ARwing 15
Incidence angle 2 deg
Table 9: T-DEP aircraft vertical tail geometry
Parameter Value Unit
Planform area- Svt 1.95 m2
Span- bvt 1.62 m
Reference chord- cvt 1.44 m
Leading edge sweep 37.45 deg
4.3.3.2 Mass Properties
The mass properties of the T-DEP aircraft are built-up from the X-57’s component
mass properties that are obtained from literature, or estimated based on the Tecnam
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(a) X-57 front view
(b) X-57 top view
(c) X-57 side view
Figure 36: The X-57 aircraft geometry using OpenVSP [133]
P2006T’s component weight breakdown. Each cruise motor is assumed to have a
mass of 117 lbs, while each high-lift motor is assumed to have a mass of 15 lbs [131].
The locations of the motors are obtained from the OpenVSP model and are given
in table 13. The battery is assumed to be located at the wing quarter chord and to
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Table 10: T-DEP aircraft stabilator geometry
Parameter Value Unit
Planform area- Sstab 2.45 m2
Span- bstab 3.14 m
Reference chord- cstab 0.78 m
have a mass of 860 lbs [131]. Procedures and equations provided in Ref. [110] are
utilized for computing inertia properties of the wing, empennage, and the fuselage
(see Appendix B). The component mass build-up is given in Table 11, and the net
aircraft mass properties are given in Table. 12.
Table 11: Mass build-up of T-DEP aircraft
Parameter Value Unit
2 × cruise motor 106.14 kg




Landing gear 61.15 kg
Wing 152.88 kg
2 × pilot 170 kg
Misc 135.7 kg
Total 1360.77 kg











The T-DEP aircraft’s propulsion is modeled to be as close to that of X-57 as possi-
ble, with simplifications where necessary. The X-57 is based on the Tecnam P2006T
which has been modified to test a distributed electric propulsive architecture. The
propulsion architecture therefore treats every single cruise and high lift propulsors
(HLP) as independent objects. The cruise motors can be throttled to control their
thrust, while the HLPs can only be switched on or off. To accurately capture the
impact of this novel architecture on the aircraft, a first principles physics based ap-
proach is utilized. Every propulsor is treated as a point object generating thrust at
its location in its own axis, which is determined from the OpenVSP model. Moments
of inertia of these motors and propellers are computed about the aircraft center of
gravity (CG) using the parallel axis theorem. The locations of the different motors
about the flight dynamics reference point are given by table 13. Appendix B provides
additional details into the calculation of the propulsive moments of inertia. The RPM
Table 13: T-DEP right engines locations relative to CG in the flight dynamics
body-fixed reference frame (x-forward, y-right, z-down)
Engine x offset y offset z offset Unit
Wingtip propulsor 0.33 4.82 -0.024 m
Distributed propulsor 1 0.39 0.89 0.11 m
Distributed propulsor 2 0.34 1.46 0.11 m
Distributed propulsor 3 0.39 2.04 0.11 m
Distributed propulsor 4 0.3 2.62 0.11 m
Distributed propulsor 5 0.35 3.19 0.11 m
Distributed propulsor 6 0.26 3.77 0.11 m
of the wingtip motors is controlled using the throttle setting τ . τ changes the RPM
of the motors linear from minimum value of 0 to a maximum value of 2500. Thus,
RPM ω as a function of the throttle (τ) is given by:
ω = ωmin + τ(ωmax − ωmin) (26)
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The wingtip propellers are modeled with a diameter (d) of 1.524 meter, with a thrust
coefficient (CT ) of 0.07. This is based on a thrust value of 511 N at 8000 feet and
2250 RPM [55]. The thrust produced by the motors at different throttle settings or
altitude is then computed using:
Twingtip = CTρω2d4 (27)
where ρ is the density of the air. The dependence of the thrust on the altitude at
which the aircraft is flying is taken into account through the density. It is assumed
that there is no dependence of Mach number on CT , since the X-57 flight envelop is
in the low-subsonic region.
As stated earlier, the high-lift motors are controlled through binary on/off switches.
When ON, the thrust they produce depends on the equivalent airspeed of the aircraft
as given in Table 14 [81]. Above 93 KEAS, they do not produce any thrust.
Table 14: High-lift motors thrust dependence on VEAS [81]
Velocity (KEAS) 0 17 24 31 38 58 64 70 76 84 93
Thrust (lbf) 0 10 20 30 40 50 40 30 20 10 0
4.3.3.4 Aerodynamics
No lateral aerodynamic data for the X-57 was found in literature at the time of writ-
ing this thesis. The T-DEP aerodynamic model is therefore decoupled into two parts-
longitudinal, and lateral. The longitudinal aerodynamic model for this work is based
on regressions that provide aerodynamic coefficients in the wind frame. These regres-
sions are obtained by fitting linear polynomial equations through the digitized data
from Deere et al. [55]. A component build-up approach is used where the aerodynamic
coefficients of the entire aircraft are found by adding contributions of each compo-
nent - wings, nacelles, pylons, stabilator, fuselage, and vertical tail. Appendix B
provides additional details of the individual contributions of these lifting surfaces.
The aerodynamic coefficients are given as a function of the following:
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• States
– Angle of attack: α
– Sideslip angle: β
– Angular rates: p, q, r
• Controls
– Stabilator incidence angle: δs
– Trim-tab deflection angle: δtt
– Flap deflection angle: δf
– Aileron deflection angle: δa
– Rudder deflection angle: δr
– High lift propeller blowing (boolean)
The lift coefficient is found as:
CL(α, δs, δtt, δf ) =CLblower
# of HLP ON
12
+ CLwing + tip-nacelle + CLflap+




Note that the lift coefficient is assumed to not be affected by the sideslip angle. The
drag coefficient is similarly found as:
CD(α, δs, δtt, δf ) =CDblower
# of HLP ON
12
+ CDwing + tip-nacelle + CDflap+




The moment coefficient is found as:
Cm(α, δs, δtt, δf ) =Cmblower
# of HLP ON
12
+ Cmwing + tip-nacelle + Cmflap+




The reader is directed to Appendix B for additional details of the component
contributions.
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Table 15: Estimated lateral aerodynamic coefficients of the T-DEP
β p̂ r̂ δa δr
CY -0.9905 -0.0813 0.8312 0.0054 0.2959
Cn 0.2616 0.0729 -0.3621 0.0132 -0.1466
Cl -0.0106 -0.6620 0.2096 0.1667 0.0048
Since no publicly available lateral aerodynamic data for the X-57 was found, a
Vortex Lattice Method (VLM) is used to estimate them. VLM is based on potential
flow theory where the lifting surfaces are model as discretized vortex panels following
Biot-Savart Law and Kutta-Joukwski Theory, while the non-lifting bodies are mod-
eled as sources/sinks or doublets to enforce the non-penetrating condition. Due to
its nature of linearization, VLM is able to quickly compute the stability and control
derivatives. An open-source vortex lattice method software, AVL [62], is used in the
present work to obtain the lateral aerodynamic coefficients. While limitations posed
by a linearized estimation method while ignoring the effects of swirl and sidewash
generated by multiple high-lift and wingtip propellers are acknowledged, the intent
of the present work is to generate a quick estimate by utilizing data available in
early-preliminary design stages. For that reason, the results generated are considered
adequate for the purpose of the present research. The lateral aerodynamic coefficients
from AVL are given in Table 15.
The net lateral coefficients are found as:
CY = CYββ + CYp p̂+ CYr r̂ + CYδaδa + CYδeδe + CYδr δr (31)
Cl = Clββ + Clp p̂+ Clr r̂ + Clδaδa + Clδeδe + Clδr δr (32)









Finally, the aerodynamic loads are computed from the coefficients as:
L = q̄SWCL (36)
D = q̄SWCD (37)
Y = q̄SWCY (38)
l = q̄SW bCl (39)
m = q̄SW cCm (40)
n = q̄SW bCn (41)
The above loads are obtained in the wind-axis and are rotated to the body-fixed axis
frame before being used in the equations of motion in DELPHI.
4.3.4 C-FHA Results
Continuous functional hazard assessment is intended to be performed during the
conceptual design stage. For the T-DEP, this means obtaining a simple polynomial
drag polar of the form.
CD = CD0 +K · C2L (42)
Depending on whether the flaps are extended or retracted, and the high lift propulsors
(HLP) are switched on or off, the aircraft has four different settings at which the drag
polar is computed. The values of the constants are given in table 16.
Table 16: Polynomial drag coefficients for different flap and high lift propulsor
settings for the T-DEP
Flaps Retracted Flaps Takeoff
HLP OFF HLP ON HLP OFF HLP ON
CD0 0.01869 0.1097 0.04235 0.1104
K 0.043 0.03255 0.02781 0.02503
The function of interest for the test problem is ‘Provide Thrust’. Propulsion
models given in chapter 4.3.3.3 are utilized to compute the amount of thrust available
under different configurations at different velocities and altitudes.
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4.3.4.1 Takeoff Field Length
Under a continuous degradation in thrust available, the Takeoff field length (TOFL)
required for the aircraft to safety takeoff from a given runway is computed using the
procedure given in Ref. [25]. For a successful takeoff, the TOFL is decomposed into
(i) ground roll (sg), (ii) rotation distance (sR), and (iii) distance to climb and clear
obstacle (sobs) [22]. In the case of a critical thrust loss during takeoff before the
decision speed VD, the balance field length (BFL) includes the distance covered to













(T −D − µr(W − L))
= g
(





(CD0 +KC2L − µrCL)
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(44)

























CD0 +KC2L − µrCL
)
(48)
Eq. 46 gives the distance covered by the aircraft on the ground when accelerating
from V1 → V2 when a thrust T acts on it. In case of a failure just before decision










where KT is evaluated at V = 0.7 · VT O for the present case. To compute the
decision speed of the aircraft, the ground roll for the braking phase is calculated by
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assuming the pilot cuts the power upon failure and applies breaks. Thus, the thrust
term in Eq. 47 is set to zero, and rolling friction coefficient µr = 0.02 in Eq. 48 is







KTB/KAB + V 2D
)
(50)





CD0 +KC2L − µBCL
)
(52)
Eq. 50 gives the distance needed to stop and aircraft from the decision speed while
reducing thrust to zero and applying breaks. The Balanced Field Length (BFL) is
given as,
BFL = sg1 + sg2 (53)
For a given runway length, the speed at which the difference between runway length
and BFL is zero can be obtained through a fixed point iteration. This speed is called
the decision speed VD, reaching which an aircraft has no choice but to continue take-
off procedure. Thus, the critical safety case is when a loss of thrust occurs just after
the decision speed. In such cases, the TOFL is given by,
TOFL = sg1 + sgfail + sR + sobs (54)
where sgfail is the distance covered by the aircraft to reach the take-off velocity VT O
from VD under a thrust degradation scenario. In such a scenario, the ground roll







KTD = (T/W )degraded − µr (56)
Finally, the distance required to rotate and clear the obstacle is calculated using
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equations provided by Anderson [22] as follows,
srotate = trotateVT O (57)
sobs = Rsin(θobs) (58)
θobs = arccos(1− hobs/R) (59)
R = 6.96V 2stall/g (60)
where the time to rotate is assumed to be 1 second for a small GA aircraft of the size
of X-57, and the obstacle height is assumed at 50 feet.
Figure 37: Ratio of TOFL required to available at 2356 ft under continuous thrust
degradation
Figure 37 gives the ratio of TOFL required to available for different runway lengths
(Y-axis) under a continuous thrust degradation scenario. The X-axis gives the thrust
that is available as a ratio to the maximum under degradation. The upper limit of
this ratio is truncated at 1.2 to keep the focus on the values near unity. The TOFL
required is computed at an altitude of 2356 feet – the altitude of the Edwards Air
Force Base in California from where the X-57 is expected to conduct its operations.
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The regions where this plot shows a ratio of above unity are the regions where the
T-DEP cannot safely takeoff or brake to a stop within the runway available.
Figure 38: Ratio of TOFL required to available at sea-level ft under continuous
thrust degradation
Figure 39: Ratio of TOFL required to available at 10,000 ft under continuous thrust
degradation
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Determining the TOFL required from sea level to 10,000 ft (as required by 14 CFR
23.2105.b.1) results in figures 38 and 39. Taken together, these three figures can be
used to estimate hazard severity as a consequence of continuous degradation in the
function ‘Provide Thrust’.
While the Edwards AFB runways are renowned to be some of the longest (for
the space shuttle), the intent of the present work is to conduct safety analysis for
novel DEP architectures similar to the X-57 that will one day takeoff from regular
GA airports. Therefore, a runway of 3400 feet, the lower end of a typical GA airport
runway length is investigated next to determine the impact of thrust degradation on
the T-DEP’s takeoff performance. Results of this runway length at the three altitudes
mentioned above are given in figure 40(a).
The next step in C-FHA pertains to converting the safety metric (TOFL required)
obtained as a consequence of degradation in thrust into aircraft level function - haz-
ard relationship. This step is inherently subjective and must be guided by subject
matter expertise or some guiding principles, either from regulatory requirements, or
engineering judgement. For the three TOFL curves given in figure 40(a), the following
heuristic is used to determine the hazard severity: i) 1 ≤ TOFL ratio is catastrophic
since the aircraft can neither continue takeoff nor stop within the runway available;
ii) 0.7 ≤ TOFL ratio ≤ 1 is rated hazardous; iii) 0.6 ≤ TOFL ratio ≤ 0.7 is rated
major; iv) TOFL ratio ≤ 0.6 is rated minor. The resultant hazard severity - thrust
loss curves are given in figure 40(b). It is important to note that this relationship
between hazard severity and thrust loss for the T-DEP is valid only for the take-off
configuration with flaps deployed and HLP powered on. The hazard severity - thrust
loss curve given at 2356 ft altitude (blue) is considered as the thrust loss hazard
curve going forward in this thesis. The curves given by airport altitudes of 0 ft and
10,000 ft present bounds on the hazard severity and serve to denote the uncertainty in
the hazard severity - thrust loss relationship for the T-DEP while considering TOFL
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(a) Ratio of TOFL required to available for a runway length of 3400 ft under
continuous thrust degradation
(b) C-FHA hazard severity due to thrust degradation during takeoff
Figure 40: T-DEP C-FHA results using TOFL metric under thrust degradation
required as a safety metric of interest.
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4.3.4.2 Maximum load factor and bank angle
A level turn is an important flight maneuver not only from an operational point of view
but also from a safety point of view. An aircraft facing a sudden degradation in thrust
might have to turn around to find a suitable location for an emergency landing. To
that extent, the airplane’s maximum attainable load factor and maximum attainable
bank angle can be utilized as metrics in C-FHA analysis. Under a level turn, the
aircraft must satisfy the following equations:
ϕ = cos−1(1/n) (61)
n = L/W (62)
The load factor thus depends only on the bank angle, and the two can be considered
together in the analysis that proceeds. As the load factor increases though, the
aircraft has to generate more lift, which increases the drag (due to the lift induced
drag). As a result, a greater amount of thrust is needed to overcome this drag increase
during a level turn. This results in an upper limit being placed on the aircraft’s load




































As is visible, the maximum load factor is dictated not only by the thrust available
under degradation, but also by design parameters like wing loading, CD0 , and K.
While Eq. 64 seems to provide an upper limit on the load factor under thrust degra-
dation, there is another consideration that constrains nmax. That stems from Eq. 62
– the wings can only produce lift until the maximum lift coefficient is reached. This











Figure 41 shows the nmax, ϕmax curves for the X-57 at nominal operations given
by Eqs. 64, 65, 61. Also plotted on the second Y-axis (in blue) is the maximum
bank angle achievable by the X-57 in the takeoff configuration. The takeoff plots
are generated at 50 feet, while cruise plots are generated at 1500 feet altitude. The
dotted lines show the trend-lines where nmax due to maximum thrust or maximum
lift coefficient are larger than the other, and therefore untenable. Some observations
(a) 0% thrust loss in takeoff configuration (b) 0% thrust loss in cruise configuration
Figure 41: nmax, ϕmax for the T-DEP in nominal conditions
can be immediately drawn from these nominal conditions. The T-DEP is capable
of attaining a load factor of over 1.5, and a bank angle of over 50◦ in both takeoff
and cruise nominal conditions. Additionally, the maxima for takeoff occur at around
70 knots, which is roughly 1.2 × Vstall for the T-DEP – a velocity that shows up
in multiple regulatory requirements. The takeoff capability drops beyond 90 knots
due to the fact that the thrust provided by the high lift propulsors peaks at around
70 knots and drops off to zero above 90 knots. In the cruise configuration (flaps
retracted,HLP off), the T-DEP’s capability reduces below about 82 knots, which is
close to the stall speed without HLPs and flaps (73 knots with flaps [45]).
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The first obvious case to consider is when the thrust degradation results in a
maximum load factor of less than 1. In the takeoff configuration seen in figure 42(a),
this is found to occur at a 50% thrust degradation at 70 knots (1.2 x Vstall). Since
this occurs right after takeoff, it is rated catastrophic in terms of the hazard severity.
For the cruise configuration seen in figure 42(b) computed at an altitude of 1500 feet,
(a) 50% thrust loss in takeoff configuration (b) 39% thrust loss in cruise configuration
Figure 42: Thrust loss resulting in nmax = 1 for the T-DEP
the aircraft can barely maintain a steady level flight with a thrust degradation of
39% at 140 knots. However, such a thrust loss does not make this off-nominal con-
dition catastrophic automatically, since the aircraft is likely to have enough time to
descend and activate the high lift propulsors to make an emergency landing. There-
fore, the condition of losing 39% thrust is characterized as ‘Hazardous’ for the cruise
configuration.
The next off-nominal consideration comes from certification considerations. The
X-57 can be classified as a low-speed (VNO < 250 kn, certification level 1 (≤ 1pax)
multi-engine aircraft according to 14 CFR 23.2005 [72]. Interestingly, the aircraft it is
based on, the Tecnam P2006T is a certification level 2 aircraft (3pax). However, there
is little change to the regulatory framework between the two as a result of this change.
One particular standard requirement of interest here comes from the accepted means
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of compliance (MoC) standard ASTM F3173 sections 4.9.1 and 4.9.2 [9, 73]. Section
4.9.1 states,
“4.9.1 Takeoff – It shall be possible, using a favourable combination of
controls, to roll the aeroplane from a steady 30◦ banked turn through an
angle of 60◦, so as to reverse the direction of turn within:
4.9.1.1 For an aeroplane of 2722 kg [6000 lbs] or less maximum weight, 5
s from the initiation of roll”
ASTM F3173 section 4.9.2 requires that 4.9.1 be met for the T-DEP at a critical loss
of thrust, with the flaps in takeoff position at 70 knots (1.2 x Vstall) [9]. While it
would be ideal to simulate this condition using a 6-DoF dynamic model to evaluate
the aircraft’s response, thrust degradation scenarios can be explored at the conceptual
stage using Eq. 64 to determine the % thrust loss beyond which the aircraft cannot
maintain a 30◦ bank angle. Figure 43(a) gives the result of a 39% degradation in thrust
(a) 39% thrust loss in takeoff configuration (b) 30% thrust loss in cruise configuration
Figure 43: Thrust loss resulting in ϕmax ≤ 30◦ for the T-DEP
for the T-DEP. In this off-nominal scenario, the aircraft is barely able to manage a
30◦ bank angle at 70 knots as is required by the regulations. Therefore, this scenario
is rated as hazardous in terms of severity. Since the T-DEP aircraft does not have an
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obvious definition of a critical loss of thrust in terms of a traditional one-engine out
scenario, such certification considerations can be reverse-engineered to define what a
critical loss of thrust is. In this case, using a safety metric of ϕmax within C-FHA,
a critical loss of thrust can be defined at a 39% loss of thrust during takeoff – as
that which does not meet ASTM F3173 section 4.9.2. The cruise condition does not
have any regulatory requirement for bank angle attainable to the best of the author’s
knowledge. Therefore, engineering judgement is used to utilize the capability of 30◦
bank angle as a scenario to define a ‘Major’ hazard severity condition. Figure 43(b)
shows that above a 30% loss of thrust in cruise configuration, the T-DEP cannot
attain a 30◦ bank angle. Thus this condition is rated as ‘Major’.
(a) 19% thrust loss in takeoff configuration (b) 14% thrust loss in cruise configuration
Figure 44: Thrust loss resulting in ϕmax ≤ 45◦ for the T-DEP
The final case in the present analysis pertains to utilizing engineering judgement
to call a situation when the T-DEP in takeoff configuration cannot attain a 45◦
bank angle as a major hazard. Ideally, subject matter experts may assign a severity
based on their judgement of appropriate off-nominal scenarios. Figure 44 provides the
thrust degradation scenarios designated as having a ‘Major’ severity during takeoff
and ‘Minor’ in cruise configuration. Thus, a thrust loss of 19% during takeoff, or 14%
during cruise are assigned their severity.
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The results stated above can be utilized to define a function-loss hazard severity




Figure 45: C-FHA hazard severity for the T-DEP aircraft due to thrust degradation
using nmax, ϕmax metrics
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4.3.4.3 Maximum Potential Climb Gradient (MPCG)
The maximum potential climb gradient metric was first introduced as energy based
metric under chapter 4.2. It is defined using equations 18 and 19. The derivation and











Under a thrust degradation scenario, the MPCG metric is a direct indicator of
the specific excess power available to the aircraft. Additionally, some certification
requirements posed by 14 CFR 23 Subpart B specify a minimum climb gradient that
the aircraft should be able to demonstrate under a critical loss of thrust. The only
information needed to compute this metric includes the degraded values of thrust,
the drag computed using Eq. 42, the maximum takeoff gross weight, and an assumed
velocity. Since specific excess power contours are usually plotted against axes of
altitude and velocity, MPCG contours are examined in a similar way in the results in
this section.
Figure 46 examines the MPCG (in %) contours against altitude and velocity for
four different thrust degradation scenarios in the takeoff configuration. The lowest
plot gives the MPCG at nominal conditions of 0% thrust loss (TA = Tdegr/Tmax is
the thrust available ratio under degradation). Regulatory requirements given in 14
CFR 23.2120(a)(1) necessitate the T-DEP to have an 8.3% climb gradient capability
at 50 feet above the runway with all engines operating [72]. As can be seen in the
lowest plot, the T-DEP is capable of meeting this requirement for runway altitudes
of ≤ 5000 feet.
Next, the topmost subplot is discussed, with a thrust loss of 50%. As is visible,
at 50% or more degradation in thrust, the T-DEP is no longer able to maintain even
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Figure 46: MPCG under thrust degradation scenarios at takeoff for the T-DEP
a steady level flight at sea level (let alone a climb!) at 70 knots (1.2×Vstall). This
result complements a similar result from the nmax, ϕmax metrics given in figure 42.
This hazard is therefore characterized as ‘Catastrophic’.
The second subplot from the top in figure 46 displays the results for MPCG under
a 37% degradation in thrust. 14 CFR 23.2120(c) requires the aircraft to be able to
manage a 3% climb gradient during balked landing [72]. While there is no stipulation
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for this to be met during a critical loss of thrust, a scenario under which an aircraft
might have to go abort landing and go-around under a loss of thrust scenario can be
imagined. In such an off-nominal scenario, any more than 37% loss of thrust means
that the T-DEP cannot maintain a 3% climb gradient at sea level. This is rated
‘Hazardous’.
The third subplot in figure 46 shows the performance of the T-DEP in terms of
its MPCG under a 12% loss of thrust (TA = 0.88). Beyond this value, the T-DEP is
unable to maintain an 8.3% climb gradient at sea level at 70 knots. While this is not
a regulatory requirement, engineering judgement can be used to categorize any worse
a thrust loss as at least a ‘Minor’ hazard.
Figure 47 examines the MPCG (in %) contours against altitude and velocity for
four different thrust degradation scenarios in the cruise configuration. The lowest
plot gives the MPCG at nominal conditions of 0% thrust loss. As can be seen in
the lowest plot, the T-DEP is capable of maintaining a positive climb gradient at all
velocities and altitudes in the cruise phase.
The second subplot from the bottom gives MPCG under an off-nominal scenario
of 14% thrust loss. 14 CFR 23.2120(b)(1) requires the T-DEP to be able to provide a
climb gradient of 1.5% at an altitude of 5000 feet in cruise conditions under a critical
loss of thrust. Any more than 14% thrust loss means that the T-DEP will be unable
of meeting this requirement. This condition is therefore rate ‘Major’. Conversely,
since a traditional definition of a critical loss of thrust (one engine inoperative) does
not apply to the T-DEP, regulations such as these could be used to reverse engineer
what a critical loss of thrust means. Therefore, a 14% thrust loss could be classified
as a critical loss of thrust.
The third subplot from the bottom considers a scenario where thrust has been
degraded by 39%. In this case, the aircraft is unable to maintain a steady level
flight at any combination of velocity and altitude and must prepare for an emergency
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Figure 47: MPCG under thrust degradation scenarios at cruise for the T-DEP
landing. This is therefore rated as ‘Hazardous’.
Finally, in the topmost subplot, a thrust loss of 66% or more results in the T-
DEP being unable to maintain a 3◦ or 5.2% glideslope at the point of transitioning
from the cruise configuration to landing configuration (1500 feet, 90 knots). If the
failure state is such that switching on the functioning number of high lift propulsors
(HLPs) does not result in the takeoff power availability to cross 50% (see Fig. 46),
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this can lead to a crash. Therefore, this cruise condition is conservatively categorized
as ‘Catastrophic’.
The results stated above are utilized to define a function-loss hazard severity
curve for the takeoff and cruise conditions using the MPCG (γmax) safety metric (see
Fig. 48).
4.3.4.4 C-FHA Results Summary
In this final step of C-FHA, the results generated using various safety metrics are
combined to get one hazard severity to functional degradation mapping for every
aircraft configuration of interest.
Figure 49 shows the hazard severity computed at takeoff and cruise configurations
of the T-DEP. It is evident that the MPCG (γmax) metric ends up being the more
stringent in terms of allocating hazard severity to loss of thrust for both configura-
tions. With this, the process of allocating hazard severity to continuous functional
degradation (C-FHA) is complete. The results of this exercise are summarized in
table 17.
Table 17: Summary of hazard severity for continuous thrust loss for the T-DEP
Severity Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Configuration
Takeoff 0.88 ≤ TA < 1 0.63 ≤ TA < 0.88 0.50 ≤ TA < 0.63 TA < 0.50
Cruise 0.86 ≤ TA < 1 0.61 ≤ TA < 0.86 0.34 ≤ TA < 0.61 TA < 0.34
Table 2 provides the allowable failure rates for different hazard severity for air-
craft certified under different assessment levels. Combining those with the functional
hazard severity allocation for an assessment level II (≤ 1 pax, multiengine) T-DEP
airplane provides us with allowable failure rate requirements allocated to the ‘Provide
Thrust’ function under different continuous thrust degradation scenarios. Minor, Ma-
jor, Hazardous, and Catastrophic failures must have a failure rates ≤ 10−3, ≤ 10−5,




Figure 48: C-FHA hazard severity due to thrust degradation using MPCG (γmax)
metrics
into allowable failure rate requirements versus function loss curves which are shown
in figure 50
When compared to figures 34 the results obtained by treating function loss as




Figure 49: Summary of C-FHA hazard severity due to thrust degradation for the
T-DEP aircraft using the different safety metrics discussed
50, and table 17 provide a much better resolution of the hazard severity allocated to
the function ‘Provide Thrust’, thus avoiding any biases in architecture design. The
results from C-FHA being backed by physics based models, are also more accurate to




Figure 50: Summary of C-FHA allowable failure rate allocation to thrust degrada-
tion for the T-DEP
available, the analyses in the present section can be augmented to provide a better
characterization of the safety related off-nominal requirements.
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4.3.5 Performance-based Multi-state Analysis Results
Revisiting the T-DEP power system architecture from figure 33 shows that the T-
DEP aircraft has 2 cruise motors providing thrust on the cruise configuration, while
the 12 high lift propulsors (HLP) augment thrust and high lift characteristics during
the takeoff phase. Additionally, each battery provides half the power to each cruise
motor through redundant traction power buses, pre-chargers, and inverters. Thus, a
cruise motor may fail completely, or it may operate at half power – that is, cruise
motors have three operational states individually (one nominal, two failed). Similarly,
the HLPs may fail individually due to different faults that get introduced into the
system. Asymmetric thrust loss is not considered in the C-FHA analysis due to the
conceptual level of detail of the models. Even then, this leaves the T-DEP power
system under consideration with 51 unique failure states as are shown in figure 51.
Figure 51: T-DEP multistate Ta/Tmax in takeoff configuration. Colored by C-FHA
hazard severity from Fig. 49(a)
Figure 52: T-DEP multistate Ta/Tmax in cruise configuration. Colored by C-FHA
hazard severity from Fig. 49(b)
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The unique (assumed) symmetric failure states for thrust involve failures of 0-
12 HLPs, and 4 states of the two cruise motors combined. The resultant thrust of
these states is computed using the propulsion model given in chapter 4.3.3.3. The
ratio of this computed thrust to the nominal takeoff thrust is given in figures 51, 52.
The different cells are colored from red to green to characterize hazard severity of
‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Negligible’
While conceptual analysis under C-FHA considered symmetric loss of thrust as
off-nominal scenarios, asymmetric thrust loss is likely to result in more constraining
requirements for an architecture like the X-57, with its cruise motors located at the
wingtips. For asymmetric thrust loss in this case, only motors on one side (left) of
Figure 53: T-DEP asymmetric loss of thrust multi-state failures
the wing are assumed to fail. The left cruise motor can once again take 3 states -
nominal, or fail at 50% or 0% thrust. The number of states with n high lift propulsors
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(HLPs) failing is given by 6Cn. However, the most critical of these states is when the
most outboard n HLPs fail generating a greater yawing moment. Thus, instead of
investigating all 3× 26 = 192 asymmetric thrust loss failure states, only 21 (3 cruise
motor states x 7 HLP states (0 to 6 HLP fails)) represent the most critical and need
to be investigated. This is qualitatively shown in figure 53.
The idea of performance-based multistate analysis is inspired by the work of
Dominguez-Garcia [60] and Agte [16], who utilized 6-DoF dynamic simulation models
to identify off-nominal states and their probabilities. However, they stopped short of
allocating severity requirements to the system and component level. In the present
work, in order to evaluate the effect of asymmetric loss of thrust, a preliminary 6-DoF
model that can perform trim analysis is utilized. The details of the aircraft model
are given in chapter 4.3.3. The implemented 6-DoF framework’s structure is given in
figure 35. The T-DEP model is created so that each motor is its own object, provid-
ing thrust according to its state, in its own axis. Similarly, the aerodynamic forces
and moments are computed for every lifting surface individually. These forces and
moments are then transferred to the aircraft’s reference point with suitable transfor-
mations to be used in the equations of motion. This framework provides an added
benefit to the C-FHA analysis. While C-FHA considered only the function ‘Loss of
thrust’, the present 6-DoF model considers failures of the different high lift or cruise
motors. Since the high-lift motors also augment the lift characteristics in addition
to providing thrust, a loss of HLPs results in a loss of not just the thrust, but a
reduction in the T-DEP’s aerodynamic performance as well. This is captured in the
6-DoF model that is generated, thus allowing a more integrated and complete assess-
ment of the T-DEP architecture. Finally, a trim algorithm proposed by Marco et
al. [120] that utilizes a minimization technique to determine a trim solution for any
input combination of aircraft state, control deflections, environmental conditions, and
propulsive state is implemented alongside the 6-DoF model. The trim objective is to
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match the mission V∞, h, while maintaining wings level (ϕ = 0) and maximizing γ.
Table 18 provides results of the 6-DoF trim analysis for the T-DEP in the cruise
configuration at 1500 feet and 105 knots. The column ‘CM-1 Loss %’ gives the ratio
of thrust loss on the left cruise motor – 0 denotes nominal operation, 0.5 denotes
50% thrust loss, while 1 denotes complete loss. The angles γmax, θ, ψ, as well as
the control deflections δa, δr are in degrees. τ denotes the throttle setting on the left
and right cruise motors. At nominal conditions, the T-DEP can climb at an angle of
1.17◦, which is just over a 2% gradient (in agreement with conceptual analysis from
Fig 47).
The throttle setting translates to thrust using equation 27, where it can be seen
that thrust is proportional to the square of the throttle setting. Maximum continuous
power is modeled as 90% throttle setting to represent 90% RPM (2250 RPM) of the
cruise motor. Thus, 50% of maximum continuous power occurs at 90%/
√
2 = 64%.
The second row of table 18 denotes cruise motor-1 (left) at 50% thrust (64% throttle).
As is visible, the T-DEP cannot maintain steady level flight if half the thrust is lost
in any one of the wingtip cruise motors. This is assigned a severity of ‘Major’ since
the T-DEP is forced to conduct an emergency landing. For a complete loss of thrust
from the left wingtip cruise motor, the trim solution provided a maximum climb
gradient of -4.84% (−2.77◦), which still allows a glideslope of less than 3◦. This is
also considered a ‘Hazardous’ condition in agreement with the results of figure 52.
The energy rate margin (ERM) metric is defined in equation 23, and provides a ratio
of the specific excess power being utilized in climb, to the maximum specific excess
power available after degradation in thrust. Thus, even after a failure, if this metric
is closer to 1, it denotes that most of the excess power is going towards ensuring a
maximum climb gradient. The nominal case from table 18 shows this to be close to
1. The other two cases do not depict a value since they are under a negative climb
gradient, which reduces the utility of this metric. However, it is important to note
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Table 18: Trim solutions maximizing γ under asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios




(%) θ ψ δa δr τL τR ERM
0 2.04 7.7 0 0 0 0.9 0.9 0.97
0.5 -0.31 6.38 -4.53 0.69 -13.75 0.64 0.9 -1.33
1 -4.84 3.84 -4.97 0.76 -15.09 0 0.66 -1.83
that under the complete loss of the left cruise motor, the right cruise motor cannot
operate at maximum continuous power due to trim considerations. The rudder does
not have enough authority to negate the yawing moment generated from the right
wingtip cruise motor at over 66% throttle setting (5̃4% thrust). Thus, a lot of the
capacity of the right cruise motor that could have been used to increase the climb
gradient to ensure a steady level flight is wasted.
Table 19: Trim solutions maximizing γ under asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios






(%) θ ψ δa δr τL τR ERM
0 0 9.95 6.1 0 0 0 0.9 0.9 1
0 1 8.94 6.09 -4.98 0 -11.69 0.9 0.88 0.97
0 2 7.55 5.89 -4.92 0.02 -11.63 0.9 0.82 0.9
0 3 6.26 5.78 -4.73 0.07 -11.27 0.9 0.76 0.82
0 4 5.08 5.77 -4.67 0.1 -11.22 0.9 0.72 0.74
0 5 4.05 5.87 -4.91 0.16 -11.87 0.9 0.69 0.66
0 6 3.11 6.05 -4.91 0.21 -11.96 0.9 0.67 0.58
0.5 0 5.56 3.66 -5 -0.05 -11.63 0.64 0.7 0.74
0.5 1 4.05 3.37 -4.87 -0.02 -11.43 0.64 0.61 0.6
0.5 2 2.67 3.17 -4.84 0.02 -11.44 0.64 0.52 0.45
0.5 3 1.41 3.08 -4.97 0.06 -11.83 0.64 0.43 0.27
0.5 4 0.24 3.06 -4.88 0.1 -11.7 0.64 0.35 0.05
0.5 5 -0.80 3.16 -4.93 0.15 -11.91 0.64 0.28 -0.22
0.5 6 -1.75 3.35 -4.94 0.2 -12 0.64 0.23 -0.61
1 0 0.59 0.85 -4.89 -0.06 -11.36 0 0.29 0.12
1 1-6 No Trim Solutions
Table 19 provides results for the off-nominal cases resulting from asymmetric loss
of thrust during takeoff. The idea is to consider the most critical conditions. When
n high lift propulsors have failed, it is assumed the ones near to the wingtip fail first
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to generate the most adverse yaw (see fig. 53). The first column provides the loss of
capacity of the left wingtip cruise motor. A total of 21 states (1st row nominal, 20
off-nominal) are shown. Under nominal conditions, the T-DEP manages an MPCG of
9.95% (5.68◦) at 1.2x stall speed. Conditions showcasing negative γmax are considered
catastrophic since the aircraft cannot maintain a steady level flight right after takeoff.
The energy rate margin (ERM) metric is also given for the different failure states. An
ideal value of 1 for ERM would mean that the aircraft is utilizing all thrust available
to reach the γmax value. However, the majority of asymmetric failure states for the
T-DEP showcase an ERM that is smaller than 1 but greater than 0. This means
that even after failures, the T-DEP has additional thrust capability available that
can be utilized to increase the climb gradient. However, the aircraft cannot trim due
to a lack of vertical tail’s (VT) lateral authority. This is especially true for the cases
where ERM lies between -1 and 0. In these cases, the aircraft is descending without
utilizing available thrust due to a lack of VT authority. As a result, if HLPs or even
the cruise motor on the left side suffer failures, the throttle setting to the right cruise
motor needs to be cut back in order to allow the VT to counter the adverse yaw
generated. This in turn means that less excess power is available to climb, which
reduces γmax. Partial loss of thrust in cruise showcases values of ERM that are less
than -1. As discussed while introducing the metric, this means that the aircraft is in
descending flight when it should be climbing, and its thrust available post failure is
less than the drag generated in the trim solution. Thus, the aircraft is thrust limited
when CM-1 loses 50% of its thrust output. When CM-1 fails completely, the aircraft
is limited both by its thrust as seen by ERM metric, but also by its rudder authority
since CM-2 throttle is set at less than 0.9 (maximum continuous) at trim.
Figure 54(a) provides a summary of γmax for the 20 off-nominal states of the
T-DEP aircraft when considering the most critical asymmetric loss of thrust scenar-




Figure 54: T-DEP multistate asymmetric thrust loss in takeoff configuration. Col-
ored by C-FHA hazard severity from Fig. 49(a)
considerations based on the different requirements for γmax as discussed under C-
FHA (see Ch. 4.3.4.3). Thus, while C-FHA assigned hazard severity purely based on
loss of thrust as seen in fig. 51, the present results indicate that thrust asymmetry
considerations dominate the requirements allocation as compared to simple loss of
thrust considerations. Figure 54(b) provides the ERM metric for the different states
discussed above in a more intuitive format.
Overall, it can be seen that performance-based multistate analysis provides much
greater resolution in terms of aircraft level failure states and the requirements posed
by them compared to the benchmark results from tables 6, 7. It also identifies require-
ments posed due to functional loss considerations (e.g. asymmetric loss of thrust) that
would not be apparent through the extended C-FHA approach.
4.3.6 Summary of Experiment 1.2
This experiment demonstrated how safety metrics of interest can be used to identify
and characterize hazards during off-nominal operations during conceptual and early
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preliminary design. It provided the details of the conceptual models and a prelim-
inary 6-DoF model of the T-DEP that were created to estimate the safety metrics
from table 5. Wherever possible, certification considerations were utilized to identify
the threshold values of the safety metrics. At other times, engineering judgement was
utilized to identify thresholds. These thresholds are then used to characterize the haz-
ard severity of the different functional degradation scenarios, as well as the different
off-nominal failure states of the T-DEP. It was noticed that the maximum poten-
tial climb gradient (MPCG) metric was the most constraining in allocating safety
requirements to the functional degradation scenarios. This metric was utilized along
with the energy rate margin (ERM) metric to characterize the T-DEP’s multi-state
asymmetric loss of thrust conditions. There if was noticed that while the T-DEP
has the specific excess power to improve its performance under failure, it is restricted
by the lateral control authority of the vertical tail due to the large yawing moments
generated from wingtip propellers. Overall, compared to benchmark results from
literature, experiment 1.2 demonstrated that the proposed combination of continu-
ous FHA with performance-based multistate analysis provides a more comprehensive
treatment of loss of thrust off-nominal conditions at the conceptual and preliminary
design stages. The new methods also provide a greater resolution into hazard severity
allocation at the aircraft level than the benchmark. These results, therefore, fulfil the
purpose of the experiment given in Ch. 4.3.1.1, and verify hypothesis 1.2.
4.4 Unit Level Allocation
The next research subquestion in this dissertation deals with allocating the aircraft
level requirements generated in previous sections at the unit level. Research question
1.3 is restated here for convenience:
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Research Question 1.3:
How can the identified aircraft level off-nominal requirements be allocated to the unit
level?
Allocation of system reliability requirements to the components is completed in
the present work by utilizing a network based bottom-up analysis to determine the
effect of single component failures on the terminal components of interest. Here
an assumption is made with respect to aircraft operations – that the probability of
multiple components failing at the same time is low enough to be ignored during
the allocation exercise. Losses of terminal components (cruise motors or high lift
motors for the T-DEP) result in a loss of a function (thrust). Thus, the effect of
single component failures on the aircraft function loss, or on aircraft failure state
can be quantified, and the resultant requirements identified from Ch. 4.3. These
requirements can then be identified to the unit level, leading to hypothesis 1.3 which
is stated as:
Hypothesis 1.3: If unit level failures are mapped to system level failure states,
the allowable failure rate requirements generated at the system level can be allocated
to the unit level
4.4.1 Experiment 1.3
The intent of the present section is to test hypothesis 1.3. A bottom up analysis to
quantify effects of component failures in terms of aircraft performance for the T-DEP
is carried out automatically using a network algorithm. The results of this analysis
are used to complete the unit level allocation of reliability requirements. A brief
overview of the steps followed in this experiment is given in figure 55.
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Figure 55: Allocating aircraft level requirements to the unit level
4.4.1.1 Purpose of the Experiment
Research question 1.2 and the solutions proposed generated safety related off-nominal
requirements in terms of hazard severity and allowable failure rates at the aircraft
level for the T-DEP power system architecture. RQ 1.3 takes this forward by trying
to allocate those aircraft level requirements to the component level. This research
subquestion deals with requirement 3 that was stated under research question 1 in
chapter 3.2. Thus, the following are the main objectives of this experiment:
• Demonstrate the ability to determine the impact of component failures at the
aircraft level
• Demonstrate a method to allocate reliability to the unit level by utilizing infor-
mation generated above
4.4.2 Network-based Bottom-up Analysis
For a bottom analysis to be automatically conducted, the algorithm used in this
thesis considers a failure state of every component individually and determines its
effect in terms of failures of the terminal components. Consider a simplified system
along with its network adjacency matrix given by figure 56. An adjacency matrix (A)
is a square matrix with rows and columns denoting the components of the system.
If component i connects forward to component j, Aij = 1, otherwise Aij = 0. This
system has dummy components D1, D2 that aid with system reliability computations
as will be explained later. The components of interest are the source components Si,
intermediate components Ii, and terminal components Ti. The system level failure
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states are characterized by the failures in its terminal, function satisfying components
Ti. Thus, this system has 23 = 8 possible states (1 nominal, 7 off-nominal) that were
provided earlier in table 4.
(a) Example network representation (b) Corresponding adjacency matrix
Figure 56: An example system with two sources and three terminal components in
network representation
For the given system represented as a network of prime movers (nodes Si), ter-
minal components that satisfy system function (Ti) and intermediate components,
Algorithm 1 is used to determine system failures states if any component (Ai) fails:
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Algorithm 1: Generate a set of terminal components that fail if any system
component fails
Result: Set of Si that fail if component Ai fails
Generate system adjacency matrix M ;
Set F = M ;
Set F (i, :) = 0 % set out-going network connections to 0;
Initialize C = zeros(size(M));
Initialize jj = 1;
while F jj is not zero do
C = C + F jj;
jj = jj+1;
end
truncate C to keep rows corresponding to all Si and columns corresponding
to all Ti and assign to C∗;
Initialize kk = 1;
while kk ≤ numCols in C∗ do
if max(T(:,kk)) == 0 then




Ti corresponding to kkth column of C∗ has NOT failed;
end
end
4.4.2.1 The Reliability Allocation Problem
Algorithm 1 generates a list of terminal failure states by individually setting each
component to a failed state and evaluating the system level impact. If a terminal
component loses a path to at least one source, the terminal component is assumed
failed. Failing intermediate components is akin to breaking a link in a chain, whose
end effects can thus be examined. Table 20 gives the results after applying the
algorithm to the notional system from figure 56. Individual component failures are
considered causal factors, with multiple components resulting in a common system
state. Each failure state (Ti failed) is assigned a hazard severity Hi based on C-FHA
or multistate analysis. This in turn results in a reliability requirement that must be
satisfied. The total system reliability of not being in any state Ti is given by the ‘state
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Table 20: System states resulting from component failures
Causal factors S1 I1 T1 I2 T2 S2 I3 T3
Common system
states T1 T2 T3
Hazard Severity H1 H2 H3
Reliability
Requirement R(H1) R(H2) R(H3)
State
Reliability R(S1).R(I1).R(T1) R(I2).R(T2) R(S2).R(I3).R(T3)
reliability’ column, which identifies the unique, independent component failures that
can result in the failure of Ti. This is not an exact formula of the system reliability
from the given state but truncates the results to consider only one failure at once.
The reliability of the system from state T1 must meet the requirements posed by the
hazard analysis. This is represented by the following equation,
R(S1).R(I1).R(T1) > R(H1) (68)
Put another way, the system state reliability requirement R(H1) must be allocated
to individual components S1, I1, T1 such that Eq. 68 is satisfied. This is considered a
classic reliability allocation problem. There is no single answer as to what is the cor-
rect way of going about this. Instead, literature treats reliability allocation problem
as an optimization problem, where decision makers apply weights to each component
depending on different factors, and then minimize a predetermined cost function to
allocate reliability to the components [125]. The simplest way to complete such an al-
location is to divide the reliability requirement equally between all elements as follows:
R(Ai) >= R(H1)1/3 (69)
where Ai can be components S1, I1, or T1. Notice that in such a case, Eq. 68 is
satisfied. However, not all components are equally reliable, and therefore assigning
them equal reliability requirements may not be the best solution. The question then
is – how can this system level reliability be portioned to get a fair allocation of
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requirements to the unit level?
4.4.2.2 The Critical Flow Method
Silvestri et al. [163] have provided a good review of the different reliability alloca-
tion methods, their advantages and disadvantages. They proposed a ‘Critical Flow
Method’ that utilizes factors of influence to discriminate against different kinds of
units. They recommend allocating system reliability requirement R(t) to components
using [163],
Ri(t) = R(t)Wi (70)










where Ci gives the component criticality and is (1/n), n being the number of compo-
nents in parallel. It allocates a higher reliability to a less critical component.
Ai represents the state of the art index, with 0 denoting old components, and 1 rep-
resenting state-of-the-art. It assigns higher reliability to state-of-the-art components
and lower to old components.
Ki represents component complexity. Suggested values include 0.33 for less complex
components, 0.66 for normal, and 1 for highly complex components. It allocates
higher reliability to less complex components.
Ti denotes the running time of a component to the time of the mission. Generally,
for the test problem (T-DEP power system), this value is taken as 1.
Finally, Oi represents the operating conditions. Components exposed to the environ-
ment are allocated lesser reliability requirements, while those that operate in sheltered
environments are allocated higher reliability. The suggested values here are 0.33 for
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easy conditions, 0.66 for normal, and 1 for difficult conditions. Readers interested in
more detail are referred to Ref. [163] for more.
4.4.3 The T-DEP Bottom-up Network Analysis
Algorithm 1 is used on the T-DEP power systems architecture given in figure 33 to
obtain unique aircraft level failure states due to single component failures. Table 21
provides details about such unique failure states at the aircraft level and the causal
factors. Due to symmetry in the T-DEP architecture, only one set of failures that
Table 21: Bottom-up analysis: T-DEP power architecture unique system level failure









CM-1 CM-1 TAT O = 0.84,
TAcruise = 0.5
Hazardous





TAT O = 0.94,
TAcruise = 1
Minor
TPB-BL Mot-1,3,5 ;CM-1 at 50%
TAT O = 0.75,
TAcruise = 0.75
Major
Battery-B Mot-1,3,5,8,10,12;CM-1,2 at 50%
TAT O = 0.5,
TAcruise = 0.5
Hazardous
is identical to other failures is considered. For instance, failure in either left or right
cruise motor individually leads to the same result of a hazardous flight condition.
Similarly, any of the 12 pre-chargers ,inverters, or motors supplying the individual
high lift propulsors failing lead to loss of the said HLP. Therefore, the aircraft level
hazard severity is a combination of these 12 identical but independent scenarios. For
the cruise pre-chargers or inverters, the result of either left or right failing is a 50%
loss of thrust to the corresponding cruise motor. Any one of the four traction power
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buses failing results in a Major condition according to C-FHA analysis. Finally, any
one of the batteries failing is considered hazardous.
Before allocating reliability requirements to any of these components, the results of
these corresponding failures using the preliminary 6-DoF trim analysis are considered.
Table 22 shows the trim analysis results of maximizing γ after individual component
failures. The lower bounds on the climb gradient discussed in Ch. 4.3.4.3 are used to
determine the hazard severity. The results agree quite closely with the C-FHA results
of table 21, except for the failure of the traction power buses. A single traction power
bus failing results in a 25% thrust loss in takeoff as well as cruise configurations.
C-FHA (see table 17) assigns a severity of ‘Major’ to the condition. However, an
important distinction is made in the 6-DoF trim analysis results in this case. The
loss of a TPB results in the loss of half of a cruise motor and 3 HLPs on the same
side. Under this asymmetric thrust condition, the T-DEP cannot utilize all the
excess power available to it as is seen by the energy rate margin (ERM) metric being
just 0.33 during takeoff – pointing towards a limited rudder authority in this case.
Therefore, the aircraft ends up having a much lower climb gradient than if it had
been a symmetric thrust failure of the same magnitude. Applying the same logic




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.4 Component Reliability Allocation Results
The hazard severity due to component loss is allocated at the aircraft level. For T-
DEP which is an assessment level II aircraft, this means aircraft level catastrophic,
hazardous, major, and minor failures must have a probability of < 10−7, < 10−6,
< 10−5, and < 10−3 per flight hour respectively. The failure rate is related to the
reliability at time t by Eq. 5, repeated here for convenience.
R(t) = e−λt
and the failure probability at time t is given from Eq. 6 as,
F (t) = 1− e−λt
The reliability requirements allocated at the component level should ensure that the
total reliability at the aircraft level stays acceptable as per table 2. Thus, losing
either CM-1 or CM-2 will result in a hazardous state. Similarly, losing either one of
four traction power buses will result in a hazardous state. Thus, the aircraft level
reliability requirements due to hazard severity given in table 22 can be related to
components using the equations that follow. Since both cruise motors are assumed
to be identical, the probability of either of them failing is 2× the probability of one
failing. This information can be used to simplify the cruise motor failure requirements
as,
FCM−1(t) + FCM−2(t) ≤ 1− e−10
−6t (73)










The time dependence of eq. 75 is surprising given exponential failure models assume
constant failure rates. However, by plotting this dependence, as seen in figure 57, it
can be seen that there is a 1% change in λreq when t goes from 102 → 104 hours.
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Thus, the present work assumes t = 5000 hours as the age of the components being
considered. Then, the (rounded off) required failure rate for the cruise motors is given
by eq. 76.
λCM,req ≤ 5× 10−07 (hr−1) (76)
Figure 57: Cruise motor required failure rate with time
Similarly, for the traction power buses,
FT P B−AL(t) + FT P B−AR(t) + FT P B−BL(t) + FT P B−BR(t) ≤ 1− e−10
−6t (77)
1− e−λT P Bt ≤ (1− e−10−6t)/4(78)






For t = 5000 hours, this translates to a failure rate requirement on the traction
power bus given by (rounded) Eq. 80.
λT P B,req ≤ 2.5× 10−07 (80)
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A trend is visible through equations 75, 79 that could be generalized. If a failure
in any one of M identical components C results in an equivalent aircraft level failure
state (but NOT the same failure state) with a failure rate requirement of λr, then the











A battery failure, similar to a cruise motor failure has a failure rate requirement
given by (rounded),
λBatt,req ≤ 5× 10−07 (hr−1) (82)
Next, the failures resulting in high lift propulsors is considered. An HLP sub-
system is considered one where a pre-charger, HLP inverter, and HLP motor are in
series. There are 12 such subsystems whose independent failures can result in an
equivalent aircraft level hazard – that corresponds to losing Mot-01 in table 22.
Figure 58: Mot-01 subsystem failure rate determination
Based on the equations 76, 80, the failure rate requirement for any one out of M
equivalent subsystems failing is simply the aircraft level requirement divided by M .
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Table 23: Mot-01 subsystem critical flow method weights
Parameter Mot-01 Inv-01 PC-01
Ci 1 1 1
Ai 1 1 1
Ki 1 0.66 0.33
Ti 1 1 1
Oi 1 0.66 0.66
IGi 1 0.4356 0.2178





= 8.33× 10−5 hr−1 (83)
RMot−01.RInv−01.RP C−01 ≥ e−λMot−01−subsyst (84)
Equation 84 provides an equation between the reliabilities of Mot-01, Inv-01, and
PC-01, and the failure rate requirement of the subsystem of the three components.
An allocation at the unit level in such a case can lead to multiple solutions. The
method used here is the Critical Flow Method described in Ch. 4.4.2.2. Table 23
provides the parameter values for the critical flow method to allocate reliability to
the components. Ki represents component complexity. The electric motor is assumed
to be the most complex component of the three, with the pre-charger being the least,
hence allocating values 1, 0.66, 0.33 to the motor, inverter, and pre-charger. Finally,
the electric motor operates in conditions most exposed to the environment, with the
inverter and pre-charger being relatively well shielded, affording the Oi values of 1,
0.66, 0.66 respectively. Since this series subsystem has no components in parallel,
Ci is 1. All components are assumed to be state of the art, making Ai = 1 for all.
Finally, all components are operational for the same time period, giving equal values
for the Ti parameter as well.
The weights generated for the three components are given as the output of table 23,
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which are used to allocate component reliability as follows,
RMot−01(t) ≥ RMot−01−subsys 0.605 (85)
e−λMot−01,reqt ≥ (eλMot−01−subsyst)0.605 (86)
λMot−01,req ≤ 0.605 λMot−01−subsys (87)
≤ 5.03965× 10−5 hr−1 (88)
Similarly, the HLP inverter and pre-charger are allocated failure rate requirements
as follows,
λInv−01,req ≤ 2.19079× 10−5 hr−1 (89)
λP C−01,req ≤ 1.09956× 10−5 hr−1 (90)
A similar process can be conducted for the subsystems consisting of the cruise
motor inverters and their pre-chargers. Here, I-1B, PC-1B (see fig. 33) can be grouped
as a subsystem supplying 50% power to the cruise motor. A failure in any component
of this subsystem results in a hazard severity of ‘Major’ according to table 22. Since
there are four such subsystems, each one must have a failure rate requirements of
≤ 2.5 × 10−6. Utilizing the same IG parameter values for the inverter and pre-
charger gives a weight of 0.67 and 0.33 to them. Thus, their failure rate requirements
are given as,
λI−1B,req ≤ 1.675× 10−6 hr−1 (91)
λP C−1B,req ≤ 8.25× 10−7 hr−1 (92)
4.4.5 Summary of Experiment 1.3
This experiment demonstrated how reliability requirements that get generated at the
aircraft level using C-FHA and performance-based multistate analysis can be allocated
to the unit level. With equations 76, 80, 82, 89, 90, 91, and 92, failure rate require-
ments generated at the aircraft level in chapter 4.3 are allocated to the component
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Table 24: Component failure rate requirement allocation
Component Failure raterequirement (hr−1)
Cruise Motor ≤ 5× 10−7
CM Inverter ≤ 1.675× 10−6
CM Pre-charger ≤ 8.25× 10−7
Traction Power Bus ≤ 2.5× 10−7
Battery ≤ 5× 10−7
HLP Motor ≤ 5.03965× 10−5
HLP Inverter ≤ 5.19079× 10−5
HLP Pre-charger ≤ 1.09956× 10−5
level for the power system architecture of the T-DEP aircraft. These requirements
are summarized in table 24. The purpose of experiment 1.3 was to demonstrate the
ability to determine the impact of component failures at the aircraft level. This was
accomplished using a network-based bottom up analysis algorithm to identify aircraft
level failure states that result from component failures. The hazard severity of these
states was quantified using results generated from C-FHA and performance-based
multistate 6-DoF trim analysis. Finally, a method to allocate the resultant reliability
requirements using the critical flow method [163] was demonstrated resulting in fail-
ure rate requirements being allocated to the component level. With this, experiment
1.3 is complete with its purpose satisfied. It verifies hypothesis 1.3 which deals with
the allocation of failure rate requirements at the component level and fulfils the broad
purpose of research question 1.3.
4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter was motivated by the first group of observations from Ch. 2.5 that led
to the formulation of a set of research questions and hypotheses for the first research
area. In particular, this chapter focused on demonstrating a set of methods that
allow identification, characterization, and allocation of safety related off-nominal re-
quirements. Towards that goal, literature was found to converge around utilizing
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performance-based methods to quantify off-nominal system response to be used as
a surrogate for hazard severity. Two methods, in particular, an extension to Con-
tinuous Functional Hazard Assessment (C-FHA),and Performance-based Multistate
Analysis were down-selected and tailored for use with novel aircraft architectures at
the conceptual and preliminary level of design.
The safety metrics necessary for quantifying off-nominal operational states of the
aircraft formed the first research sub-question which was answered using a focused
literature review. While there is no one size fits all solution for finding appropriate
safety metrics to use for every novel architecture, a set of metrics useful for the Test
Distributed Electric Propulsion aircraft (T-DEP) inspired by the X-57 were identified
in table 3.
The next research sub-question focused on estimating these metrics by developing
suitable conceptual and preliminary 6-DoF models that can simulate the aircraft’s
response to thrust degradation scenarios. Thresholds for these metrics were set based
on certification considerations or engineering judgement. Experiment 1.2 compared
the hazard severity requirements allocated to the aircraft functional degradation and
multistate failures with those obtained from literature sources resorting to traditional
analyses. It demonstrated a clear benefit of utilizing the proposed methods in terms of
improved resolution of hazards. It also provided results based on physics based models
instead of relying on heuristics, while allowing the designers to update their results
once higher fidelity models are available. Some additional insights regarding the T-
DEP architecture include the fact that certain hazards were not due to insufficient
thrust after a failure, but due to insufficient lateral stability provided by the vertical
tail.
Finally, the third research sub-question dealt with allocating the requirements gen-
erated at the aircraft level to the components. A network-based bottom-up analysis
algorithm was developed to identify the impact of component failures on the aircraft
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level functional availability and failure states. It was assumed that in an aerospace
application, the probability of two components failing at once during a flight is small
enough to be neglected, therefore allowing single failure considerations drive the re-
liability allocation problem. Finally, a Critical Flow Method was demonstrated to
allocate reliability to components of a subsystem that cannot be dealt with using
simple considerations of redundancy. Experiment 1.3 demonstrated that by using
the above mentioned methods, allowable failure rate requirements can be allocated
to the unit level from the system level, thus verifying hypothesis 1.3.
Taken together, the three sub-hypothesis and the techniques used to verify them
were found to satisfy all the requirements posed by research question 1. This verified




A BAYESIAN PROBABILITY AND DECISION
FRAMEWORK WITH MULTISTATE EXTENSION
The previous chapter dealt with the identification, characterization, and allocation
of safety related off nominal requirements at the aircraft and component level for the
test problem of interest - the T-DEP aircraft. This chapter presents the work on the
second research area which deals with the treatment of uncertainty in quantitative
risk assessment of novel architectures primarily due to the lack of data and experience
with the components and novel technologies used. Research area two is based on the
observation group 2 identified in chapter 2.5. Traditional methods fall short in pro-
viding a complete treatment of ‘epistemic’ uncertainty in the frequentist approach.
The unavailability of sufficient failure data means that the aleatory uncertainty is
large too. This lead to research question 2, which is reproduced here for convenience:
Research Question 2:
What method or group of methods can allow estimation of unit and system reliability
- accounting for both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty under scarcity of available
data, while also providing a mathematically defensible framework for compliance
decision making?
Chapter 3.3 states the requirements that any solution answering RQ 2 must meet.
They include (i) the ability to estimate unit level failure probabilities under a scarcity
of data; (ii) Explicit treatment of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty; (iii) A math-
ematically defensible framework for compliance decision making; (iv) Estimation of
multistate system reliability. These requirements are further grouped into three broad
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categories. The solutions for these three categories are given by the procedure no-
tionally given in figure 59.
Figure 59: Procedure used to answer research question 2
The first of the three deals with estimation of unit level probabilities under un-
certainty, and can be posed as a smaller, research subquestion:
Research Question 2.1:
What method or group of methods can allow estimation of unit level reliability while
accounting for both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty under scarcity of available
data?
An enabler noted in observation group 2 in Ch. 2.5 is a ‘Bayesian’ probability
approach to modeling failure rates. There are two broad schools of thought in prob-
ability theory - the ‘frequentist’ and the ‘Bayesian’. Kaplan and Garrick state that
the prior deals with frequency type of information and is objective. Whereas when
there is a lack of such information, they state what choice is there but to utilize ‘prob-
ability’, which is essentially a statement of belief in a certain outcome [100]. This
subjective ‘probabilistic’ approach is the bedrock of ‘Bayesian’ probability theory.
Instead of only using data, a Bayesian approach relies on using available informa-
tion – including data, models, as well as subject matter expertise [58]. Bayesian infer-
ence techniques for safety and reliability assessment have been applied to numerous
problems in literature [21,28,43,177] and are considered mature and mathematically
sound for the purpose. The utility of this approach can be attested to when one
considers that numerous industries consider these techniques standard [1,79,80,102].
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Furthermore, as technologies mature and more data are available, a Bayesian infer-
ence model can be continuously updated and tends towards the ‘frequentist’ models
with sufficient data.
5.1 A Bayesian Probability Framework
5.1.1 Basic Principles
Bayesian statistics borrows its name from Thomas Bayes (1701-1761), who discovered





= P (B|Ai).P (Ai)∑n
j=1 P (B|Aj).P (Aj)
(94)
This equation of Bayes’ theorem is valid in the context of n discrete events Ai and
Aj etc. P (B|Ai) is the probability of event B occurring given Ai has already occurred
and is known as the conditional probability of B given Ai. In a Bayesian sense, P (Ai)
is the prior probability and represents one’s (subjective) hypothesis/belief about the
outcome Ai. As Mantis [119] states in his Ph.D. thesis,
“Therein lies the shock value of Bayes’ theorem, as subjectivity appears
for the first time in the previously objective field of statistics”
P (B|Ai) represents the observations made while testing the hypothesis, and P (Ai|B)
is the posterior probability or the new hypothesis, or the original hypothesis now
corrected by the new observations made [119]. When data is already available in
the form of P (B|Ai), a casual observer may ask why not utilize it directly as in a
‘frequentist’ sense. This is because the resulting inference, especially under limited
observations, may be misleading when prior opinion is not considered. The posterior
is, in some sort, a weighting function. When limited observations are available, the
posterior tends to be biased by prior opinion. As observations become exceedingly
numerous, the weight of the evidence pushes the posterior towards the likelihood
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functions, reducing the importance of the prior opinion and thus tending towards a
‘frequentist’ result. With these basic principles elucidated, the next section explores
how the Bayesian statistical theory applies to component reliability.
5.1.2 Failure Rate Distributions - A Bayesian Approach
Instead of only using data, a Bayesian approach relies on using information - which in-
cludes data, models, and other available information like subject matter expert (SME)
knowledge [58]. Instead of a point estimate as under the frequentist paradigm, the
failure rate (λ) under the Bayesian framework is given by a distribution that quan-
tifies uncertainty in its estimate. When available failure data (ȳ) is provided, the





Equation 95 gives the Bayesian posterior distribution p(λ|ȳ) based on the likelihood of
observing the data that was observed p(ȳ|λ), and the analyst’s prior belief p(λ), nor-
malized over all realizations of the data p(ȳ). Note that Eq. 95 is simply a statement of
Bayes’ theorem applied to multiple independent identically distributed observations
ȳ = y1, y2, ...yn 1.
5.1.2.1 The Likelihood
The likelihood p(ȳ|λ) is a function that seeks to determine the likelihood of observ-
ing the data ȳ given a hypothesis for λ. It is a statistical model used to represent
the aleatory uncertainty associated with the data and the underlying physical phe-
nomenon [172].
In the context of aircraft design, while numerous distributions can be used to
1Preliminary work of this chapter has been published in Refs. [30, 34]
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model component failure data, the three most common distributions used are the Bi-
nomial, Poisson, and Exponential [58]. Figure 60 provides a guideline for the different
types of likelihood distributions that can be utilized to model failure phenomenon in
aerospace applications. As seen in Fig. 60, a Binomial model is generally used to
model failures on demand, a Poisson model is used when there are failures in time or
initiating events, while an exponential distribution is used when the time to failure
is being modelled [58].
Figure 60: Guidelines for selecting the Likelihood and Prior distributions (adapted
from [58])
5.1.2.2 The Prior
For a new design problem, the analyst’s initial estimation of disciplinary uncertainty
is based on expert opinion [119]. The prior distribution p(λ) captures information
that is denoted by the analyst’s subjective state of belief regarding the failure rate.
Since this distribution is based on the analyst’s knowledge about the component or
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event, it captures the epistemic uncertainty associated with estimating the failure
rate (λ) [172].
There are two broad categories of prior distributions – the informative prior and
the non-informative prior. The non-informative priors seek to minimize the infor-
mation bias within a prior, thus allowing the posterior to be dominated only by the
data available. Informative priors, on the other hand, contain information that can
influence the posterior and is usually generated based on the analyst’s own knowl-
edge, along with subject matter expert (SME) opinion on the unknown parameter λ.
A prior distribution is typically determined before any data are observed.
Priors may also be classified as conjugate or non-conjugate. Conjugate priors can
be used with certain likelihood functions to ensure that the posterior follows the same
family of distributions. This can allow an analyst to have analytical solutions for the
posterior and simplify calculations. Conjugate priors for different choices of likelihood
functions are given in Fig. 60. Therefore, if a Gamma prior is used along with
an exponential likelihood, the resulting posterior is guaranteed to follow a Gamma
distribution with modified parameters. In cases of non-conjugate priors, numerical
methods like Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) can be used to determine the
posterior.
Selection of the prior distribution needs to be made carefully by the analyst. For
instance, if an event has a probability of zero set by the prior, no amount of data
observed otherwise can change the posterior. In the absence of data, the prior distri-
bution becomes the posterior! The reader is directed to the work of Dezfuli et al. [58]
which provides comprehensive guidance on selecting the appropriate distributions
to model the priors by considering opinions of SMEs, and component failures from
other domain applications among other cases. This is particularly pertinent because
while modeling failure rates for novel aircraft components, data may not be readily
available, or may not be from an aerospace background.
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5.1.2.3 Posterior Distribution
The likelihood multiplied by the prior distribution gives a joint distribution of the data
and parameter λ. The normalizing constant in the denominator p(ȳ) can be obtained
by integrating λ out of this joint distribution to give the posterior distribution as




This posterior provides an updated state of knowledge of the failure rate taking
into account the analyst’s subjective state of belief, and available failure rate data.
When heritage data is available, it can be used by eliciting its applicability from
SMEs and averaging the posterior distributions according to the applicability of the
data [58]. When available data are small, the prior has a greater influence on the
posterior which reduces as more and more data become available. As a result, in the
abundance of available data, the Bayesian posterior starts replicating the frequentist
estimate – an outcome that is desirable.
Overall, a Bayesian approach has numerous benefits over the traditional frequen-
tist approach in addition to the better treatment of both levels of uncertainty which
makes it suitable for application to the safety assessments of novel aircraft architec-
tures. First, a Bayesian posterior can be continuously updated as more data become
available by treating the existing posterior as a prior and updating it with the like-
lihood of any newly observed data. Second, a 95% credible interval for λ has a 95%
probability of the true value of λ lying within in [112], unlike the more complicated
interpretation of frequentist confidence intervals.2 Third, a Bayesian predictive pos-
terior can be generated which provides the probability of a future observation being a
2A 95% frequentist confidence interval states that if multiple samples of failure data were collected
a large number of times, 95% of the generated confidence intervals will containt the true λ; an
interpretation that is less useful in the current application.
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certain value. Such a predictive posterior can be useful in the paradigm where repairs
and health monitoring of systems is considered.
With this background, hypothesis 2.1 is restated here:
Hypothesis 2.1: Utilizing a Bayesian probability framework to model unit level
failure rates results in a more comprehensive treatment of both epistemic and aleatory
uncertainty under scarcity of available data.
5.1.3 Experiment 2.1
The intent of this section is to test hypothesis 2.1 stated above. However, before
testing whether the Bayesian framework postulated provides a ‘better’ treatment of
uncertainty, the term ‘better’ must be defined in this context. Paté-Cornell describes
six levels of treatment of uncertainty in risk analysis in Ref. [146], with each level
providing a more comprehensive or ‘better’ treatment of uncertainty than the previ-
ous. These definitions are used in the present work to demonstrate how the proposed
approach is better than traditional. These six levels can be summarily explained as
follows [146]:
1. Level 0 involves the simple detection of potential hazards or different states of
system failure without attempting to assess risk quantitatively
2. Level 1 is the accumulation of worst-case scenarios without involving any no-
tion of probability. It simply yields the maximum loss level and can be consid-
ered a ‘worst case’ approach.
3. Level 2 can be called a ‘quasi-worst case’ approach. It attempts to evaluate
the worst possible conditions that can be ‘reasonable’ expected when i) there is
uncertainty regarding what the worst-case will be, or ii)the worst-case is highly
unlikely.
174
4. Level 3 focuses on obtaining a ‘best-estimate’ or a measure of central tendency
(mean, median, etc.) of the risk/loss distribution
5. Level 4 Most probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), quantitative risk assessment
(QRA), or probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) processes lie here. It involves
obtaining a distribution of probabilities of different system states and captures
mainly aleatory uncertainty. Risk is represented not as a point estimate, but
by a curve. However, all uncertainties are aggregated into one curve, making
it difficult to extract epistemic uncertainty regarding expert disagreements or
competing models.
6. Level 5 is the highest treatment of uncertainty and involves a set of risk curves
(one for each expert) that is provided to decision makers without attempt-
ing to aggregate the results. This means representing the information exactly
as encoded, and translating it as far into models and analyses as is possible
before inevitably aggregating the results or obtaining central tendency. Epis-
temic uncertainty is generally estimated using a statistical treatment or using
Bayesian probabilities to encode expert opinion. This helps address the issue
of ‘secondary’ probabilities or uncertainty about probabilities.
5.1.3.1 Purpose of the Experiment
Hypothesis 2.1 states that a Bayesian probability framework will provide a more
comprehensive treatment of uncertainty for novel architectures. To that extent, the
following are the main objectives of this experiment:
1. Demonstrate that failure rate information can be synthesized using subject
matter expert opinion and available data in a Bayesian framework
2. Demonstrate that the results generated in such a framework provide a more
comprehensive treatment of uncertainty than a benchmark traditional approach
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5.1.3.2 Experiment Setup
In order to meet the objectives of this experiment, multiple steps need to be carried
out. First, results must be generated using a traditional ‘frequentist’ paradigm to be
used as a benchmark for comparison. Second, appropriate failure rate priors must be
determined to correspond to expert opinion. Third, available data must be encoded
and used to update the priors through appropriate likelihood distributions to generate
the posterior distribution. Fourth, steps two and three can be repeated with different
initial assumptions to generate a ‘family of curves’ as Paté-Cornell calls it [146] to
demonstrate a comprehensive treatment of uncertainty. The components of the T-
DEP power systems architecture from figure 33 will be the ones on which these results
will be demonstrated.
5.1.4 Benchmark Component Failure Rates
Traditional safety analyses at the conceptual or preliminary level consider central
tendency, usually the mean or median of the failure rates to represent component
failure rates. Therefore, for the benchmark results in the present study, mean failure
rates of the different components are compiled from various sources. The detailed
failure rates from different sources are compiled in Appendix C.
Battery: Generic battery failure rate data is available from historical databases
given in Ref. [2,5]. Additional data available for lithium ion batteries include a recent
NASA report [53] that suggests using a failure rate of 9.3 × 10−6 hr−1. Boeing 787
reported two battery safety events in about 104000 combined flight hours of battery
operation [134], while NPRD-2016 [117] provides a failure rate of 2.99 × 10−5 hr−1.
These values are aggregated to give a point estimate of the failure rate as
λBatt,mean = 7.6159× 10−6 hr−1 (97)
176
Electric Motor: Failure rates from historical databases [2,5,7] are averaged with
data from newer sources in Ref. [49, 53, 117] to give a mean failure rate of
λEM,mean = 9.7761× 10−6 hr−1 (98)
Motor Inverter: Similar to above components, historical data from Ref. [2] is
averaged with latest data in Ref. [49, 53] to get
λInv,mean = 3.51× 10−5 hr−1 (99)
Traction Power Bus: Data from Refs. [2,5,117] is averaged to get a mean failure
rate give by,
λT P B,mean = 4.2177× 10−6 hr−1 (100)
Pre-Charger: Data for resistors and contactor switches is obtained from Refs. [3,
5, 7, 117] and added up to get the pre-charger failure rate.
λP C,mean = 5.2594× 10−5 hr−1 (101)
Utilizing mean values is probably the most common approach to modeling compo-
nent failure rates in literature. Therefore, using this approach as a benchmark is not
only convenient, it is also a realistic depiction of the studies performed in conceptual
or preliminary design stages. This approach falls under the 3rd level in the six levels
of treatment of uncertainty discussed previously. While useful, utilizing measures
of central tendency from available data does not provide a complete treatment of
uncertainty, especially for novel architectures where data might be insufficient. The
next section will explore how data from the exact same sources can be utilized to
efficiently capture and propagate uncertainty in the component failure rates.
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5.1.5 Bayesian Component Posteriors
For all components in Fig. 33, a Poisson likelihood model is assumed since failures
generally occur during operation with the number of failures and corresponding op-
erating time being the information documented(see fig. 60) [58]. A prior is selected
based on an analyst’s subjective bias about the component failure rate.
In order to demonstrate a comprehensive (level 5) treatment of uncertainty with
the intent of providing alternate failure rate models to decision makers, two different
(imaginary) analysts are invented that perform the Bayesian exercise separately. They
are called Analyst A and Analyst B. Both these analysts provide their characterization
of domain specific (epistemic) uncertainty through their subjective opinions on the
failure rates of different components. This information is encoded using the prior
distributions, which are assumed to be gamma distributed (conjugate prior for Poisson
likelihood) to make the posterior calculations easier. For Poisson likelihood models, a
Jeffry’s non-informative conjugate prior is a Gamma distribution with shape α = 0.5,
and rate β = 0. Although this is not a proper distribution (integral over all λ is
not finite), it results in a proper posterior distribution. Since a Gamma prior is
conjugate to the Poisson likelihood, the posterior also takes the form of a Gamma
distribution [58].
Prior : λprior ∼ Gamma(shape = αprior, rate = βprior) (102)




Posterior : λposterior|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = αprior +
∑
yi, β = βprior +
∑
ti)(104)
In a gamma distribution used for failure analysis, the shape parameter α can be
interpreted as the number of failures, while the rate parameter β can be interpreted
as the number of hours of operational experience with a component. Thus, a high
value of β can be interpreted as having a lot of operating hours experience, while a
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lower value indicates a lack of experience and is likely to result in a much wider spread
in the posterior distribution. Similarly, higher α values for a given rate parameter
means a component is likely to have higher failure rates. Recent data sources are
used next to update the analyst’s prior to get a component’s failure rate posterior.
In sources where point values are provided for failure rates, Dezfuli et al. [58] provide
a method to convert these to likelihood estimates, which are then used here to reach
a posterior distribution. When a mean value for the failure rate λ is available in a
Poisson distribution, it can be treated as being an equivalent of a number of failures
= 0.5, and time = 1/(2x mean). The raw failure rate data used in the following
analysis are provided in Appendix C.
5.1.5.1 Analyst A
Since the T-DEP power system architecture utilizes numerous electrical components
that have little precedence in aircraft applications, Analyst A chooses to take the path
of accepting ignorance by utilizing non-informative priors for all the components. For
a Poisson likelihood, conjugate non-informative priors are Gamma distributed with
shape α = 0.5 and rate β = 0. Additionally, Analyst A only utilizes the latest
data that is available for the components of interest in aircraft applications since it
provides a more accurate representation of the aleatory uncertainty associated with
the T-DEP components. This data is then used to update the non-informative priors
to get the posteriors of interest.
Battery Posterior: A non informative prior is assumed for the battery. Data
available for lithium ion batteries include a recent NASA report [53] that suggested
using 9.3 failures per million hours. Additionally, Boeing 787 reported two battery
safety events in about 104000 combined flight hours of battery operation (2 batteries
per aircraft, 52000 flight hours) [134], while NPRD-2016 [117] provides 8 failures in
2.6735E5 hours of operation for battery packs. This results in the following battery
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failure rate posterior:
Analyst Prior : λpriorA ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 0) (105)
Likelihood : yi|λ ∼ Poisson(λti, yi) (106)
Posterior : λposteriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 19.8, β = 1371350) (107)
Electric Motor Posterior: Similar to a battery, a non-informative prior is as-
sumed.
Analyst Prior : λpriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 0) (108)
Ref. [53] suggests using 9.24 failures per one million hours. Ref. [49] provides a failure
rate of 6.6E-5 per flight hour for three-phase electric drives(applied with a weight of
10x), while NPRD [117] provides additional failure rates of 7.23887E-7 and 3.9586E-7
per hour. The posterior is given by:
Posterior : λposteriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 15.74, β = 3029546) (109)
Motor Inverter Posterior: A non-informative prior is considered as before.
Analyst Prior : λpriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 0) (110)
Ref. [53] suggests using 4.75 failures in one million hours. Ref. [49] provides a failure
rate of 8.5E-5 per flight hour (applied with a weight of 10x) for electronics related to
three-phase electric drives. The final posterior is:
Posterior : λposteriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 10.25, β = 1058800) (111)
Traction Power Bus Posterior: A non-informative prior is considered by Ana-
lyst A.
Analyst Prior : λpriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 0) (112)
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NPRD [117] data includes zero failures for 1,363,267 hours of operating experience
for electric buses. Together, the posterior is:
Posterior : λposteriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 1363267) (113)
Pre-Charger Posterior: Failure data for pre-chargers was not found readily
available in literature. However, upon closer inspection (as a Bayesian analyst may
have to do to determine the prior), analyst A notices that a pre-charger typically
incorporates a resistor and a contactor switch to manage a sudden rush of current
from damaging the inverter circuit. A non-informative prior is used the same as above
in this case too.
Analyst Prior : λpriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 0) (114)
Data for resistor and switch failures from NPRD [117] is scaled and used to update
the precharger prior to give Analyst A’s posterior:
Posterior : λposteriorA|ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 58688) (115)
5.1.5.2 Analyst B
Analyst B takes a different approach. Knowing that the components under consider-
ation have been in use in ground and other applications for a longer time, Analyst B
decides to let historical data from these similar components from dissimilar applica-
tions guide the prior distribution by weighting such data. This is to incorporate some
influence from historical data from dissimilar applications guide the characterization
of epistemic uncertainty, while not letting it overwhelm the limited data available for
state of the art components being developed for aircraft applications. Thus, Analyst
B updates an initial Jeffry’s non-informative conjugate prior using weighted historical
data to generate an analyst’s prior. This is then updated using the latest relevant
component data to obtain the posterior.
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Battery Posterior: An analyst’s prior is constructed by updating a non-informative
prior with historical data [2, 5] weighted at just 10% applicability since a lot of the
historical data is not for Li-ion batteries.
Non− informative Prior : λprior ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5, β = 0) (116)




Analyst Prior : λpriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.5 + Σyi, β = 0 + Σti)
: λpriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 11.45, β = 3966800) (118)
Eq. 118 can now be used as an analyst’s prior. Data available for lithium ion batteries
include a recent NASA report [53] that suggested using 9.3 failures per million hours.
Additionally, Boeing 787 reported two battery safety events in about 104000 combined
flight hours of battery operation (2 batteries per aircraft, 52000 flight hours) [134],
while NPRD-2016 [117] provides 8 failures in 2.6735E5 hours of operation for battery
packs. This results in the following battery failure rate posterior:
Analyst Prior : λpriorB ∼ Gamma(α = 11.45, β = 3966800) (119)
Likelihood : yi|λ ∼ Poisson(λti, yi) (120)
Posterior : λposteriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 30.75, β = 5338150) (121)
Electric Motor Posterior: Similar to a battery, an analyst’s prior is constructed
by updating a non-informative prior with historical data [2,5,7] with a 10% weighting
since it includes data for old electric motors.
Analyst Prior : λpriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 26.15, β = 1.2417E7) (122)
Ref. [53] suggests using 9.24 failures per one million hours. Ref. [49] provides a failure
rate of 6.6E-5 per flight hour for three-phase electric drives(applied with a weight of
10x), while NPRD [117] provides additional failure rates of 7.23887E-7 and 3.9586E-7
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per hour. The posterior is given by:
Posterior : λposteriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 41.39, β = 15446550) (123)
Motor Inverter Posterior: An analyst’s prior is constructed by updating a
non-informative prior with historical data [2] weighted 10% as before.
Analyst Prior : λpriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 4.5, β = 286940.5) (124)
Ref. [53] suggests using 4.75 failures in one million hours. Ref. [49] provides a failure
rate of 8.5E-5 per flight hour (applied with a weight of 10x) for electronics related to
three-phase electric drives. The final posterior is:
Posterior : λposteriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 14.25, β = 1345800) (125)
Traction Power Bus Posterior: An analyst’s prior is constructed by updating
a non-informative prior with historical data [2, 5] weighted 10% as before.
Analyst Prior : λpriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.85, β = 8, 467, 600) (126)
Note that this prior suggests that the analyst believes an electric bus is likely to fail
less than once in over 8 million hours! NPRD [117] data includes zero failures for
1363267 hours of operating experience for electric buses. Together, the posterior is:
Posterior : λposteriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 0.85, β = 9830867) (127)
Pre-Charger Posterior: Failure data for a pre-charger was not found readily
available in literature by the authors. However, upon closer inspection (as a Bayesian
analyst may have to do to determine the prior), analyst B notices that a pre-charger
typically incorporates a resistor and a contactor switch to manage a sudden rush of
current from damaging the inverter circuit. An analyst’s prior is therefore constructed
by updating a non-informative prior with historical data for the two components taken
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in series [5, 7] weighted 20% for the connector switches, and 100% for the resistor.
These are then scaled to assume a similar operating time and the number of failures
added to give (see Appendix C),
Analyst Prior : λpriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 6.1145, β = 1476012) (128)
Data for resistor and switch failures from NPRD [117] is scaled and used to update
the precharger prior to give Analyst B’s posterior:
Posterior : λposteriorB |ȳ ∼ Gamma(α = 6.1145, β = 1534700) (129)
5.1.6 Bayesian Posterior Results - A family of curves
The failure rate posteriors generated by Analysts A and B are provided in figure 61. In
the present experiment, Analyst A represents someone with little disciplinary knowl-
edge, who treats uncertainty by looking at available data. Analyst B is someone
who provides disciplinary information to bias available observations. This is incor-
porated in the present experiment by assuming that weighted historical data from
other applications (e.g. ground, naval, etc.) will provide some perspective into every
component’s expected behavior in novel aircraft applications. This is also visible in
part in the posteriors shown in figure 61. Since analyst A accepts ignorance regarding
epistemic uncertainty and uses non-informative conjugate priors, the spread in failure
rate posteriors is visibly larger than those of Analyst B who uses weighted historical
data to inform prior beliefs. Overall, the failure rates for analyst B are also found to
be lower, although this need not be the case every time and can depend on the expert
opinion utilized. The reduced variability in Analyst B’s posteriors is an indication of
the reduced state of epistemic uncertainty in the estimation of failure rates.
In practice, multiple such Bayesian posteriors can be generated by subject matter
experts by encoding their own understanding of the disciplinary uncertainty (epis-




Figure 61: Bayesian failure rate posteriors for the two analysts
component is provided as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate a level-5 treatment of
uncertainty discussed earlier. As more data becomes available, the effect of these
priors reduces and the posteriors tend to approach ‘frequentist’ estimates in failure
rates obtained using data only. This is because as more and more data is generated,
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the epistemic uncertainty related to lack of knowledge and experience reduces as well,
and the overall uncertainty ends up being dominated by fundamental stochastic be-
havior of the manufacturing and operational processes (aleatory). When compared to
the benchmark results that utilize central tendency, it is quite clear that a Bayesian
approach provides a better treatment of uncertainty in the failure rate data. Thus
the purpose of experiment 2.1 is complete.
5.1.7 Summary of Experiment 2.1
Experiment 2.1 was set up to test if a Bayesian probability framework provides a more
comprehensive treatment of epistemic and aleatory uncertainty under a scarcity of
available data. In designing the experiment, the six levels of treatment of uncer-
tainty in risk analysis defined by Paté-Cornell [146] were explained. These served as
a metric against which benchmark mean failure rates were compared to generated
Bayesian posteriors utilizing the same available datasets. It was demonstrated that
while central measures of tendency like mean failure rates are used during concep-
tual and preliminary design to conduct safety analysis, these correspond to the 3rd
level in the six levels of treatment of uncertainty. Bayesian posteriors generated for
two imaginary analysts making different discipline specific assumptions to encode
epistemic uncertainty demonstrated the Bayesian framework’s capability to provide
decision makers with alternate models, thus providing the highest treatment of un-
certainty according to Paté-Cornell [146]. While two analysts were considered for a
proof of concept, the Bayesian framework is not restricted to the number of differ-
ent posteriors that can be generated and translated through the analyses. Different
subject matter experts may encode different disciplinary assumptions into the prior
distributions, which when updated with the available datasets will generate differ-
ent posteriors. Overall, the results from experiment 2.1 satisfied the purpose of the
experiment and therefore verify hypothesis 2.1.
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5.2 A Bayesian Decision Framework
So far, safety related off-nominal requirements in terms of allowable failure rates have
been allocated to the components in chapter 4.4. Chapter 5.1 generated failure rate
posteriors for the different components while providing a comprehensive treatment of
uncertainty. The next obvious task is then to make a compliance finding. However,
it would be ideal to not lose the gains made in quantifying uncertainty while making
compliance findings. This leads to the second sub-question of the current chapter
which is restated here for convenience:
Research Question 2.2:
How can mathematically defensible compliance decisions be made without losing the
gains made in quantifying uncertainty?
Compliance finding is fundamentally an exercise in decision making under uncer-
tainty. The Bayesian probability framework introduced previously can be considered
as a probability of frequency framework [100]. That is, if the failure rate is a mea-
sure of the frequency of failures, the Bayesian posteriors from Ch. 5.1.6 provide a
probability distribution that represents the level of confidence in this frequency. This
enabling feature of a Bayesian probability framework can be leveraged in a decision
theoretic setup.
Consider A as an action space which includes a ∈ A as actions pertaining to
compliance finding; typically A ={accept,reject}. For instance, a decision maker
takes an action a pertaining to whether a component is compliant or not with the
safety requirements. This action is a function of the observations made regarding
the number of failures (yi), and the operating times (ti). Such a function is called a
decision rule δ(ȳ). Under a Bayesian framework, a loss is used to denote the opposite
of utility. Every action has a potential utility, and therefore a potential loss. A loss
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function L(X, a) represents the loss incurred when a decision maker takes an action
a when the true (unknown) state of the component is X.
Definition 5.2.1 (Bayesian Expected Loss). Bayesian expected loss is the expectation
of the loss function with respect to the posterior distribution
ρ(a, π) = Eλ|ȳL(a, λ) =
∫
λ
L(λ, a) π(λ|ȳ) dλ (130)
where π gives the posterior distribution of λ.
Definition 5.2.2 (The Expected Loss Principle). After data ȳ has been observed, the
preferred action between two actions a1 = δ1(ȳ) and a2 = δ2(ȳ) is the one for which
the posterior expected loss is smaller. Such an action a∗ minimizing the posterior
expected loss is called Bayes action.
Thus, to fully leverage the uncertainty quantification afforded by a Bayesian proba-
bility framework, determining the Bayes action provides a mathematically defensible
way of making a compliance finding at the component level.
As an example, assume two hypothetical components A and B have been allocated
failure rate requirements, and their failure probability posteriors have been computed
using the Bayesian approach explained earlier. Placing the probability requirements
on the CDFs of the Bayesian failure posteriors, analysts can compute the probability
with which reliability requirements can be met (probability of frequency). This is
shown notionally in Fig. 62. For example, the probability with which component B
in the notional example can meet the reliability requirement is given by the dashed
line showing p(λposterior < λallowable) on the CDF in Fig. 62.
Decision makers now need to make a decision on whether the corresponding prob-
ability of meeting the requirement is good enough to consider component B compliant
with the safety requirements. In a Bayesian decision theoretic setup, such a compli-
ance decision regarding component B is considered an action a
a ∈ A, A = {compliant, non− compliant}
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Figure 62: Notional Integrated Risk Assessment - Probability of meeting component
failure rate requirements
If the true value of the compliance finding (in reality - unknown) is given by x
x ∈ X, X = {compliant, non− compliant}
then a loss function (x, a) can be defined to represent the penalty to be paid if
the analyst chooses action a when the true compliance value is x, under available
information p(λposterior < λallowable). That is to say, imagine an analyst takes an
action a1 = {complaint}, when the true value of compliance finding (theoretical and
unknown in reality) was x2 = {non−compliant}, the loss incurred would be L(x2, a1)
and so on.
In such a framework, the Bayesian expected loss ρ(a, p) is the expectation of this





An action a∗ that minimizes the expected loss given by Eq. 131 should be the action
taken by the analyst and is also called Bayes action. As is visible from the above
mathematical framework, the analyst needs only to compute the Bayesian posterior
and supply a loss function L(x, a), and the framework provides a recommendation for
compliance finding based on minimization of the expected loss. It is a mathematically
defensible method for compliance decision making while accounting for epistemic
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and aleatory uncertainty. With this background, hypothesis 2.2 is restated here to
reiterate the claim made in the above discussion.
Hypothesis 2.2: If the posterior expected loss using suitable loss functions can be
determined for system components, then the action that minimizes such an expected
loss would inform the compliance action to be taken under uncertainty
5.2.1 Experiment 2.2
The intent of this section is to test hypothesis 2.2 stated above. The previous experi-
ment (see Ch. 5.1.3) compared the level of treatment of uncertainty between tradition-
ally used mean failure rates as a benchmark against Bayesian posterior distributions
created by two imaginary analysts. In the present case, compliance decisions can be
similarly compared. A benchmark method to determine compliance is compared to
the results obtained using an expected loss framework explained above.
5.2.1.1 Purpose of the Experiment
Hypothesis 2.2 states that minimizing a posterior expected loss would be the solution
to research sub-question 2.2. RQ 2.2 focuses on obtaining a mathematically defensible
way to make compliance finding without losing the higher treatment of uncertainty
afforded by a Bayesian probability framework. This informs the main objective of the
present experiment:
1. Demonstrate that computing the posterior expected loss captures and translates




For the T-DEP architecture, table 24 provides the failure rate requirements allocated
to the different components. Similarly, a simple failure rate analysis using central
tendency to provide mean component failure rates is given in chapter 5.1.4. For
the present experiment, a simple operation of comparing these two, as is done in
traditional preliminary system safety assessment yields component compliance finding
as given in table 25. As can be seen, the vast majority of the components in the T-DEP
Table 25: Benchmark compliance results





Cruise Motor ≤ 5× 10−7 9.7761× 10−6 Non-compliant
CM Inverter ≤ 1.675× 10−6 3.51× 10−5 Non-compliant
CM Pre-charger ≤ 8.25× 10−7 5.2594× 10−5 Non-compliant
Traction Power Bus ≤ 2.5× 10−7 4.2177× 10−6 Non-compliant
Battery ≤ 5× 10−7 7.6159× 10−6 Non-compliant
HLP Motor ≤ 5.03965× 10−5 9.7761× 10−6 Compliant
HLP Inverter ≤ 5.19079× 10−5 3.51× 10−5 Compliant
HLP Pre-charger ≤ 1.09956× 10−5 5.2594× 10−5 Non-compliant
architecture seem to be non-compliant with the reliability requirements generated
from Ch. 4.4.4. This approach simply compares the failure rate requirement to the
mean failure rates obtained from (limited) data to make a compliance assessment.
Any uncertainty information encoded in the failure rates is thus lost. The results of
this exercise serve as a benchmark to compare the output of the Bayesian decision
theoretic approach discussed next.
5.2.3 Loss Functions
With the component level reliability (allowable failure rate) requirements now avail-
able from Ch. 4.4.4, and failure rate posteriors available from Ch. 5.1.6, the Bayesian
decision framework described in Ch. 5.2 is now utilized to determine compliance find-
ing. To proceed, decision makers must come up with loss functions that capture the
potential loss (opposite of utility or benefit) of any action. For the present case, a loss
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function can be allocated based on a decision matrix (also called confusion matrix).
Table 26 provides a simple loss function that allocates four different losses based on
the true (unknown) state of the component, and the decision action taken. The fol-
Table 26: Generic loss function L(X, a)
True State Decision Action a
X a1 = {Compliant} a2 = {Non− Compliant}
X1 = {Compliant} L11 L12
X2 = {Non− Compliant} L21 L22
lowing discussion provides some insights into the choice of this generic loss function
and the typical values in it [172]:
1. L11 is the loss incurred when a component is deemed compliant when it is truly
compliant. Since this is a desirable outcome, and the minimization of loss is
desired, L11 is typically negative.
2. L12 is the loss incurred when a component is deemed compliant when it is not
in truth. This is the worst possible outcome from a safety standpoint, and
therefore is accorded the largest positive loss. That is L12 = max(Lij).
3. L21 is the loss incurred when a component is deemed non-compliant when in
reality it is compliant. While this is undesirable, it is better than the previous
case and is typically provided a small positive loss.
4. L22 is the loss incurred when a component is rightfully declared non-compliant.
Since this is desirable, L22 is typically provided the largest magnitude of negative
loss. That is L22 = min(Lij).
The Bayesian expected loss given by Eq. 131 gets simplified because of the loss
function provided by Table 26 to give,
ρ(a1, p) = L11 · p+ L21 · (1− p) (132)
ρ(a2, p) = L12 · p+ L22 · (1− p) (133)
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Where p = p(λposterior ≤ λreq) is the probability of the component meeting its
requirements. Each term in equations 132, 133 above provides information. For
instance, the first term L11p in Eq. 132 gives the (negative) loss value of choosing to
call a component compliant under posterior probability of it meeting the requirements.
The second term computes the loss of calling the component compliant weighted by
1 − p, which is used to measure the true state X2. The losses due to both these
estimations of X1, X2 and their probabilities are added up to provide the net loss due
to taking the decision action a1 = compliant. Eq. 133 provides a similar consideration
for the action a2.
The test problem of interest is the T-DEP power system architecture from Fig. 33.
In the discussion that follows, a decision maker D utilizes the posteriors generated by
analysts A and B from chapter 5.1.6 to compute the expected losses. The assumed
loss function is given by table 27.
Table 27: Loss function L(X, a) for decision maker D
True State Decision Action a
X a1 = {Compliant} a2 = {Non− Compliant}
X1 = {Compliant} $-1,000,000 $500,000
X2 = {Non− Compliant} $3,000,000 $-2,000,000
Decision maker D looks at the compliance problem in terms of costs it would
impose on the company developing the T-DEP architecture. A correct compliance
finding is assumed to result in a loss of $-1 million (profit), whereas a correct finding of
the lack of compliance prevents the company from having to face potential future costs
of $2 million. A decision of non-compliant when true state is compliant levies a cost of
$500,000 to go through the certification process again and to generate additional data,
whereas a wrongful ‘compliant’ decision is assumed to result in future (litigation and
others) costs of $3 million. These values in the present analysis are notional. The idea
is to provide a working example of how decision makers might utilize the described
Bayesian decision framework in making a compliance finding.
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5.2.4 Bayesian Expected Loss Results
The Bayesian expected loss for the different components of the T-DEP power systems
architecture from Fig. 33 is computed using equations 132, 133. These equations re-
quire a value for p – the probabilities of meeting requirements. These are obtained
by computing the cumulative distributions of the component posteriors and finding
p(λposterior ≤ λreq). Table 28 shows these probabilities for meeting failure rate require-
ments for the different components for the two Bayesian analysts A, B from Ch. 5.1.6.
Table 28: Probability of meeting failure rate requirements for Bayesian analysts





Cruise Motor ≤ 5× 10−7 0 0
CM Inverter ≤ 1.675× 10−6 0.00001 0
CM Pre-charger ≤ 8.25× 10−7 0.24463 0.00162
Traction Power Bus ≤ 2.5× 10−7 0.59098 0.93573
Battery ≤ 5× 10−7 0 0
HLP Motor ≤ 5.03965× 10−5 1 1
HLP Inverter ≤ 5.19079× 10−5 1 1
HLP Pre-charger ≤ 1.09956× 10−5 0.74407 0.99915
Using these posterior probabilities of meeting the requirements, decision maker
D utilizes the loss function from table 27 to compute the expected loss of taking
actions a1 = {compliant} or a2 = {non− compliant}. The results of this analysis for
Analyst A’s posteriors are provided in table 29. It is worth noting that Analyst A had
assumed non-informative priors and only the latest data to compute the posteriors.
Under these circumstances, the compliance results using the expected loss for Analyst
A’s posteriors end up matching the benchmark results from table 25. That is, the
high lift motors and their inverters are the only components found compliant with
the requirements generated. However, that does not mean the two approaches are
equivalent. Results in table 29 translate the posterior probabilities of component
failure rates to determine the loss incurred in taking either action a1 or a2. In doing
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so, the uncertainty information encoded during the Bayesian probability analysis
is not lost and instead is translated through the loss functions to decision makers.
This, therefore, is a higher treatment of uncertainty than the benchmark where point
estimates strip away uncertainty in failure rates to give only binary results a1 or a2,
as against providing a probability informed penalty of making either decision.
Table 29: Expected loss and compliance finding using Analyst A’s posteriors
Component ρ(a1, p) ρ(a2, p) Decision Action
Cruise Motor $ 3,000,000 $ -2,000,000 a2 = Non-compliant
CM Inverter $ 2,999,960 $ -1,999,975 a2 = Non-compliant
CM Pre-charger $ 2,021,480 $ -1,388,425 a2 = Non-compliant
Traction Power Bus $ 636,080 $ -522,550 a2 = Non-compliant
Battery $ 3,000,000 $ -2,000,000 a2 = Non-compliant
HLP Motor $ -1,000,000 $ 500,000 a1 = Compliant
HLP Inverter $ -1,000,000 $ 500,000 a1 = Compliant
HLP Pre-charger $ 23,720 $ -139,825 a2 = Non-compliant
Table 30 provides the expected loss incurred by decision maker D in taking either
compliance action using Analyst B’s posterior failure rates. Analyst B had utilized
weighted historical data to simulate expert opinion to allocate prior distributions to
the components. These priors were then updated using the same data as Analyst A to
determine the likelihoods. The resulting posteriors were different from Analyst A, and
were found to have a reduced variance, indicative of reduced epistemic uncertainty
in the posteriors. The compliance finding is again found by minimizing the expected
loss for different components. In this case, in addition to the high lift motors and
their inverters, the traction power buses and high lift pre-chargers are also found to be
compliant. This is an interesting development that warrants further discussion. The
HLP prechargers have a probability of meeting the requirement of 74% for analyst A,
which is improved to over 99% for analyst B when historical data is used to inform the
prior. Similarly, the traction power bus with a probability of meeting requirements of
59% for analyst A has a higher value of over 93% for analyst B. These changes suggest
that analyst B’s expert opinion encoded through the priors biases the posterior enough
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Table 30: Expected loss and compliance finding using Analyst B’s posteriors
Component ρ(a1, p) ρ(a2, p) Decision Action
Cruise Motor $ 3,000,000 $ -2,000,000 a2 = Non-compliant
CM Inverter $ 3,000,000 $ -2,000,000 a2 = Non-compliant
CM Pre-charger $ 2,993,520 $ -1,995,950 a2 = Non-compliant
Traction Power Bus $ -742,920 $ 339,325 a1 = Compliant
Battery $ 3,000,000 $ -2,000,000 a2 = Non-compliant
HLP Motor $ -1,000,000 $ 500,000 a1 = Compliant
HLP Inverter $ -1,000,000 $ 500,000 a1 = Compliant
HLP Pre-charger $ -996,600 $ 497,875 a1 = Compliant
to make these two components compliant. Another effect of incorporating subject
matter opinion by analyst B is visible in the compliance finding of the cruise motor
pre-charger unit. The probability of meeting its requirements reduces from analyst A
to B, denoting that reducing the variance may not always result in better compliance
outcomes. If anything, the decision maker can be more sure of declaring the CM
pre-chargers as non-compliant.
5.2.5 Summary of Experiment 2.2
Experiment 2.2 was set up to test the proposed Bayesian decision framework against
a more conventional benchmark approach typically used in PSSA compliance find-
ing. The intent of this experiment was to demonstrate that minimizing the posterior
expected loss informs the compliance action to be taken while making full use of the
improved uncertainty quantification afforded by the Bayesian probability framework.
Towards that goal, a benchmark compliance finding was completed using the mean
failure rates using historical and latest data available for the components of interest.
The point estimates were compared to the requirements generated in Ch. 4.4.4. This
method, while standard in traditional PSSA, does not translate the gain in uncer-
tainty made during the Bayesian probability analysis thus preventing the decision
makers from getting the full picture. A Bayesian decision framework was introduced
to utilize the expected loss principle to allow decision makers to choose the cost of
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making a decision under different truth values. These costs were then weighted using
the probability of meeting failure rate requirements (probability of frequency frame-
work) to get a posterior expected loss for each decision action being considered by
the decision maker. While minimizing such a loss informed the compliance decision
to be taken, the loss values of every alternative preserved the uncertainty informa-
tion encoded by Bayesian probability analysts and provided the decision makers with
a more holistic perspective of the compliance actions. The results generated using
analyst A’s posteriors (non-informative priors) showed agreement with the bench-
mark results. Results generated using Analyst B’s posteriors, which utilized weighted
historical data to simulate SME opinion as a prior, demonstrated an improved com-
pliance finding due to the reduced epistemic uncertainty. Overall, this experiment
successfully demonstrated the objective for which it was designed, thus verifying hy-
pothesis 2.2.
5.3 Multi-state Reliability
A multi-state system is one where the system and its components may assume more
than two levels of performance. Reliability analysis that considers these multiple
possible states is known as multi-state (MS) reliability analysis [176]. Novel aircraft
architectures, by definition (see def. 2.1.1.1), are likely to have novel means of sat-
isfying an aircraft level function. These terminal components satisfying the aircraft
level functions may fail in multiple different states, or in multiple combinations due to
the complexity of such architectures. Therefore, novel architectures are likely to have
multi-state failures. In the present work, the T-DEP architecture can be considered
a multi-state architecture due to the different unique failure states that can result
from combinations of the cruise motor or high lift propulsor failures. Chapter 4.3.5
focused on determining the safety related off-nominal scenarios and their severity in
a multi-state fashion. These resulted in the allocation of failure rate requirements to
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the unit level in chapter 4.4.4. In chapter 5.2.4, a Bayesian decision framework was
introduced that provided component level compliance finding. The next logical step is
to consider the reliability of the multi-state system failures to meet the requirements
generated (see fig. 59). These considerations, as well as the final requirement posed
under research question 2 in chapter 3.3 leads to the following research sub-question:
Research Question 2.3:
What method can allow the estimation of multistate system reliability while account-
ing for both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty under scarcity of available data?
5.3.1 A Multi-state Network Reliability Approach
Computation of multi-state system reliability is a well established problem with nu-
merous potential solutions provided in literature. Of these, a Monte-Carlo simulation
approach can be utilized for computing the reliability of almost every complex, real-
world multi-state system [176]. In this method, a system is typically represented as a
network with nodes or edges representing different components. An adjacency matrix
that denotes the connections between such notes is created to depict the connections
within the system of interest. Consider a simplified system that was introduced earlier
along with its network adjacency matrix given by figure 63. An adjacency matrix (A)
is a square matrix with rows and columns denoting the components of the system. If
component i connects forward to component j, Aij = 1, otherwise Aij = 0. This sys-
tem has dummy components D1, D2 that aid with system reliability computations.
The components of interest are the source components Si, intermediate components
Ii, and terminal components Ti. The system level failure states are characterized by
the failures in its terminal, function satisfying components Ti. Thus, this system has
23 = 8 possible states(1 nominal, 7 off-nominal) that were provided earlier in table 4.
A terminal component can be considered to have failed in a network approach if there
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(a) Example network representation (b) Corresponding adjacency matrix A
(c) Corresponding A2 (d) Corresponding A3
Figure 63: An example system with two sources and three terminal components in
network representation
exists no paths between the source and the terminal component of interest.
An adjacency matrix allows the determination of the existence of a path between
a source and a terminal component of interest due to some interesting properties.
The non-zero elements of A1 provide the components that are connected by a path
with an edge-length of 1. For instance, if A1(i, j) = 1, then component i is connected
to component j with a path of length 1. This is by definition of the adjacency matrix
and is trivial. However, this property extends to higher orders as well. For instance,
if A2(i, j) = k, then components i and j are connected by k different paths of edge-
length 2. Generalizing, if An(i, j) = k, then components i, j are connected by k paths
of length n. Finally, AN+1 = 0 when N = nrows(A) = ncols(A). This is visible
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in figure 63(c), where the matrix elements in rows S1, S2 with columns T1, T2, T3 are
non-zero, meaning these components are connected with a path of length 2. Similarly,
components D1, D2 are connected with T1, T2, T3 with paths of length 3 as shown in
figure 63(d). Thus, (A+A2 +A3 + ...AN)(i, j) provides the total number of paths of
varying lengths between components i, j.
In the present work, components are modeled as nodes, with the columns of the
adjacency matrix giving incoming connections from components upstream, while rows
give outgoing network connections to downstream components. This is visible in the
example case in Fig. 63(b) for the system provided. To simulate the failure of any
component, all its incoming connections are set to 0. For instance, if component j
were to fail, all elements in column j of the corresponding adjacency matrix A would
be set to zero. The sources only have outgoing connections (rows) but no incoming
connections (columns). Thus source failures can only be simulated by having an
upstream dummy component D, so that incoming (columns) edges of a source can
be set to zero. Once failures have been introduced into the adjacency matrix, the
resultant paths between the sources and terminal components can be re-calculated to
see if there are any places where those paths are disconnected (failed path from source
to terminal component). This knowledge can be used in a Monte-Carlo simulation.
Lam and Szeto [106] provide two algorithms to evaluate the network reliability
and path-connectedness of a network given by an adjacency matrix A. These have
been modified and combined in the present work to evaluate the multi-state relia-
bility of novel aircraft architectures with multiple sources and sinks (terminal com-
ponents), and with Bayesian posterior probabilities. While the original algorithms
assume constant reliability p for every component, the modified algorithm utilizes
failure probability (p=1 − e−λt). The failure rate λ is sampled from the Bayesian
posterior distribution for every Monte-Carlo experiment/iteration, thus translating
the uncertainty in failure rates through the system reliability evaluation. When a
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component fails, it may result in the terminal component Ti getting disconnected
from the source components Si, identifiable with having zero paths between the two.
In such a case, the terminal component is considered failed, with its state xT = 0. A
state vector X = {xT1 , xT2 , .., xTk} is introduced to capture the state of the terminal
components of the system. X, therefore, defines the state of the system, with different
combinations of terminal component failures representing multi-state system failures.
The modified algorithm for multi-state reliability assessment is provided below.
Algorithm 2: Evaluate MS network failure probability (FXk) for a given
matrix A with given component unreliability pi
Result: MS failure probability FXk of system network with adjacency A
n_exp = number of experiment;
for n← 1 to n_exp do
Let Arand be a random N ×N matrix whose column j is p = (1− e−λt),
where λ is sampled from the posterior failure probability of component j;
if the ijth entry of Arand is greater than p and the corresponding ijth of A
is 1 then
let the ijth entries of Arand be 1 ;
else







Compute Atrim by trimming Apath to keep rows corresponding to source
elements S and columns corresponding to terminal elements T ;
Compute and store the system state vector X by summing up the
columns of Atrim;
end
If Xk is a unique system state, FXk(t) = nXk/n_exp, where nXk is the
number of iterations that result in Xk
This algorithm provides the probability of every unique system failure state, com-
puted within one single Monte-Carlo simulation. The modification made in algo-
rithm 2 from Ref. [106] are given in blue. With this multi-state reliability algorithm
expounded, hypothesis 2.3 is restated as follows:
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Hypothesis 2.3: A multistate network reliability approach utilizing Monte Carlo
simulations, suitably adjusted to work with Bayesian failure rate posteriors will pro-
vide accurate estimation of the system level reliability under uncertainty.
5.3.2 Experiment 2.3
Since hypothesis 2.3 is a feasibility hypothesis, the intent of this experiment is to
demonstrate that algorithm 2 can compute the multi-state failure rates of a complex
system.
5.3.2.1 Purpose of the Experiment
The test problem for this thesis is the T-DEP architecture given in Fig. 33, whose
multi-state failures and their hazard severity was documented in chapter 4.3.5. Ta-
ble 2 requires that each of the failure states from Fig. 51, 52, 54 have a failure rate
of less than those mentioned for assessment level II aircraft depending on the hazard
severity of those states. Component failure rate requirements (Ch. 4.4.5), component
failure rate posteriors (Ch. 5.1.6), as well as component compliance (Ch. 5.2.4) have
been obtained in the previous chapters. While component compliance results give
an insight into the reliability of the components, their impact on the aircraft/system
level in a multi-state fashion is not obvious for complex systems. Thus, the purpose
of this experiment can be stated as,
1. Demonstrate network based multi-state reliability analysis approach to compute
T-DEP power system multi-state failure rates using the proposed Monte-Carlo
algorithm
5.3.3 Multi-state Reliability Results
For the T-DEP architecture, the multi-state failure rate requirements stem from re-
sults provided in Figs. 51, 52, and 54. The corresponding failure rate requirements
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are given by figures 64, 65, and 66.
Figure 64: T-DEP multi-state λreq in takeoff configuration. Colored by C-FHA
hazard severity from Fig. 49(a)
Figure 65: T-DEP multi-state λreq in cruise configuration. Colored by C-FHA
hazard severity from Fig. 49(b)
Figure 66: T-DEP asymmetric multi-state λreq in takeoff configuration. Colored by
asymmetric thrust loss hazard severity from Fig. 54
A potential shortcoming of Monte-Carlo analysis to evaluate reliability is that
events that are unlikely with a low probability of occurrence tend to be dispropor-
tionately missed. To solve this issue, the present analysis assumes a operating time of
t = 5000hr to compute component failure probabilities (F (t)) using Eq. 6. A Monte-
Carlo simulation of 1 million experiments is carried out as detailed in algorithm 2
following which the probability of the system in different failure states (FXk(t)) is
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computed. The failure states (Xk) are represented by the terminal components (high
lift propulsors or cruise motors) losing full or partial power supply. The failure rates












Figure 67: Multi-state failure rates for the two Bayesian analysts for takeoff C-FHA
hazards colored by compliance finding
Figure 67 provides results of the multi-state failure rate of the different failure
conditions of the T-DEP power system from figure 33. During the component-specific
compliance finding from Ch. 5.2.4, it was discussed how Analyst A’s posteriors encode
a larger epistemic uncertainty and result in more components being declared non-
compliant compared to Analyst B. Similar trends are visible at the aircraft level
multi-state compliance analysis. When compared to the failure rate requirements
allocated from C-FHA analysis at the system level (Fig. 67), Analyst A’s posteriors
result in a larger number of aircraft level failure states being non-compliant compared
to Analyst B’s posteriors.
Also of note is that component allocation assumed multiple component failures
204
were unlikely, thus allowing reliability requirement allocation based on single compo-
nent failures. The results in the present experiment suggest that multiple component
failures may be a cause for concern when it pertains to certain failure states in the T-
DEP power system. Consider the non-compliant (in red) failure states using Analyst
B’s posteriors. A state where a cruise motor has lost half power, along with a single
(any one out of 12) high lift motor failing is deemed non-compliant of the reliability
requirements generated. This failure state has no single component failure and must
involve two different components (CM inverter/PC and HL motor/inverter/PC) fail-
ing. Similarly, a state with total thrust loss (2 CM lost, 12 HLP lost) is possible
only through a complete loss of both batteries, or through multiple combinations of
traction power bus failures, or individual component failures. However, this state
is found to have a higher failure rate than the 10−7 per flight hour required for a
catastrophic event.
In a way, such a Monte-Carlo reliability analysis by modeling the system as a
multi-state network allows the analysts to consider all possible combinations of fail-
ures, irrespective of whether it involves multiple components failing at once. While
such states may be perceived as being highly unlikely in preliminary safety analysis,
analyses such as these do not require any assumptions and can capture the compliance
of off-nominal states of a system better.
(a) Analyst A (b) Analyst B
Figure 68: Multi-state failure rates for the two Bayesian analysts for cruise C-FHA
hazards colored by compliance finding
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Figure 68 provides the failure rate results for the two analysts for the three dif-
ferent off-nominal states the T-DEP power system architecture can take in its cruise
configuration. The results using the posteriors of both Bayesian analysts reach the
same conclusions at the system level – that partial loss of thrust from a cruise motor,
and a complete loss of one cruise motor are scenarios that are non-compliant with the
reliability requirements. This result was hinted at when the cruise motors and their
inverters were found to be non-compliant with the safety requirements generated in
Ch. 5.2.4 by the decision maker D using both Analysts’ posteriors. While a total
loss of thrust in cruise might be catastrophic, it sufficiently meets the failure rate
requirements of < 10−7 per flight hour.
The next set of results examined are the failure rates of the asymmetric loss of
thrust states of the T-DEP architecture. The output of the Monte-Carlo runs is
processed to determine the number of system failure states with the left HLP and
cruise motor failed asymmetrically and doubled to consider the mirror case when the
right side fails. The resultant failure rates are given in figure 69.
(a) Analyst A
(b) Analyst B
Figure 69: Asymmetric loss of thrust – multi-state failure rates for the two Bayesian
analysts for takeoff. Colored by compliance finding
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An important distinction between the results of figure 67 and 69 must be qualified.
The number of HLP failed term at the top represents the difference between the HLP
failures on the left and right side of the fuselage for Fig. 69. Thus, even a case with 6
left HLP failures and 5 right HLP failures would fall under 1 asymmetric HLP failure
in figure 69. The failure rate requirements, in this case, are based on figure 66. These
requirements were in turn computed by assuming a worst-case scenario of the most
outboard propulsors failing first during multi-state analysis conducted in Ch. 4.3.5.
Under these conservative assumptions, the results indicate that the T-DEP failure
states consisting of half a cruise motor failing (CM at half power), along with up to
2 HLP failing on the same side are non-compliant with the safety requirements. It is
interesting to note that a majority of these failure states are categorized as ‘Major’ or
‘Hazardous’ severity, and not ‘Catastrophic’. This means failures that would typically
go under the radar in conceptual or preliminary design have the potential to drive
safety related off-nominal requirements. Such an insight would not have been possible
in a traditional safety analysis framework during conceptual or preliminary design,
since the focus during these is to minimize the risk posed by catastrophic failures.
5.3.4 Summary of Experiment 2.3
The intent of this experiment was to demonstrate that a Monte-Carlo algorithm
suitably modified to work with Bayesian failure rate posteriors and network-based
multi-state reliability approach provides accurate estimation of the multi-state relia-
bility of the T-DEP power system architecture. The need stemmed from evaluating
the system level impacts of the combined performance based off-nominal requirements
identification, and a Bayesian unit level failure rates determination framework. The
performance based off-nominal conditions were characterized by Fig. 51, 52, and 54.
The corresponding failure rate requirements were provided in Fig. 64, 65, and 66.
A modified Monte-Carlo algorithm (see alg. 2) was introduced to compute the
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probability of the different T-DEP power system failure states. Operating time was
set to t = 5000hr to overcome the tendency of a Monte-Carlo analysis to under-sample
the remote probability states. One million Monte-Carlo samples were generated and
analyzed to generate the failure rates of the different states using Eq. 134. The results
have been provided in Fig. 67, 68, and 69.
Results pertaining to symmetric failure states analyzed by C-FHA indicated that
multi-component failures are not as unlikely as were previously assumed, and in fact
result in failure states that are non-compliant with the requirements from table 2. Cer-
tain multi-state C-FHA analyzed failures were non-compliant across both Bayesian
analyst’s posteriors. These include (i) losing half a cruise motor and one high lift
propulsor (HLP), (ii) Losing one cruise motor equivalent (two half CMs or one full)
+ 6 to 8 HLPs. Finally, a complete loss of thrust scenario was also found to be non-
compliant with failure rate requirements. Some of these results may be explained by
considering the component level compliance from Ch. 5.2.4. For instance, the cruise
motors, their inverters, and the batteries were found to be non-compliant for both
the Bayesian analyst’s posteriors. These components drive a majority of the non-
compliant failure states observed in the results in the present experiment. However,
they alone cannot explain results where one cruise motor and 8 HLPs have failed –
pointing towards multiple component failures as a cause. The importance of different
components in terms of system reliability is considered later in chapter 6.1.
The next multi-state reliability considered involved the asymmetric thrust loss
failures from Ch. 4.3.5 and table 19. The failure rates computed from the Monte-
Carlo simulations indicate that failures of half/full cruise motor with up to two HLPs
on one side tend to be non-compliant with the reliability requirements. These failures
correspond to a severity category of ‘Major’ to ‘Hazardous’. This indicates that
reliability requirements for the T-DEP architecture are driven by some of the less
critical failure states. This goes counter to the assumption typically made during
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traditional safety analysis during preliminary design where ‘Catastrophic’ failures
drive reliability requirements.
These results satisfy the intent of the present experiment by demonstrating results
and insights from multi-state reliability analysis of the T-DEP architecture. They,
therefore, verify hypothesis 2.3.
5.4 Chapter Summary
The second research question (RQ 2) was motivated by observations group 2 from
Ch. 2.5. With the characterization and unit level allocation of safety related off-
nominal requirements completed in Ch. 1.5, the next logical step was to evaluate
the system level and unit level reliability. To that end goal, the overall intent of
RQ 2 was to provide a better treatment of uncertainty in the reliability estimations
of novel aircraft architectures at the system and component level. RQ 2 was further
divided into three research sub-questions – (i) RQ 2.1 that dealt with component level
reliability assessment; (ii) RQ 2.2 that dealt with component compliance decision
making; and (iii) Multi-state system level reliability assessment.
One hypothesis was stated for each research sub-question above. Hypothesis 2.1
(H-2.1) recommended a Bayesian probability framework for failure rate estimation of
the novel components while providing better treatment of uncertainty. The metrics
used to define ‘better’ in this instance were the 6-levels of treatment of uncertainty
by Paté-Cornell [146]. For experiment 2.1 (E-2.1), a benchmark approach considered
point estimates (mean) for component failure rates. Two Bayesian analysts A, B were
imagined providing two different prior distributions to encode disciplinary knowledge
as epistemic uncertainty. The resulting distributions were found to represent a level
5 treatment of uncertainty, better than the level 3 afforded by the benchmark, thus
verifying H-2.1.
Hypothesis 2.2 (H-2.2) suggested that minimizing the posterior expected loss
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would provide an uncertainty-informed compliance decision for the novel aircraft ar-
chitecture components. In verifying H-2.2, experiment 2.2 considered a benchmark
method of compliance of testing where the point failure rate estimates generated in
E-2.1 are compared to failure rate requirements generated in Ch. 4.4.4. A Bayesian
decision framework was developed that computes the posterior expected loss for each
component using a loss function that is defined by a decision maker. Minimizing the
expected loss for the two analysts’ posteriors resulted in slightly different compliance
findings. However, the results not only indicated whether a component was compli-
ant or not but also included the probability weighted cost of taking either decision.
This provides the decision makers with additional information and alternate models,
leading to better uncertainty-informed decision making.
By now, component failure rates and compliance decisions were made for the T-
DEP architectures. RQ 2.3, therefore, looked at compliance finding at the system
level in a multi-state context where the system may fail in multiple states. Hy-
pothesis 2.3 (H-2.3) suggested a Monte-Carlo network reliability algorithm suitably
modified to work with Bayesian posteriors and for multi-state failures as a solution.
For experiment 2.3 (E-2.3), a Monte-Carlo simulation was run to generate one mil-
lion working and failed system states using Bayesian component failure probabilities
from E-2.1. The output was then post-processed to identify the failure rates of differ-
ent failure states postulated in the C-FHA and asymmetric thrust loss analysis from
Ch. 4.3.5. These results suggested that multiple failures are not as unlikely as first
assumed, resulting in certain failure states not meeting reliability requirements. The
asymmetric thrust loss states’ reliability analysis showed that more failure states that
were categorized as ‘Major’ or ‘Hazardous’ do not meet requirements as compared to
‘Catastrophic’. This means that the less safety critical failures have a tendency to
drive reliability requirements for the T-DEP power systems architecture.
With these results, the proposed hypotheses for the three parts of RQ 2 were
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successfully verified, completing the intent of research area 2 from Ch. 3.3
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CHAPTER VI
THE INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK - SENSITIVITIES
AND TRADE STUDIES
The intent of the present chapter is to integrate the tools and methods discussed so
far into a framework that allows better incorporation of safety related off-nominal
considerations into early design stages for novel aircraft architectures. The need for
such an integrated solution is also felt through the last requirement posed by the
overall research objective in Ch. 3.1. The requirement to integrate this framework
into early design trade studies stems from observation group 3 in Ch. 2.5 which can
be summarized to say that traditional methods fall short when it comes to enabling
design trade-off analysis under safety related off-nominal considerations. This moti-
vates research question 3, which is restated here:
Research Question 3:
How can design trade studies for novel aircraft architectures and technologies be
conducted in early design while incorporating safety related off-nominal scenarios?
An overview of the developed framework was first provided in Ch. 3.5 and is
provided here again in figure 70. The framework assumes that the configuration has
been sized – this includes the weight breakdown including mass properties, geometric
definitions including wing and other areas including locations of control surfaces if any,
architecture definition that includes any redundancy considerations for the internal
energy flows of the systems, any available aerodynamics and propulsion models, and
finally any available subsystem sizing details. The first task then is to identify a set
of appropriate safety metrics of interest for the given architecture. This part was
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completed and demonstrated in Ch. 4.2.
Next, adequate models are developed for the functions of interest to characterize
the effect of functional degradation on safety metrics. In the present work, since
the test problem is the T-DEP aircraft with novel architecture to provide thrust and
high lift, models that evaluate the safety metrics given in table 5 at the conceptual
and preliminary stage were created in Ch. 4.3.3, 4.3.4. The outputs of these models
included the safety metrics of interest under functional or component loss scenarios.
Certification requirements and engineering judgement were used to set thresholds
on these metrics that helped characterize the severity of the hazards postulated. A
bottom-up network algorithm in Ch. 4.4 was used to allocate the requirements to the
components.
With the safety related off-nominal requirements now characterized and allocated,
a Bayesian probability and decision framework with a multi-state extension were in-
troduced in Ch. 5. Here, component Bayesian failure rate posteriors with compliance
finding were completed, along with a system level multi-state reliability and system
level multi-state compliance findings.
All of these tools and methods can be put together into one integrated framework
that enables evaluation of off-nominal safety related requirements and reliability of
novel aircraft architectures in early design. At this stage, the framework can be used
to inform design decisions, as well as close the loop to perform trade-studies. It
can also be used to optimize the conceptual sizing using reliability information in a
reliability based design optimization (RBDO) loop (beyond the scope of the present
work). The outputs of this framework can be used to inform the late stage preliminary
design and onward. This framework given in figure 70 is the final hypothesis of this





























































Hypothesis 3: The integrated framework given in figures 24 or 70 enables design
trade studies while incorporating safety related off-nominal requirements and reliabil-
ity of novel aircraft architectures in early design
In order to verify hypothesis 3, the present chapter takes a two-pronged approach.
First, component level multi-state importance metrics are established and evaluated
to determine the sensitivity of multi-state system reliability to the component failure
rate posteriors. Second, design trade-studies in terms of resizing the vertical tail
and oversizing cruise inverters are demonstrated with any benefits in off-nominal
operations quantified.
6.1 Unit Level Importance
Component importance measures are used in reliability theory to quantify the criti-
cality of components within a system. They may be used (i) to provide a ranking of
components with respect to their influence on system level reliability, (ii) to deter-
mine the top contributors to unreliability, (iii) to focus on making improvements that
will have the greatest reliability effect, and (iv) to perform sensitivity studies [153].
6.1.1 Experiment 3.1
The multi-state reliability results provided in Ch. 5.3.3 depend on numerous assump-
tions made throughout the analysis. Since the focus of the present chapter is on
enabling trade-studies, quantifying the sensitivity of system multi-state reliability re-
sults with respect to the reliability of individual components forms experiment 3.1.
This sensitivity analysis will help identify components that drive the reliability of
the different failure states of the T-DEP aircraft power system architecture. Once
these components and the failure states they most affect are determined, this infor-
mation can be used to focus the development efforts with the goal of improving their
individual reliability.
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6.1.2 Reliability of Complex Systems
Complex systems typically involve multiple components to enable the satisfaction
of a top level function with a level of fault-tolerance through adequate reliability.
Even when the component failures of such systems are assumed to be binary (work-
ing/failed), these can result in different off-nominal states for the system of interest.
6.1.2.1 The Structure Function
The present state of such a system can be denoted through a structure function, that
relates the state of the components to that of the system [123]. Assume xi denotes
the binary state (working/failed) of component i. That is, xi = 0 when a component
has failed and xi = 1 when it is working. A state vector x̄ = (x1, x2, ...xn) ∈ {0, 1}n
can be used to denote the state of the n components in the system. The structure
function ϕ(x̄) can then be defined to determine the present state of the system. When
the system itself has binary failure states, ϕ(x̄) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. For two component
state vectors l̄ and m̄, the following properties hold true [123].
l̄ + m̄ = (l1 +m1, l2 +m2, ..., ln +mn)
l̄ · m̄ = (l1.m1, l2.m2, ..., ln.mn)
The set of x̄ is assumed partially ordered with a property of ‘≤’. For instance, if
mi ≤ li for i = 1, 2, ...n, with mi < li for some i, then m̄ ≤ l̄. Finally, a structure
function ϕ(x̄) is said to be monotone, if (i) ϕ(0) = 0, ϕ(1) = 1, and (ii) ϕ(m̄) ≤ ϕ(l̄) if
m̄ ≤ l̄. Thus, since the structure function is monotone, it represents that the system
level reliability can be improved if the component level is improved [123].
A couple of examples of the structure function are provided next. Assume a system
made of n components in series. It will be in a working state only if all components
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= x1 · x2... · xn
= min(x1, x2, ..., xn)





= x1 + x2...+ xn
= max(x1, x2, ..., xn)
The structure functions for complex systems (combinations of series and parallel) get
complicated and are not always the best means to represent the system of interest.
The intent in introducing the structure function is to enable a discussion on multi-
state reliability that will then tie into multi-state component importance.
The above discussion assumes the system failure is binary. In a system such as the
T-DEP architecture in the present thesis where component failures are assumed to
be binary, while the system level may have multi-state failures, the structure function
can be modified to ϕ(x̄) : {0, 1} → [0, 1], where [0, 1] is a continuous set that denotes
the proportion of maximum capability available in a given system failure state.
6.1.2.2 Multi-state System Reliability
While the term reliability and its definition have been discussed earlier, the present
section seeks to introduce the formalism used when quantifying multi-state reliability
using state vectors and structure functions. The failure probability of a system failing
in a time interval [0, t] is given by,





The reliability is simply the complement of the failure probability,
R(t) = 1− F (t) = Pr(T > t)
where Pr(T > t) denotes the probability of the system to remain functioning after
time t. If the component state vector x̄(t) is generated based on component i oper-
ational reliability xi(t) = Pri(T > t), the system multi-state reliability can be given
as,
RMS(t) = Pr(ϕ(x̄(t)) > d) (135)
where d ∈ [0, 1] denotes the proportion of system capability left. For instance, d may
represent the thrust available after a failure in an aircraft power systems architecture.
In some cases, d = {d1, d2, ...dk} is a set of k discrete performance levels a system
may take under failure.
6.1.3 Multi-state Component Importance Measures
With the background of how multi-state reliability may be characterized using a struc-
ture function provided, the present section introduces traditionally utilized measures
of component importance along with their multi-state extensions used in this thesis.
There are typically two kinds of multi-state importance measures – (i) Type 1 which
measure how specific components affect multi-state system reliability, and (ii) Type
2 which measure how a particular component failure state affects multi-state system
reliability [152]. Since the T-DEP architecture assumes the component failures are
binary, Type 1 multi-state importance measures are of interest in the present work
and are discussed next.
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6.1.3.1 Birnbaum Importance
Birnbaum [37] introduced the concept of component importance in 1968, with a mea-




= RS(t|Ri(t) = 1)−RS(t|Ri(t) = 0)
= Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1 | xi = 1)− Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1 | xi = 0) (136)
The Birnbaum importance measure is the partial derivative of the system reliability
RS with respect to the component reliability Ri [153] and denotes the maximum loss
in system reliability when a component i switches from working to failed [123].
For the T-DEP architecture and multi-state reliability considerations, hazard
severity is used to denote system capability d defined above. Therefore, d = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
correspond to ‘Negligible, ‘Minor’, ‘Major’,‘Hazardous’,‘Catastrophic’ respectively.
Then, the multi-state reliability definition from Eq. 135 is used. Multi-state Birn-
baum importance measure from Ref. [152] is modified to provide a custom defined
measure in this thesis, and is given by,
MIBBi = Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d | xi = 1)− Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d | xi = 0)
= Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d ∩ xi = 1)
Pr(xi = 1)
− Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d ∩ xi = 0)
Pr(xi = 0)
(137)
The proposed multi-state Birnbaum measure given in Eq. 137 considers the hazard
severity as a classifier of system state. For the T-DEP aircraft power system, this is
a departure from the failure states that were defined so far as different combinations
of cruise motors or high lift propulsors failing. Considering the severity of different
failure states in the importance measures enables decision makers to determine which
components are driving the off-nominal severity of interest. Consider the ‘Catas-
trophic’ severity conditions (d = 5). For a component i under consideration, the
first term in Eq. 137 calculates the probability of the aircraft to stay in a severity
219
that is less critical than ‘Catastrophic’ (ϕ(x̄) < d = 5) given component i is working
(xi = 1). The second term subtracts from the first, the probability of the system
failing in a severity that is less critical than ‘Catastrophic’, given component i has
failed (xi = 0). Similarly, for a ‘Major’ hazard severity, the multi-state Birnbaum
importance measure developed above will consider all nominal and off-nominal con-
ditions that are less critical than ‘Major’ (so ‘Negligible’ and ‘Minor’ are included,
others are excluded) in the probability computation.
The statement of Eq. 137 is a simplification of the equation described above using
Bayes’ theorem of conditional probability. Writing it in this format makes it easier
to compute the proposed importance measure from the same set of Monte-Carlo
simulations that were completed for experiment 2.3 (see alg. 2 and Ch. 5.3.3).
6.1.3.2 Criticality Importance
One shortcoming of the Birnbaum importance measure is that it does not consider the
magnitude of reliability change with respect to the system’s baseline reliability. This is
remedied by the Criticality Importance measure, which corrects Birnbaum’s measure
with the ratio of component unreliability Fi(t) to system unreliability FS(t) [25,123].
It is also defined as the probability that component i is critical for the system and
failed at time t, when it is known that the system has failed at time t [153]. Mathe-








For the multiple states characterized by hazard severity defined for the Birnbaum
importance (see Ch. 6.1.3.1), d = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} corresponding to ‘Negligible, ‘Minor’,
‘Major’,‘Hazardous’,‘Catastrophic’ respectively are utilized to define the multi-state
220





1− Pr(xi = 1)
1− Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d)
(139)
where Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d) is the probability of the system being in a state that is less
critical than d, and is considered the system reliability (from) severity d. Eq. 139 can
be computed from the same Monte-Carlo runs conducted for experiment 2.3 and thus
requires no additional failure simulations to be conducted.
6.1.3.3 Reliability Achievement Worth (RAW)
Reliability achievement worth measures the maximum relative increase in system
reliability that can be generated by component i [152] 1. It is given by,
IRAWi =
RS(t | Ri(t) = 1)
RS(t)
= Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1 | xi = 1)
Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1)
(140)
For a multi-state case similar to measures above where d denotes the hazard severity,
a modified RAW measure is provided as,
MIRAWi =
Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d | xi = 1)
Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d)
= Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d ∩ xi = 1)
Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d)Pr(xi = 1)
(141)
The RAW is typically greater than 1, with a value of 1 suggesting that component
i has no potential to improve on system reliability. The multi-state RAW measure
from Eq. 141 is computed from the same set of Monte-Carlo results from E-2.3 just
like the measures discussed before.
1An analogous but not equal measure is the risk achievement worth which measures the relative
increase in system unreliability when it is known that component i has failed [153]
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6.1.3.4 Fussell-Vesely (FV)
The Fussell-Vesely measure captures the maximum relative decrement in system re-




= Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1)− Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1 | xi = 0)
Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1)
(142)
For the multi-state failures grouped according to hazard severity as in the above cases,
the modified multi-state FV measure is given as,
MIF Vi =
Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d)− Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d | xi = 0)
Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d)
= Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d)Pr(xi = 0)− Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d ∩ xi = 0)
Pr(ϕ(x̄) < d)Pr(xi = 0)
(143)
Eq. 143 puts it into a form where the values can be computed for each component
of the T-DEP power system architecture by utilizing the results of the Monte-Carlo
simulation carried out for experiment 2.3, just as all the newly defined measures
above.
6.1.3.5 Reliability Reduction Worth (RRW)
The last importance measure considered in this thesis is the RRW. It is defined by
Levitin et al. [113] as an index measuring the potential damage caused to the system
by a particular component. The binary expression for RRW is given as [152],
IRRWi =
RS(t)
RS(t | Ri(t) = 0)
= Pr(ϕ(x̄) = 1)





Since the RRW measure is directly related to the FV measure, its multi-state exten-






6.1.4 Multi-state Component Importance Results
The dataset of one million Monte-Carlo experiments simulated for experiment 2.3 (see
Ch. 5.3.3) is analyzed in the present experiment to evaluate the measures defined
above. The Criticality Importance (CI) measure normalizes Birnbaum importance
(BB) with system and component unreliability values. Therefore, of the two, only CI
is reported here. All the results in this section are for the Monte-Carlo simulations
generated using the posteriors of Analyst B from Ch. 5.3.3. The results based on
Analyst A’s posteriors show a similar pattern and are provided in Appendix D. For
(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 71: Multi-state importance metrics for Catastrophic failure conditions (An-
alyst B)
the T-DEP power system architecture (from fig. 33), figure 71 provides results for
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multi-state importance measures discussed above for failure states that are classified
as catastrophic. It is apparent that the batteries have the highest contribution in
terms of all four measures in failure states that are categorized as ‘Catastrophic’. A
higher CI measure means that the T-DEP aircraft has a higher chance of entering a
catastrophic failure when whenever a battery fails compared to any other component.
Similarly, if designers were looking for ways to improve the system reliability when
it pertains to catastrophic failures, the RAW measure hints that focusing on the
batteries is likely to have the largest impact. Similarly, the FV and RRW measures
signify that any decrease in the battery’s reliability is likely to hit the reliability of
the T-DEP architecture against Catastrophic failures the hardest compared to any
other component.
Figure 72 provides the importance measures for the T-DEP aircraft’s reliability
against ‘Hazardous’ failures. Once again, the CI measure indicates that system relia-
bility against a hazardous state is most sensitive to battery reliability. This is verified
by the RAW measure which indicates that if the system reliability is to be improved
against hazardous failures, designers should focus efforts on improving the battery re-
liability. The FV – which measures the maximum decrement in system reliability due
to a component, when equal to 1, indicates that every single battery failure results in
a hazard severity of ‘Hazardous’. This is a confirmation of the results from Ch. 4.4.3.
A value of MIF Vbatt = 1 results in an undefined (infinite) value for the RRW measure
for the battery. In addition to the battery, it is interesting to note that while the
improvement in traction power bus (TPB) or the cruise motor (CM) reliability may
not drive the system level reliability from ‘Hazardous’ failures, any reduction these
two components’ reliability can lead to a big reduction at the system level.
Figure 73 provides the results of multi-state importance measures for the different
failure states from fig. 51 that fall under severity ‘Major’. The CI measure points out
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(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 72: Multi-state importance metrics for Hazardous failure conditions (Analyst
B)
that most components except the TPB influence the system level reliability to a simi-
lar extent. The RAW measure singles out the cruise motor inverter as the component
which can have the greatest impact in improving the aircraft level reliability of the
T-DEP architecture against failure states characterized as ‘Major’. While looking at
the maximum decrement in aircraft reliability that a component could cause using
the FV measure, the CM, TPB, and batteries stand out. That is because a failure
in either of these directly leads to a hazard with severity ‘Major’ or worse. Apart
from these components, the cruise motor inverter and pre-chargers are identified by
the RRW measure as the components that can have the highest negative impact on
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(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 73: Multi-state importance metrics for Major failure conditions (Analyst B)
T-DEP reliability against ‘Major’ conditions if their component reliability were to
drop.
The final set of results in figure 74 provide the T-DEP component importance
measures against a failure severity of ‘Minor’. Since most component failures result
in a hazard severity of at least ‘Minor’, the T-DEP reliability from this state is not
sensitive to the components’ reliability. This is visible in the FV measure as well,
where all components have a value of 1 - reaffirming that their failure results in
a severity of at least ‘Minor’. The RAW measure however shows that in case this
reliability of the T-DEP was to be improved, the focus should be on the high lift
motors, their inverters, as well as the cruise motor inverters.
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(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 74: Multi-state importance metrics for Minor failure conditions (Analyst B)
6.1.5 Summary of Experiment 3.1
The intent of this experiment was to evaluate the sensitivity of T-DEP failure states
with respect to the reliability of individual components. This can provide a rank-
ing of components with respect to their influence on system reliability, determine
top contributors to unreliability, determine the components to focus on to improve
system reliability and to perform sensitivity studies. For these end goals, compo-
nent importance measures were introduced. Since novel architectures are expected
to have multiple failure states, extensions to traditional importance measures were
developed in the present work to determine the effect of different components on
different off-nominal conditions.
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Results generated for the T-DEP architecture indicate that the batteries are the
most critical component when it pertains to ‘Catastrophic’ or ‘Hazardous’ failures.
An improvement or degradation in battery reliability is likely to have a bigger impact
on the reliability of the T-DEP aircraft against these hazard severity conditions as
compared to any other component. The traction power bus (TPB) and the cruise
motors(CM) are the other components that show some influence on the T-DEP reli-
ability from ‘Hazardous’ severity.
For ‘Major’ conditions, the cruise inverters and batteries were shown to have the
highest impact in terms of improving the system reliability. Therefore, any decision
makers wanted to improve reliability for the ‘major’ hazards must consider these two
components first. The RRW metric gives the maximum damage that can be caused by
a component failure. Since the loss of a Battery, TPB, or a CM leads to a ‘hazardous’
state, these components are evidently most important. Apart from these, the cruise
inverter and pre-charger were found to affect the system unreliability the most for
the ‘Major’ failure severity.
Finally, since any single component failure causes a ‘Minor’ severity, the FV mea-
sure for these are all 1, and the RRW measures are undefined. In order to improve
the reliability of the system from ‘Minor’ failures, the high lift cruise motors, their
inverters, and the cruise motor inverters were found to yield the most improvement.
That is these components may be focused upon to improve system reliability in a
‘Minor’ failure state.
Overall, this experiment successfully identified the component driving the relia-
bility of the T-DEP architecture in different failure severity states. It provided the
sensitivity of the system reliability with respect to that of components while also pro-
viding evidence of how such information can be used to improve aircraft components
and system reliability. This completed the purpose of experiment 3.1.
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6.2 Trade-studies
Two trade studies conducted in this thesis are motivated by results from asymmetrical
loss of thrust scenarios from experiment 1.2 (see ch. 4.3.5). In particular, recall
discussion related to tables 18 and 19. For the case when there is a complete loss
of one cruise motor in table 18, the remaining cruise motor is set at 64% throttle
while descending at a gradient of -4.84%. The reason the remaining cruise motor
cannot be operated at its maximum continuous power (90% throttle) is due to a lack
of lateral stabilizing force from the vertical tail (VT) to trim the T-DEP architecture.
The ERM metric for this case is -1.83, indicating that not only is this off-nominal
condition limited by lateral control authority (determined from the throttle), but
also by the maximum thrust available even if the remaining cruise motor were to be
operated at maximum continuous power. Now consider the takeoff asymmetric loss
of thrust results from table 19. Most states evaluated show some degree of limitation
due to a lack of VT’s lateral control authority. This is evident by looking at the ERM
metric (defined in Ch. 4.2), which considers the specific power utilized in the trim
solution with maximum γ, to the specific excess power available in the failed state.
The values of the ERM metric are all less than 1, with the right engine throttle not
set to 90% maximum continuous power setting. This indicates a limitation due to a
lack of VT authority. This is particularly important in cases of losing half a cruise
motor and 5 or 6 high lift propulsors on the same side. Such failed states can only be
trimmed at a negative climb gradient with a negative ERM metric, indicating that
there is sufficient excess power available to climb, but it cannot be used since the
aircraft cannot be trimmed at those.
The above discussion inspires the two trade studies performed in this thesis. For
the first, designers might ask the question, “But what if we were to resize the VT?”.
That trade study is the focus of the next experiment. The second trade study consid-
ers a larger resized VT along with boosted cruise inverters that can supply additional
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power in case the other cruise inverter fails, thus maintaining additional thrust on
the partially failed cruise motor.
6.2.1 Experiment 3.2 - Resized Vertical Tail (VT)
Experiment 3.2 is intended to test whether resizing the vertical tail (VT) is likely to
result in better safety outcomes for asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios measured by
the maximum climb gradient attainable under trim, and an improved ERM metric. In
particular, the VT is resized to consider a 10% larger chord as well as span dimensions
resulting in a 21% increase in VT area as seen in table 31. In this trade-study, the
rest of the aircraft parameters are assumed constant. The result of the VT resizing is
considered in terms of updated mass properties and lateral aerodynamic coefficients.
The updated aerodynamic coefficients are generated using AVL [62] and are provided
in table 32.
Table 31: T-DEP aircraft resized VT geometry
Parameter Value Unit
Planform area- Svt 2.36 m2
Span- bvt 1.78 m
Reference chord- cvt 1.58 m
Leading edge sweep 37.45 deg
Table 32: Estimated lateral aerodynamic coefficients of the T-DEP with resized VT
β p̂ r̂ δa δr
CY -1.2937 -0.0729 1.1459 0.0427 0.3939
Cn 0.3865 0.0688 -0.4976 0.0309 -0.1969
Cl -0.0275 -0.6628 0.2275 0.1650 0.0163
The asymmetric thrust loss cases of tables 18 and 19 are re-evaluated for the
present experiment with the updated parameters. The expected results include im-
provement to the γmax and ERM metrics for cases where the remaining cruise motor
was throttled to less than maximum continuous power.
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6.2.2 Results - Resizing the VT
Table 33 provides the 6-DoF trim analysis results for the T-DEP aircraft under asym-
metric thrust loss conditions during cruise. This table is read in a similar fashion to
table 18. The column ‘CM-1 Loss %’ gives the ratio of thrust loss on the left cruise
motor – 0 denotes nominal operation, 0.5 denotes 50% thrust loss, while 1 denotes
complete loss. The angles γmax, θ, ψ, as well as the control deflections δa, δr are
in degrees. τ denotes the throttle setting on the left and right cruise motors. At
nominal conditions, the T-DEP can climb at an angle of 1.17◦, which is just over a
2% gradient (in agreement with conceptual analysis from Fig 47). The second row
of table 33 denotes cruise motor-1 (left) at 50% thrust (64% throttle). As is visible,
the T-DEP cannot maintain steady level flight if half the thrust is lost in any one of
the wingtip cruise motors. For a complete loss of thrust from the left wingtip cruise
motor, the trim solution provided a maximum climb gradient of -4.18%.
Table 33: Resized VT: Trim solutions maximizing γ under asymmetric loss of thrust




(%) θ ψ δa δr τL τR ERM
0 2.04 7.7 0 0 0 0.9 0.9 0.97
0.5 -0.31 6.38 -3.66 1.09 -11.26 0.64 0.9 -1.32
1 -4.23 4.18 -5 1.49 -15.39 0 0.74 -1.6
While nominally this might indicate no difference due to increasing the VT span
and chord by 10% each, table 34 provides the change in the maximum climb gradient
and ERM between the two cases. It shows that increasing the VT size results in no
change in the nominal performance as well as the performance under 50% thrust loss
in the left cruise motor. This is expected since these cases were not constrained by
the lateral stability considerations in table 18. The last case pertaining to a complete
loss of thrust shows an absolute improvement of 0.61% in the climb gradient and 0.23
in ERM. Thus, increasing the VT size results in the T-DEP aircraft improving its
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maximum potential climb gradient under the loss of a cruise motor in cruise, along
with an absolute improvement in excess power utilization of over 23%.
Table 34: Resized VT: ∆ tan(γmax) (%) and ∆ ERM under asymmetric loss of








Next, the results of asymmetric thrust loss right after takeoff for the larger VT
are compared to results obtained earlier in table 19. Under nominal conditions, the
T-DEP manages an MPCG of 9.95% (5.68◦) at 1.2x stall speed, same as before. Once
again, a cursory visual inspection may not yield much difference between the results
of tables 35 and 19. The hazard severity does not change much for the different states
considered.
However, tables 36 and 37 provide the difference between these two in terms of
their maximum potential climb gradient (MPCG) and ERM metrics. The larger VT
results in an absolute increase in MPCG of approximately 0.23%, with ERM im-
proving by about 4-5% in absolute terms. This means that the T-DEP architecture
can now utilize an additional 4-5% of its maximum excess power while trimming the
aircraft as compared to earlier. While the gains may not be much or may not change
hazard severity, they confirm that some of the asymmetric failure states discussed
earlier for the T-DEP aircraft are limited by the VT’s lateral control authority. In-
creasing the VT span and chord does not change the nominal performance, it improves
the aircraft’s response to off-nominal failures. This trade study is provided as an ex-
ample to demonstrate that the framework presented in this thesis can be utilized to
conduct numerous such trade studies in order to improve novel aircraft’s design and
performance to deal with off-nominal operational considerations.
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Table 35: Resized VT: Trim solutions maximizing γ under asymmetric loss of thrust






(%) θ ψ δa δr τL τR ERM
0 0 9.95 6.1 0 0 0 0.9 0.9 1
0 1 9.15 6.21 -4.8 0.39 -12.2 0.9 0.9 0.99
0 2 7.78 6.02 -4.93 0.46 -12.61 0.9 0.84 0.92
0 3 6.50 5.92 -4.9 0.51 -12.6 0.9 0.79 0.85
0 4 5.35 5.91 -4.96 0.58 -12.83 0.9 0.75 0.78
0 5 4.3 6 -4.98 0.64 -12.96 0.9 0.72 0.7
0 6 3.35 6.19 -4.95 0.71 -12.93 0.9 0.7 0.63
0.5 0 5.77 3.78 -4.92 0.35 -12.42 0.64 0.73 0.77
0.5 1 4.28 3.5 -4.93 0.4 -12.51 0.64 0.64 0.64
0.5 2 2.9 3.3 -4.9 0.44 -12.5 0.64 0.55 0.49
0.5 3 1.64 3.21 -4.96 0.51 -12.75 0.64 0.48 0.31
0.5 4 0.49 3.2 -4.99 0.57 -12.89 0.64 0.4 0.11
0.5 5 -0.56 3.3 -5 0.64 -12.98 0.64 0.34 -0.15
0.5 6 -1.50 3.49 -5 0.71 -13.04 0.64 0.3 -0.52
1 0 0.82 0.98 -4.99 0.34 -12.59 0 0.35 0.16
1 1-6 No Trim Solutions
Table 36: Resized VT: ∆ tan(γmax) (%) under asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios






Failed → 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24
0.5 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24
1 0.23 No Trim Solution
Table 37: Resized VT: ∆ ERM under asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios at takeoff
(ϕ = 0, h = 50ft, V∞ = 70 knots, flaps – takeoff)
CM-1
Loss % ∆ ERM
# HLP
Failed → 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0 0 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05
0.5 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09
1 0.04 No Trim Solution
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6.2.3 Summary of Experiment 3.2
The present experiment was designed as a way to test the capability of the developed
framework to incorporate safety related off-nominal requirements and reliability into
design trade studies. It was observed from the results of experiment 1.2 (see Ch. 4.3.5)
provided in tables 18, 19 that the T-DEP aircraft’s performance under certain asym-
metric thrust loss scenarios was restricted by the lateral control authority available
from the VT. This is visible from the ERM metric being less than 1 indicating not
all specific excess power is being utilized in improving the maximum potential climb
gradient (MPCG) due to a trim penalty. This is the case for most scenarios consid-
ered during takeoff, and for the complete loss of cruise motor scenario considered in
cruise.
To test whether this is really the case, the vertical tail was resized in this experi-
ment to increase its span and chord by 10% each (21% increase in area). The impact
of this change was assumed in terms of increased VT mass (therefore moments of in-
ertia), and the lateral stability and control derivatives of the T-DEP aircraft obtained
from AVL [62], as provided in table 32.
Re-evaluating the asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios from experiment 1.2 pro-
vided an absolute improvement of about 0.24 to the MPGC (in %) and 5% increase
in ERM in takeoff configuration. In the cruise configuration, increasing VT size does
not seem to affect the case where half thrust is lost by one cruise motor. This was
expected since the discussion around table 19 mentioned that this failure is limited
by the thrust available post failure, and not by the VT’s lateral control authority.
This is also visible given the right engine throttle is set at maximum continuous (0.9)
after failure. However, in the case of a complete loss of one cruise motor, the solution
was determined to be limited by VT size due to the remaining motor being throttled
at less than maximum continuous power. The resized VT resulted in an improvement
of 0.61 MPCG (in %) and 23% in ERM metric, in this case, confirming the earlier
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observation.
Overall, this experiment successfully demonstrated that the present framework
provides meaningful inputs regarding off-nominal considerations that may be skipped
in traditional conceptual or preliminary design stages. It also demonstrated how the
framework can be utilized in informing decision makers with safety related off-nominal
requirements while conducting design trade studies, a capability not available under
the traditional safety assessment paradigm.
6.2.4 Experiment 3.3 - Resized VT + Oversized Cruise Inverters
While resizing the VT in experiment 3.2 provided improvements in the maximum
potential climb gradient and ERM metrics for asymmetric thrust loss cases that were
limited by VT’s lateral control authority, it did not make a significant difference to
the hazard severity. Additionally, certain scenarios like losing partial thrust in one
cruise motor during cruise were found to have no improvement because they are thrust
limited.
To verify these potential insights about the T-DEP architecture, the present ex-
periment evaluates the impact of oversizing the cruise motor-inverters. Previously, it
was assumed that post failure of one cruise motor-inverter/pre-charger, the remaining
subsystem (see fig. 33) provided enough power to system 50% thrust on the degraded
cruise motor. This assumption is modified in the present experiment to oversize the
cruise motor-inverters to operate in a boosted mode if the other one fails, enabling
the degraded cruise motor to generate 67% thrust instead of the previous 50%. This
oversizing is performed on top of the resized VT from experiment 3.2 to obtain the cu-
mulative impacts of the two design changes. The throttle setting translates to thrust
using equation 27, where it can be seen that thrust is proportional to the square of
the throttle setting. Maximum continuous power is modeled as 90% throttle setting
to represent 90% RPM (2250 RPM) of the cruise motor. Thus, 67% of maximum
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continuous power occurs at 90% ∗
√
2/3 = 73.5% throttle setting.
6.2.5 Results - Resizing the VT + Cruise Inverters
The results of table 38 are contrasted against the results of partial cruise motor thrust
loss from table 35 in experiment 3.2, and against table 19 in experiment 1.2. The
first observation of note is that none of the seven off-nominal scenarios that result
in partial thrust loss in a cruise motor along with zero to six high lift motors on the
same side of the wing are now ‘Catastrophic’ in hazard severity because the resized T-
DEP architecture is able to ensure a positive climb gradient at sea level for each case.
Similarly, the case where the partial loss of a cruise motor and 3 HLPs on the same
side was assigned a severity of ‘Hazardous’ earlier (see fig. 54), it is now afforded a
severity of ‘Major’ because the resized T-DEP can trim at a climb gradient of above
3%. Revisiting the reliability requirements generated from figure 66, the modified
requirements eliminate catastrophic failures from partial loss of a cruise motor, and
lower the hazard severity when that occurs in conjunction with 3 HLP failures on the
same side.
Table 38: Larger VT + CM-Inv: Trim solutions maximizing γ under asymmetric






(%) θ ψ δa δr τL τR ERM
0.33 0 7.36 4.67 -4.96 0.35 -12.52 0.735 0.814 0.89
0.33 1 5.87 4.39 -4.96 0.4 -12.6 0.735 0.736 0.78
0.33 2 4.49 4.19 -4.94 0.45 -12.61 0.735 0.663 0.66
0.33 3 3.23 4.09 -5 0.51 -12.85 0.735 0.598 0.54
0.33 4 2.06 4.08 -4.94 0.57 -12.77 0.735 0.54 0.39
0.33 5 1.01 4.18 -4.93 0.63 -12.81 0.735 0.497 0.22
0.33 6 0.07 4.37 -4.93 0.71 -12.88 0.735 0.47 0.02
The updated multi-state failure rate requirements are given in figure 75, and show
the changes to a partial loss of thrust (33% thrust loss as against 50%). Catastrophic
hazards have been eliminated from this row, while the case with partial cruise motor
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Figure 75: Resized VT + Oversized Cruise Inverters: T-DEP asymmetric multi-




Figure 76: Resized VT + Oversized Cruise Inverters: Asymmetric loss of thrust
– multi-state failure rates for the two Bayesian analysts for takeoff. Colored by
compliance finding
thrust loss and two HLP failed is now rated ‘Major’ instead of ‘Hazardous’. As a
result, the multi-state compliance finding results change from figure 69 to figure 76.
In particular, the failure state with partial loss of cruise motor along with two HLP on
the same side is now compliant with reliability requirements given by Fig. 75. Table 39
shows the improvement of the suggested cruise inverter oversizing + VT resizing over
just the VT resizing results from experiment 3.2 in table 35. The oversizing of the
inverter results in an improvement of trim MPCG metric of about 1.6% in absolute
terms for the partial loss of cruise motor case. The ERM metric improves by 12
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to 54% over just the VT resizing case. This indicates that any cruise motor failure
induces a large yawing moment that cannot be neutralized by simply oversizing the
vertical tail, but requires improving the cruise motors’ functional (thrust) availability
to improve the safety outcomes.
Table 39: Larger VT + CM-Inv: ∆ ERM and ∆ tan(γmax) (%) under asymmetric




Failed → 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
∆ ERM 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.37 0.54
∆ tan(γmax) (%) 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.57 1.57 1.57
Table 40: Larger VT + CM-Inv: Trim solutions maximizing γ under asymmetric loss




(%) θ ψ δa δr τL τR ERM
0.33 0.45 6.81 -2.46 0.73 -7.58 0.735 0.9 0.87
Table 41: Larger VT + CM-Inv: ∆ tan(γmax) (%) and ∆ ERM under asymmetric







Table 40 provides the results for partial loss of thrust in one cruise motor in the
low speed limits of cruise configuration. Oversizing the cruise inverter along with
VT resizing results in a positive maximum potential climb gradient (MPCG) metric
as against previous results of just resizing the VT in table 33, or the baseline T-
DEP in table 18. However, this does not result in a reduction of hazard severity
for this case (previously categorized ‘Major’). Therefore, the compliance finding,
that found a partial loss of thrust in cruise ‘non-compliant’ (see fig. 68) remains
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unchanged. This indicates that the only way to improve the compliance of this
failure state is to improve the reliability of components that contribute to it, or by
re-architecting the power systems architecture from fig. 33. However, that is not to
say that oversized cruise inverter does not have an effect – to the contrary, it results
in a large absolute increase of MPCG of 0.77%, with a jump in ERM from a negative
value of less than -1 (indicates thrust limited failure condition) to a positive value
of 0.87, a jump of 2.19! This indicates that this one change will enable the T-DEP
architecture to utilize as much as 87% of its specific excess power towards maximizing
its climb gradient while trimmed. Once again, this experiment demonstrates that the
developed framework enables trade studies to evaluate a novel aircraft architecture’s
off-nominal performance and safety compliance under different design decisions.
6.2.6 Summary of Experiment 3.3
The present experiment was designed to follow up the results of experiment 3.2 in
testing the capability of the developed framework to incorporate safety related off-
nominal requirements and reliability into design trade studies for novel aircraft archi-
tectures. Results of experiment 3.2 demonstrated benefits in cases where the T-DEP
aircraft’s performance under asymmetric thrust loss conditions was limited by the
vertical tail’s (VT) lateral control authority. However, certain failure conditions –
notably those with ERM < -1 from table 18, were postulated to be thrust limited
under failure.
To test these, the cruise motor (CM) inverters were oversized in the present ex-
periment to provide 67% thrust (instead of 50%) when a CM faces a partial loss of
thrust, in addition to the benefits of increasing the VT size from experiment 3.2. Re-
evaluating the asymmetric loss of thrust cases from with one CM providing partial
thrust in takeoff configuration from tables 35 provided an improvement in the ERM
metric of 12 to 54% in magnitude, while the MPCG metric showed improvements of
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about 1.57% or more in magnitude. This changed the hazard severity assigned to
these failure states to eliminate catastrophic hazards altogether. The failure state
with one cruise motor under partial failure, with two high lift propulsors (HLPs) lost
on the same side was found to be compliant with the failure rate requirements as a
result.
In the cruise configuration, improvements over table 33 showed that the T-DEP
aircraft can manage a positive 0.45% climb gradient under a partial loss of a cruise
motor, as against a negative 0.31 earlier. This is an improvement of 0.77% magnitude
of MPCG, while the ERM metric improved to 0.87 from a value of -1.32 earlier. This
confirmed that the partial loss of thrust in cruise condition is thrust-limited and not
limited by the VT’s lateral control authority for the T-DEP aircraft.
Overall, experiment 3.3 followed up the results of 3.2 to once again successfully
demonstrate the capability of the developed framework in generating meaningful in-
puts regarding off-nominal requirements that may be skipped in traditional concep-
tual or preliminary design stages. It enables decision makers to incorporate safety re-
lated off-nominal considerations while conducting trade studies in early design phases,
a capability not afforded by the traditional safety assessment paradigm.
6.3 Chapter Summary
The third research question (RQ 3) was motivated by observations group 3 from chap-
ter 2.5. This group primarily noted that traditional methods used to conduct safety
assessments of novel aircraft concepts limit the scope for exploration and trade studies
in preliminary design stages. It also noted that optimizing for nominal considerations
could worsen performance under off-nominal conditions. Therefore, the goal of RQ 3
was to enable design trade studies for novel aircraft architectures while incorporating
safety related off-nominal considerations. To that end, hypothesis 3 proposed that
the integrated framework (see fig. 70) developed in this thesis serves as an enabler
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for conducting trade studies informed by safety related off-nominal requirements and
reliability of novel aircraft architectures in early design.
The chapter then took a two-pronged approach to verify hypothesis 3. For the first
experiment, sensitivities of system multi-state reliability to component failure rate
posteriors was established through unit level importance metrics. In a multi-state
failure scenario, the component importance metrics were re-defined to incorporate
the reliability of the system from a given hazard state. For instance, reliability from
‘Hazardous’ failures was defined as the likelihood of the system ending up in a state
that is less severe than ‘Hazardous’, and so on. These multi-state importance metrics
were evaluated for the ‘Minor’, ‘Major’, ‘Hazardous’, and ‘Catastrophic’ off-nominal
hazard severity scenarios. The batteries were found to have the highest contribution
in terms of criticality index (CI), reliability achievement worth (RAW), and reliabil-
ity reduction worth (RRW) for ‘Catastrophic’ and ‘Hazardous’ failure states. The
traction power buses (TPBs), and cruise motors (CMs) were found to have the next
highest risk reduction worth for ‘Hazardous’ failures, meaning any decrease in their
reliability would affect the system’s reliability from that severity to the greatest ex-
tent. For multi-state failures from experiment 1.2 classified as ‘Major’, the cruise
motor inverters are the ones that can provide the highest improvement in the system
reliability if they are improved. For the risk reduction worth, the cruise inverters and
pre-chargers were found to be the most important, hinting at great loss of system
level reliability from ‘Major’ hazards if their component reliability was to decrease.
In the present dissertation, most single component failures result in at least a ‘Mi-
nor’ severity. As a result, the Fussell Vesely (FV) measure gives a value of 1 for all
components for this severity class, while the RRW measure is undefined. The RAW
measure provides important insights nevertheless. The high lift motors, their invert-
ers, and the cruise inverters were found to promise the maximum system reliability
improvement if the component reliability of these components were improved.
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The second part of this chapter focused on revisiting some aircraft design and
architecting assumptions to improve the system response to off-nominal failure states.
In particular, the asymmetric loss of thrust from experiment 1.2 had demonstrated
that the T-DEP architecture was limited by the lateral control authority of the vertical
tail (VT) in some off-nominal cases, as well as by the thrust available in some cases.
To verify these results and demonstrate the capability of the developed framework
to conduct design trade-studies, two experiments were proposed. Experiment 3.2
resized the T-DEP aircraft’s VT to increase the chord and span by 10% each. The
impact of this resizing was considered by modifying the aircraft’s mass properties
and lateral aerodynamic derivatives. Upon evaluating the asymmetric loss of thrust
cases, it was seen that a larger VT results in improvements in the maximum potential
climb gradient metric (MPCG) of about 0.24% during takeoff and 0.64% during cruise
with one CM lost. The improvement in energy rate margin (ERM) that denotes the
percentage of specific excess power after failure that can be utilized for maximizing
the climb gradient was found to be around 5% for takeoff, and 23% for cruise. The
cases which were thrust limited (partial loss of a CM) showed no improvement as
expected.
The last experiment of this thesis considered the resized VT along with oversized
CM inverters. The new CM inverters allow the CMs to generate 67% thrust under
partial failures which may result from loss of one CM inverter or pre-charger for
instance. Such a modified T-DEP architecture now afforded a larget VT as well
as greater thrust capability under partial CM failures. The results of experiment
3.3 showed significant improvements in takeoff and cruise MPCG under partial loss
of CMs. The takeoff MPCG improved by about 1.6% abosolute value, while ERM
improved by about 12-54%. In the cruise condition, MPCG improved by 0.77%, while
ERM went from -1.32 to 0.87! As a result, the T-DEP aircraft could now maintain
a positive climb gradient under any combination of partial loss of a cruise motor and
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HLP failures on the same side during takeoff, removing any ‘Catastrophic’ conditions
from these failure states. The resultant change in reliability requirements meant that
a failure state with partial loss of thrust in one CM, with 2 HLPs on the same side
lost was deemed compliant, as compared to non-compliant earlier.
Overall, experiments 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrated two design and architecting trade-
studies using the T-DEP aircraft that were enabled by the framework developed in
this thesis. The framework enables trade-studies like these to be conducted for novel
aircraft architectures while incorporating safety related off-nominal requirements in
early design phases. Along with the importance metrics of experiment 3.1, these three




The world of aviation is moving towards revolutionary novel aircraft architectures
and technologies as a result of a push towards higher efficiencies, lower operating
costs, and lower emissions. This paradigm shift towards novel aircraft architectures
and technologies is necessitated as the current concepts reach technological satura-
tion. Efforts to develop such concepts are ongoing in the transport category (14
CFR Part 25) aircraft in terms of hybrid-electric or all-electric architectures. In the
normal category (14 CFR Part 23) which form the bulk of General Aviation (GA)
operations, these efforts are more pronounced with novel concepts of operation like
Urban/Advanced Air Mobility (UAM/AAM), architectures such as electric vertical
take-off and landing (e-VTOL), and technologies such as distributed electric propul-
sion (DEP) being developed by various entities.
While these novel concepts and architectures are required to achieve aggressive
targets in fuel efficiency and emissions, their development and implementation face
obstacles in terms of uncertainty regarding the reliability and safety risk they pose.
The limitations and off-nominal operational considerations generally postulated dur-
ing traditional safety analysis may not be complete or correct for new concepts. Even
when Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have preferred to take a cautious
approach by introducing new technologies in a step-wise manner in aircraft, recent
incidents have reiterated the need to do so in a safe manner. This need is felt even
more strongly in the case of revolutionary designs that are likely to be introduced
in GA. In order to speed up the process of introduction of novel aircraft architec-
tures and technologies, it is paramount for aircraft designers to have the capability
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to quantify off-nominal requirements earlier in the design phases in a manner that (i)
provides a better treatment of uncertainty in light of limited knowledge and experi-
ence with these concepts, and (ii) informs trade studies before degrees of freedom are
locked down by design decisions. These observations provided a high-level rationale
to motivate the overall research objective of this thesis:
Research Objective:
Develop a framework that will enhance safety assessments of novel aircraft physical
architectures and technologies in early design by
1. identifying off-nominal requirements,
2. allocating them to the system and component level,
3. enabling compliance decision-making while addressing both epistemic and
aleatory uncertainties, and
4. informing design trade-studies.
A novel aircraft architecture was defined loosely in this dissertation (see def. 2.1.1.1)
as one which differs significantly from the traditional paradigm in its physical imple-
mentation to fulfil at least one aircraft level function. A thorough literature survey
of the current paradigm and the state-of-the-art (SotA) resulted in three groups of
observations. The first group focused on characterizing the safety related off-nominal
requirements for novel aircraft architectures. The second group focused on the (in-
complete) treatment of uncertainty in available data and models when they pertain
to failure rates and reliability of novel aircraft architectures and technologies. Finally,
observation group 3 focused on how incorporating safety requirements into early de-
sign for novel aircraft architectures is a challenge that does not have a solution in
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traditional methods.
The three observation groups informed the three broad research areas of this the-
sis. The overall research formulation of this thesis is provided in figure 77. It provides
a top level summary of each research question, the hypotheses stated, sub-research
questions and their hypotheses where they have been stated, and the experiments
conducted to verify them. A detailed summary of each research area is reproduced
here from the respective chapter summaries for convenience.
7.1 Detailed Summary of Findings
7.1.1 Research Area 1: Identification, characterization, and allocation of
safety related off-nominal requirements
Chapter 4 was motivated by the first group of observations from Ch. 2.5 that led to the
formulation of a set of research questions and hypotheses for the first research area.
In particular, it focused on identifying a set of methods that allow identification, char-
acterization, and allocation of safety related off-nominal requirements. Towards that
goal, literature was found to converge around utilizing performance-based methods
to quantify off-nominal system response to be used as a surrogate for hazard severity.
Two methods, in particular, an extension to Continuous Functional Hazard Assess-
ment (C-FHA), and Performance-based Multi-state Analysis were down-selected and
tailored for use with novel aircraft architectures at the conceptual and preliminary
level of design.
The safety metrics necessary for quantifying off-nominal operational states of the
aircraft formed the first research sub-question (RQ 1.1) which was answered using
a focused literature review. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution for finding
appropriate safety metrics to use for every novel architecture, a set of metrics useful
for the Test Distributed Electric Propulsion aircraft (T-DEP) inspired by the X-57
were identified in table 3.



























by developing suitable conceptual and preliminary 6-DoF models that can simulate
the aircraft’s response to thrust degradation scenarios. Thresholds for these metrics
were set based on certification considerations or engineering judgement. Experiment
1.2 compared the hazard severity requirements obtained using Continuous-FHA (C-
FHA) and performance based multi-state analysis with those obtained from literature
sources resorting to traditional analyses. It demonstrated a clear benefit of utilizing
the proposed methods in terms of improved resolution of hazards. It also provided
results based on physics based models instead of relying on heuristics, while allowing
the designers to update their results once higher fidelity models are available. Some
additional insights regarding the T-DEP architecture include the fact that certain
thrust loss hazards were not due to insufficient thrust after a failure, but due to
insufficient lateral stability provided by the vertical tail.
Finally, the third research sub-question dealt with allocating the requirements gen-
erated at the aircraft level to the components. A network-based bottom-up analysis
algorithm was developed to identify the impact of component failures on the aircraft
level functional availability and failure states. It was assumed that in an aerospace
application, the probability of two components failing at once during a flight is small
enough to be neglected, therefore allowing single failure considerations to drive the
reliability allocation problem. Finally, the Critical Flow Method was demonstrated
to allocate reliability to components of a subsystem that cannot be dealt with using
simple considerations of redundancy. Experiment 1.3 demonstrated that by using the
above mentioned methods, allowable failure rate requirements can be allocated to the
unit level from the system level, thus verifying hypothesis 1.3.
Taken together, the three sub-hypothesis and the techniques used to verify them
were found to satisfy all the requirements posed by research question 1. This verified
the solution proposed by hypothesis 1, and completed the discussion on research area
1.
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7.1.2 Research Area 2: Gaps in the treatment of uncertainty in failure
rates
Chapter 5 dealt with the second research area from research formulation. The sec-
ond research question (RQ 2) was motivated by observations group 2 from Ch. 2.5.
With the characterization and unit level allocation of safety related off-nominal re-
quirements completed in Ch. 3.2, the next logical step was to evaluate the system
level and unit level reliability. To that end goal, the overall intent of RQ 2 was to
provide a better treatment of uncertainty in the reliability estimations of novel air-
craft architectures at the system and component level. RQ 2 was further divided into
three research sub-questions – (i) RQ 2.1 that dealt with component level reliability
assessment; (ii) RQ 2.2 that dealt with component compliance decision making; and
(iii) Multi-state system level reliability assessment.
One hypothesis was stated for each research sub-question above. Hypothesis 2.1
(H-2.1) recommended a Bayesian probability framework for failure rate estimation of
the novel components while providing better treatment of uncertainty. The metrics
used to define ‘better’ in this instance were the 6-levels of treatment of uncertainty
by Paté-Cornell [146]. For experiment 2.1 (E-2.1), a benchmark approach considers
point estimates (mean) for component failure rates. Two Bayesian analysts A, B were
imagined providing two different prior distributions to encode disciplinary knowledge
as epistemic uncertainty. The resulting distributions were found to represent a level
5 treatment of uncertainty, better than the level 3 afforded by the benchmark, thus
verifying H-2.1.
Hypothesis 2.2 (H-2.2) suggested that minimizing the posterior expected loss
would provide an uncertainty-informed compliance decision for the novel aircraft ar-
chitecture components. In verifying H-2.2, experiment 2.2 considered a benchmark
method of compliance testing where the point failure rate estimates generated in E-
2.1 are compared to failure rate requirements generated in Ch. 4.4.4. A Bayesian
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decision framework was developed that computes the posterior expected loss for each
component using a loss function that is defined by a decision maker. Minimizing the
expected loss for the two analysts’ posteriors resulted in slightly different compliance
findings. However, the results not only indicated whether a component was compli-
ant or not but also included the probability weighted cost of taking either decision.
This provides the decision makers with additional information and alternate models,
leading to better uncertainty informed decision making.
By now, component failure rates were computed and compliance decisions were
made for the T-DEP architecture. RQ 2.3, therefore, looked at compliance finding at
the system level in a multi-state context where the system may fail in multiple states.
Hypothesis 2.3 (H-2.3) suggested a Monte-Carlo network reliability algorithm suitably
modified to work with Bayesian posteriors and for multi-state failures as a solution.
For experiment 2.3 (E-2.3), a Monte-Carlo simulation was run to generate one million
working and failed system states using Bayesian component failure probabilities from
E-2.1. The output was then post-processed to identify the failure rates of different
failure states postulated in the C-FHA and asymmetric thrust loss analysis from
Ch. 4.3.5. These results suggested that multiple failures are not as unlikely as first
assumed, resulting in certain failure states not meeting reliability requirements. The
asymmetric thrust loss states’ reliability analysis showed that more failure states that
were categorized as ‘Major’ or ‘Hazardous’ do not meet requirements as compared to
‘Catastrophic’. This means that the less safety critical failures have a tendency to
drive reliability requirements for the T-DEP power systems architecture.
With these results, the proposed hypotheses for the three parts of RQ 2 were
successfully verified, completing the intent of research area 2 from Ch. 3.3
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7.1.3 Research Area 3: Sensitivities and Trade-studies
Chapter 6 dealt with the third research area from the research formulation. The third
research question (RQ 3) was motivated by observations group 3 from chapter 2.5.
This group primarily noted that traditional methods used to conduct safety assess-
ments of novel aircraft concepts limit the scope for exploration and trade studies in
preliminary design stages. It also noted that optimizing for nominal considerations
could worsen performance under off-nominal conditions. Therefore, the goal of RQ 3
was to enable design trade studies for novel aircraft architectures while incorporating
safety related off-nominal considerations. To that end, hypothesis 3 proposed that
the integrated framework (see fig. 78) developed in this thesis serves as an enabler
for conducting trade studies informed by safety related off-nominal requirements and
reliability of novel aircraft architectures in early design.
Chapter 6 then took a two-pronged approach to verify hypothesis 3. For the first
experiment, sensitivities of system multi-state reliability to component failure rate
posteriors was established through unit level importance metrics. In a multi-state
failure scenario, the component importance metrics were re-defined to incorporate
the reliability of the system from a given hazard state. For instance, reliability from
‘Hazardous’ failures was defined as the likelihood of the system ending up in a state
that is less severe than ‘Hazardous’, and so on. These multi-state importance metrics
were evaluated for the ‘Minor’, ‘Major’, ‘Hazardous’, and ‘Catastrophic’ off-nominal
hazard severity scenarios. The batteries were found to have the highest contribution
in terms of criticality index (CI), reliability achievement worth (RAW), and reliabil-
ity reduction worth (RRW) for ‘Catastrophic’ and ‘Hazardous’ failure states. The
traction power buses (TPBs), and cruise motors (CMs) were found to have the next
highest risk reduction worth for ‘Hazardous’ failures, meaning any decrease in their
reliability would affect the system’s reliability from that severity to the greatest ex-





























































motor inverters were the ones that can provide the highest improvement in the sys-
tem reliability if they are improved. For the risk reduction worth, the cruise inverters
and pre-chargers were found to be the most important, hinting at great loss of system
level reliability from ‘Major’ hazards if their component reliability was to decrease.
In the present dissertation, most single component failures result in at least a ‘Minor’
severity. As a result, the Fussell Vesely (FV) measure gave a value of 1 for all com-
ponents for this severity class, while the RRW measure was undefined. The RAW
measure provided important insights nevertheless. The high lift motors, their invert-
ers, and the cruise inverters were found to promise the maximum system reliability
improvement if the reliability of these components were improved.
The second part of this chapter focused on revisiting some aircraft design and ar-
chitecting assumptions in order to improve the system response to off-nominal failure
states. In particular, the asymmetric loss of thrust from experiment 1.2 had demon-
strated that the T-DEP architecture was limited by the lateral control authority of
the vertical tail (VT) in some off-nominal cases, as well as by the thrust available in
some cases. To verify these results and demonstrate the capability of the developed
framework to conduct design trade studies, two experiments were proposed. Exper-
iment 3.2 resized the T-DEP aircraft’s VT to increase the chord and span by 10%
each. The impact of this resizing was considered by modifying the aircraft’s mass
properties and lateral aerodynamic derivatives. Upon evaluating the asymmetric loss
of thrust cases, it was seen that a larger VT results in improvements in the maximum
potential climb gradient metric (MPCG) of about 0.24% during takeoff and 0.64%
during cruise with one CM lost. The improvement in energy rate margin (ERM)
that denotes the percentage of specific excess power after failure that can be utilized
for maximizing the climb gradient was found to be around 5% for takeoff, and 23%
for cruise. The cases which were thrust limited (partial loss of a CM) showed no
improvement in experiment 3.2 as expected.
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The last experiment of this thesis considered the resized VT along with oversized
CM inverters. The new CM inverters allow the CMs to generate 67% thrust under
partial failures which may result from loss of one CM inverter or pre-charger for
instance. Such a modified T-DEP architecture now afforded a larger VT as well
as greater thrust capability under partial CM failures. The results of experiment
3.3 showed significant improvements in takeoff and cruise MPCG under partial loss
of CMs. The takeoff MPCG improved by about 1.6% absolute value, while ERM
improved by about 12-54%. In the cruise condition, MPCG improved by 0.77%,
while ERM went from -1.32 to 0.87! As a result, the T-DEP aircraft could now
maintain a positive climb gradient under any combination of partial loss of a cruise
motor and HLP failures on the same side during takeoff, removing any ‘Catastrophic’
conditions from these failure states. The resultant change in reliability requirements
meant that a failure state with partial loss of thrust in one CM, with 2 HLPs on the
same side lost was deemed compliant, as compared to non-compliant earlier.
Overall, experiments 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrated two design and architecting trade
studies using the T-DEP aircraft that were enabled by the framework developed in
this thesis. The framework clearly enables trade studies like these to be conducted
for novel aircraft architectures while incorporating safety related off-nominal require-
ments in early design phases. Along with the importance measures of experiment 3.1,
these three experiments help verify hypothesis 3.
7.2 Contributions
The first significant contribution of this thesis is a performance-based framework to
identify, characterize, and allocate safety related off-nominal requirements for novel
aircraft architectures at the system and component level during conceptual and pre-
liminary design. Towards that end, Continuous-FHA (that considers the magnitude
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of functional degradation) is extended to consider the number of terminal, function-
satisfying components lost in a failure mode. This extended C-FHA is developed for
conceptual level analysis and demonstrated on a test distributed electric propulsion
(T-DEP) aircraft inspired from the X-57. When additional design information is avail-
able, a preliminary 6 degrees of freedom (6-DoF) model is utilized in a performance-
based multi-state analysis framework to evaluate the aircraft’s response in different
failure states. Combining the results of these conceptual and 6-DoF analyses with
certification requirements or engineering judgement allows the characterization of
hazard severity at the aircraft system level. Additionally, a network-based bottom
up algorithm was demonstrated along with the Critical Flow Method to allocate reli-
ability requirements at the component level. Publications in this research area focus
on the identification of certification and off-nominal requirements. The prior includes
a model-based framework to automatically extract relevant certification requirements
for novel aircraft as well as any potential gaps in their applicability due to technology
mismatch. The latter includes initial aspects of C-FHA and multi-state performance-
based analysis framework to identify safety-related off-nominal requirements.
Publication: A Model-Based Aircraft Certification Framework for Normal Category
Airplanes, AIAA Aviation 2020 (Published) [35]
Publication: Evaluation of Off-Nominal Performance and Reliability of a Distributed
Electric Propulsion Aircraft during Early Design, AIAA SciTech 2021 (Published) [34]
→ AIAA Journal of Aircraft (Under Review)
The second significant contribution of this thesis is in providing a more compre-
hensive treatment of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainty in reliability and com-
pliance finding. This is achieved using the meager reliability data available for novel
concepts in a Bayesian probability and decision framework. The Bayesian framework
allows subject matter expert opinion to be encoded in the failure rate models through
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prior distributions that capture epistemic uncertainty. This framework also enables
the evaluation and propagation of alternative models generated by different subject
matter experts to decision makers, leading to a more comprehensive treatment of
uncertainty as compared to utilizing traditional measures of central tendency (point
estimates). A Bayesian decision framework utilizes the expected loss principle to
minimize the posterior expected loss for any component while making a compliance
decision. Such a method makes full use of the uncertainty encoded in Bayesian fail-
ure rate posteriors to provide a loss value for different compliance actions to decision
makers, who can then make an informed choice. Finally, this thesis contributes a
modified Monte-Carlo algorithm to estimate multi-state reliability of complex sys-
tems while utilizing the Bayesian failure rate posteriors previously generated. Initial
aspects of this framework were presented at AIAA Aviation 2019 Forum.
Publication: A Bayesian Safety Assessment Methodology for Novel Aircraft Architec-
tures and Technologies Using Continuous FHA, AIAA Aviation 2019 (Published) [30]
The third significant contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate the integrated
framework’s capability in informing sensitivity and trade studies in early design phases
for novel aircraft architectures and technologies. This contribution can be divided into
two parts.
The first part is the development and implementation of multi-state component im-
portance metrics pertaining to different hazard severity categories. The aircraft sys-
tem reliability in this instance was re-defined as reliability from a particular severity.
So reliability from ‘Hazardous’ severity includes the probability that the aircraft is
in a nominal or failed state that is less severe than ‘Hazardous’. This may include
‘Minor’ or ‘Major’ failures, but not ‘Catastrophic’. In such a scenario, table 42 gives
the list of multi-state component importance measures developed and implemented
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in this thesis. These measures help identify which components have the highest im-
pact on improving or decreasing the aircraft system reliability, as well as the general
sensitivity of the system reliability to the component reliability.
Table 42: Multi-state Component Importance Measures
Symbol Measure Name
MIBBi Multi-state Birnbaum Importance
MICIi Multi-state Criticality Importance
MIRAWi Multi-state Reliability Achievement Worth
MIF Vi Multi-state Fussell-Vesely
MIRRWi Multi-state Reliability Reduction Worth
The second part is the demonstration of how conceptual and preliminary design trade
studies can be informed with safety related off-nominal requirements for novel aircraft
architectures using the developed framework. To this end, the two final experiments
looked at resizing the vertical tail and oversizing the cruise motor-inverters of the
T-DEP aircraft to improve its performance in asymmetric loss of thrust scenarios.
Plans for converting this contribution of the present thesis into archival papers are in
the works at the time of writing this dissertation. While not directly related to the
present work, the author’s Ph.D. journey has resulted in numerous other published
works that have contributed to his growth as a researcher and are acknowledged here 1
[31–33,38].
Providing a systematic, performance-based framework that enhances the safety
1Other Publications:
1. Rapid Assessment of Power Requirements and Optimization of Thermal Ice Protection Sys-
tems, AIAA Aviation 2018 (Published)
2. A Model-Based System Engineering Approach to Normal Category Airplane Airworthiness
Certification, AIAA Aviation 2019 (Published)
3. Evaluating Optimal Paths for Aircraft Subsystem Electrification in Early Design, AIAA Avi-
ation 2019 (Published)
4. Optimal Paths for Progressive Aircraft Subsystem Electrification in Early Design, AIAA
Journal of Aircraft (Under Review)
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assessment of novel aircraft architectures, and informs the conceptual and preliminary
stage design trade studies with safety-related off-nominal requirements is the defining
contribution of this thesis. It supports the main research objective of the present
work with an example demonstration on a test distributed electric propulsion (T-
DEP) aircraft inspired by NASA’s X-57. The developed framework is expected to
support the ability to more quickly explore the architectural and design space for
novel aircraft architectures and technologies while bringing safety-related off-nominal
considerations into early design.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Work
The work presented in this thesis has multiple avenues for future research oppor-
tunities. These fall into two main categories. The first pertains to addressing the
limitations and extending the tools and methods proposed in this thesis. The sec-
ond pertains to extending the present work to tackle different problems and provide
additional capabilities.
In the first category, the present work is limited by the assumptions made and
models utilized to demonstrate the developed framework on a test distributed electric
propulsion (T-DEP) architecture. The C-FHA analysis can consider numerous other
off-nominal scenarios with different safety metrics, apart from the ones considered
presently. For instance, an available range or glide distance under a loss of thrust
during cruise, or landing performance during the final approach are some other scenar-
ios that could be considered for a more thorough analysis. For the performance-based
multi-state analysis, the 6-DoF model developed for the T-DEP aircraft considered
trim analysis to evaluate the performance of a failure state for this thesis. A model
that can simulate the aircraft’s dynamic response under failures will provide a more
complete perspective into the aircraft’s capabilities under off-nominal conditions. Ad-
ditionally, such a model can be combined with the provided framework to evaluate
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certain certification requirements, leading to a certification driven design capability.
Such a capability will enable the incorporation of certification requirements into early
design, providing a level of confidence that a designed airplane will meet its regula-
tory requirements before a first prototype is even built. This could be lucrative for
original equipment manufacturers due to the large potential cost savings. Many novel
aircraft concepts are likely to incorporate some level of autonomy in their design and
operations. Therefore, having a capability that can simulate the aircraft’s dynamic
response to off-nominal conditions while considering aspects of reconfigurability and
adaptive control will enable a more thorough examination of run-time assurance as
against design time assurance. Data like flight paths and states generated from such
simulation exercises can open avenues of incorporating machine learning techniques
into identification and classification of off-nominal scenarios. Another avenue of model
extension can look at defining the expected loss function used in the Bayesian compli-
ance finding stage using cost models found in literature. These cost models can then
enable trade-offs regarding the cost of improving the reliability of a given component
versus the cost of selecting another component versus the cost of adding redundancy
to inform architecting considerations earlier in the design phases. This forms the first
category of future work that could be explored by interested researchers.
The second category has numerous possibilities of extending the present work, a
few of which are discussed here. One of the most obvious avenues for future work
could entail applying the developed safety framework on different categories of novel
architectures. For instance, the present work utilized the T-DEP architecture as
a test case to demonstrate the different techniques and methods for the different
research questions. However, numerous novel concepts are being developed concur-
rently, which include diverse architectures that enable vertical take-off and landing –
composite rotorcraft, tiltrotors, turbo-electric, blended wing concepts, etc. to name a
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few. These span different airworthiness categories as well as different operational cer-
tification categories. The largest diversity in novel architectures is likely to be found
in the unmanned aerial systems (UAS) concepts for delivering cargo, or for other
applications. While the developed framework is intended to be generalizable to such
novel architectures, its implementation is likely to face challenges. Demonstrating this
framework on a variety of such concepts would entail defining suitable safety metrics
for them (as was noted under RQ 1.1, there is no one-size-fits-all solution), and gen-
erating appropriate conceptual and dynamic models to evaluate their performance
under functional degradation scenarios as well as in multi-state failure scenarios.
While this dissertation provides certain guidelines, down-selecting these metrics for
different architectures of interest, creating models to estimate them, and extracting
safety criticality of different off-nominal scenarios will need more work. Depending on
the components utilized in these diverse concepts, their Bayesian posteriors will have
to be determined by gathering SME opinion and relevant data. Another potential
challenge in implementing this framework on diverse novel architectures that is left
for the future includes identifying suitable certification basis to inform thresholds of
safety-metrics as well as postulating multi-state failures for them. A detailed analysis
for different such concepts while considering off-nominal requirements could be the
second avenue of future research for the presented work.
Finally, while this thesis demonstrated how the developed framework can be used
to inform trade studies in the early preliminary design stage, tying back the loop
to utilize that information in order to resize or re-architect the aircraft concept was
considered beyond the scope of the present work. Future work can focus on tying back
the requirements generated from this framework to iteratively constrain the design
and architectural space, with a goal of enabling reliability-based design optimization




PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE MATRIX OF
ALTERNATIVES
Matrix of alternatives for commercial aircraft architecting solutions from literature [101].
Table 43: Commercial aircraft architecting alternatives (Adapted from Ref. [101])
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Function 1: Lifting Payload
Configuration Monoplane Biplane Box Wing Tandem
Wing shape Rectangular Tapered Delta Swept
LE devices LE flap Slat Kruger flap Leading-edge slot
TE devices None Plain Flap Kruger flap Slotted flap
Function 2: Storing Payload
Number of fuselages BWB 1 2 3
Shape Cylindrical Airfoil Shaped Box shaped
Function 3: Accelerating Payload
Engine Type Piston-prop Electric Turbo-prop Turbo-fan
Number of engines 1 2 3 4
Engine location Inside VT Fuselage-mounted Under wing Above wing
Function 4: Maintaining pitch stability, control, and trim
Configuration HT V-shaped tail Tailless
Horizontal location Aft of wing Canard Three surface
Function 5: Maintaining yaw stability, control, and trim
Configuration VT V-tail 2 surfaces




The Dynamic Environment for Loads Prediction and Handling Investigation (DEL-
PHI) [63, 78, 160, 161] framework developed at the Aerospace Systems Design Lab is
the 6-DoF flight dynamics environment used in this thesis. DELPHI is developed as
an object-oriented python code that can accept any aircraft model, any desired ma-
neuver, and simulate the flight dynamics. In this thesis, it is combined along with a
trim analysis algorithm by Marco et al. [120] that utilizes a minimization technique to
determine a trim solution for any input combination of aircraft state, control deflec-
tions, environmental conditions, and propulsive state. A high-level view of DELPHI
is shown in Fig. 79.
Maneuver Maneuver command
Time marching
ti , i = 0, ... , tf
~x at ti
~u at ti − ∆t
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Controller ~u at ti
~x ,~u time history Vehicle ~x ~x ,~u ~x ,~u ~x
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~x at ti + ∆t Integration
Figure 79: DELPHI framework (Credit: Refs. [34, 161])
Within DELPHI, a desired maneuver can be specified in the Maneuver block. The
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Controller block compares the desired maneuver to the current state of the aircraft and
produces a control vector u⃗ which specifies all control surface deflection and throttle
settings on the vehicle. The Vehicle block contains within it the mass properties,
aerodynamics, and propulsion. This is where the test distributed electric propulsion
architecture (T-DEP) inspired by the X-57 is implemented. Given the current state
vector, x⃗, and control vector u⃗, the vehicle block computes the loads due to gravity,
aerodynamics, and propulsion. The net loads, F⃗&M⃗ , are sent to the Equations of
Motion block which computes the time derivative of the state vector, ⃗̇x. ⃗̇x is integrated
forward in time using an appropriate time-integration scheme to obtain the state
vector at the next time step, x⃗ at ti + ∆t. The entire loop is time-marched till the
final time tf is reached.
The Vehicle block is implemented such as to allow the user to provide an arbitrary
number of aircraft control surfaces and propulsion devices. Flexibility is offered to
allow the data for propulsion and aerodynamics to come on any source- be it simple
look-up tables, or function calls to an analysis code. This makes the job of imple-
menting the T-DEP architecture easier. Every high lift propulsor and wingtip cruise
motor is treated as an independent object generating thrust along its own axis at its
own position, all of which are later translated into vehicle level forces and moments.
The equations of motion are cast about a fixed reference point O rather than the
CG. This enables, for instance, the dynamics of a moving CG (e.g., due to decreasing
fuel mass or fuel transfer) to be modeled. The force and moment equations in vector
form are given below:
F⃗total = m
( ˙⃗
V0 + ω⃗ × V⃗0 + ¨⃗rg + ˙⃗ω × r⃗g + 2 ω⃗ × ˙⃗rg + ω⃗ × (ω⃗ × r⃗g)
)
, (147)
M⃗total = ¯̄I ˙⃗ω + ω⃗ × ¯̄Iω +m r⃗g ×
( ˙⃗
V0 + ω⃗ × V⃗0
)
, (148)
where r⃗g is the position vector from ‘O’ to the center of gravity (CG) of the aircraft,
V⃗0 = {u, v, w}T the velocity of the reference point ‘O’, ω⃗ = {p, q, r}T the angular
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velocity of the aircraft, and ¯̄I the mass moment of inertia matrix of the aircraft
about ‘O’. The more specific case where the reference point ‘O’ coincides with the
CG can be obtained by setting r⃗g = 0 in the above. Kinematic relationships are
used to obtain the derivatives of the Euler angles ϕ, θ, and ψ from the angular
rates p, q, and r, and also derivatives of the position x0, y0, and z0 of the reference
point ‘O’ from the velocities u, v, and w. The resulting system of 12 nonlinear
ordinary differential equations (in u, v, w, p, q, r, ϕ, θ, ψ, x0, y0, z0) for six degrees-of-
freedom rigid body motion is numerically integrated to obtain the motion history of
the aircraft during the maneuver.
The DELPHI environment has been validated by simulating 14 CFR Part 25- Sub-
part C specified maneuvers: the checked-pitch maneuver, the rudder-kick maneuver,
and the rolling maneuver for a representative business jet aircraft in Refs. [78, 160].
B.1 Mass Properties
Components such as the motors, battery, landing gear from table 11 are treated as
point masses distributed at their respective locations with respect to the center of
gravity of the aircraft. A simple parallel axis theorem is then used to compute their
contributions to the aircraft moments of inertia as,
Ixx = m((y − yCG)2 + (z − zCG)2) (149)
Iyy = m((x− xCG)2 + (z − zCG)2) (150)
Izz = m((y − yCG)2 + (x− xCG)2) (151)
Ixy = m((x− xCG)(y − yCG)) (152)
Ixz = m((x− xCG)(z − zCG)) (153)
Izy = m((z − zCG)(y − yCG)) (154)
For lifting surfaces and the fuselage, the moments of inertia calculations given by
Ref. [110] are used. For a lifting surface with weight W , semi-span b (or span for
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conventional vertical tail), root and tip thicknesses tr, tt, root chord c, leading and


































































Izz = Ixx + Iyy (158)
The T-DEP fuselage is assumed to be a simple cylinder with radius Rf and length
lf and mass mf for the purpose of computing the moments of inertial. The formulae
from Ref. [110] simplify to yield,
Ixx = mf R2f (159)














Ixz = mf Rf lf (162)
These are then translated to the CG using parallel axis theorem. The component
contributions to the aircraft moments of inertia are then added to get the results
given in table 12.
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B.2 Aerodynamics
The longitudinal aerodynamic model for the T-DEP aircraft is based on regressions
that provide aerodynamic coefficients in the wind frame. These regressions are ob-
tained by fitting linear polynomial equations through the digitized data for the X-57
available in Deere et al. [55]. A component build-up approach is used where the
aerodynamic coefficients of the entire aircraft are found by adding contributions of
each component - wings, nacelles, pylons, stabilator, fuselage, and vertical tail. The
aerodynamic coefficients are given as a function of the following:
• States
– Angle of attack: α
– Sideslip angle: β
– Angular rates: p, q, r
• Controls
– Stabilator incidence angle: δs
– Trim-tab deflection angle: δtt
– Flap deflection angle: δf
– Aileron deflection angle: δa
– Rudder deflection angle: δr
– High lift propeller blowing (boolean)
The lift coefficient is found as:
CL(α, δs, δtt, δf ) =CLblower
# of HLP ON
12
+ CLwing + tip-nacelle + CLflap+





Note that the lift coefficient is assumed to not be affected by the sideslip angle. The
drag coefficient is similarly found as:
CD(α, δs, δtt, δf ) =CDblower
# of HLP ON
12
+ CDwing + tip-nacelle + CDflap+




The moment coefficient is found as:
Cm(α, δs, δtt, δf ) =Cmblower
# of HLP ON
12
+ Cmwing + tip-nacelle + Cmflap+




Deere et al. [55] provide the longitudinal aerodynamic data for the X-57 in terms
of different configurations. Of these, a subset are useful in determining the component
buildup of longitudinal aerodynamic coefficients. This subset is given in table 44.








2 x x 0
8 x x 0 -1,0
11 x x x 0 -1,0
12 x x x 0 -1,0
The high lift propulsor contributions can be obtained by subtracting C11 without
high lift blowing from C11 with high lift blowing and are given by Eq. 166 suitably
applied to the parameter of interest.
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Cblower = C11-blow − C11-noblow (166)
CL11-blow = 0.1153 α + 2.6807 (167)
CL11-noblow = 0.075 α + 1.7047 (168)
CD11-blow = 0.0461 C2L11-blow − 0.1294 CL11-blow + 0.2942 (169)
CD11-noblow = 0.0579 C2L11-noblow − 0.1283 CL11-noblow + 0.1661 (170)
CD11-noblow = 0.075 α + 1.7047 (171)
Cm11-blow = 0.0064 α− 0.7585 (172)
Cm11-noblow = 0.0062 α− 0.407 (173)
(174)
The wing + tip nacelle contributions can be obtained directly from configuration
1 (C1) and are given by Eq. 175 suitably applied to the parameter of interest.
Cwing+tip−nacelle = C1 (175)
CL1 = 0.0633 α + 0.8055 (176)
CD1 = 0.1033 C2L1 − 0.1302 CL1 + 0.0584 (177)
Cm1 = 0.053 C2L1 − 0.0604 CL1 − 0.1675 (178)
The flap contributions can be obtained by subtracting C8 from C11 without high
lift blowing and are given by Eq. 179 suitably applied to the parameter of interest.
Cflap = C11-noblow − C8 (179)
CL8 = 0.0674 α + 0.6946 (180)
CD8 = 0.0754 C2L8 − 0.0687 CL8 + 0.0419 (181)
Cm8 = 0.0467 C2L8 − 0.0452 CL8 − 0.1754 (182)
The high lift nozzle (HLN) contributions can be obtained by subtracting C1 from
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C2 and are given by Eq. 183 suitably applied to the parameter of interest.
Cflap = C2 − C1 (183)
CL2 = 0.0721 α + 0.6633 (184)
CD2 = 0.1059 C2L2 − 0.1049 CL2 + 0.0491 (185)
Cm2 = 0.0665 C2L2 − 0.085 CL2 − 0.1411 (186)
The fuselage + vertical tail (VT) contributions can be obtained by subtracting
C8 from C12 and are given by Eq. 187 suitably applied to the parameter of interest.
Cfuse−V tail = C12 − C8 (187)
CL12 = 0.082 α + 0.7155 (188)
CD12 = 0.0514 C2L12 − 0.029 CL12 + 0.04 (189)
Cm12 = 0.0811 C2L12 + 0.4284 CL12 − 0.5138 (190)
Finally, the stabilator contributions are obtained by computing the effective angle
of attack on the stabilator. The coefficients are given by,
CLstab = 0.065558 αstab + 0.02 δtrimtab (191)
CDstab = 0.0871 C2Lstab + 0.0005 CLstab + 0.0086 (192)
Cmstab = 0.028 CLstab − 0.0056 δtrimtab (193)
where the stabilator angle of attack depends on the aircraft angle of attack, wing
incidence (iwing = 2◦), stabilator incidence (δs), and the downwash induced (ϵstab).
αstab = α + iwing + δs − ϵstab (194)
The downwash angle is computed using regressions provided by Deere et al. [55],











Table 45: Coefficients for computing downwash angle [55]
Config m b offset
8 0.65 0.33 0.0
11-noblow 1.0 0.0 -1.6
11-blow 1.0 0.0 -2.7
12 1.5 -0.76 0.0
where, parameters m, b, offset are given in table 45.
These component contributions are combined using equations 163, 164, 165 to get
the aircraft level longitudinal aerodynamic coefficients. These are used to evaluate





Table 46: Battery failure data
# of failures Operating time (hrs) Mean (hr−1) Source Pooling










0 4.1× 105 [2]
0 96,426 [2]
0 2.0× 105 [2]
9.3 1.0× 106 [53]
Likelihood2 104,000 [134]
8 2.6735× 105 [117]
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C.2 Electric Motor
Table 47: Electric Motor failure data









6 1.332× 106 [5]
89 9,463,428 [7]
62 1.0465× 107 [7]
97 10,194,888 [7]




0.723887× 10−6 [117] Likelihood
0.39586× 10−6 [117] Likelihood
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C.3 Electric Motor Inverter
Table 48: Motor Inverter failure data









2 3.85× 104 [2]
3.0× 10−6 [2]
1.0× 10−6 [2]
9 3.37× 105 [2]
2 1.729× 105 [2]
3 3.04× 105 [2]





C.4 Traction Power Bus
Table 49: Traction Power Bus failure data
# of failures Operating time (hrs) Mean (hr−1) Source Pooling











0 3.4× 104 [2]
0 4.1× 105 [2]
0 2.89× 105 [2]
0 5.4× 105 [2]
0 9.5× 105 [2]
0 1.4× 106 [2]
0 2.17× 106 [2]
0 26,467 [117] Likelihood
0 1.3368× 106 [117] Likelihood
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C.5 Pre-Charger
Table 50: Switch failure data
# of failures Operating time (hrs) Mean (hr−1) Source Pooling




0 52,934 [117] Likelihood
0 5754 [117] Likelihood
Table 51: Resistor failure data
# of failures Operating time (hrs) Mean (hr−1) Source Pooling








Component importance metrics results for Analyst A are included here.
(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 80: Multi-state importance metrics for Catastrophic failure conditions (An-
alyst A)
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(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 81: Multi-state importance metrics for Hazardous failure conditions (Analyst
A)
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(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 82: Multi-state importance metrics for Major failure conditions (Analyst A)
278
(a) MICIi (b) MIRAWi
(c) MIF Vi (d) MIRRWi
Figure 83: Multi-state importance metrics for Minor failure conditions (Analyst A)
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